public belief; it was simply the right of reasoning claimed for reason."

We have already seen how utterly devoid of truth is this assertion of the publicist. The very attack upon au

And yet, if these innovators had entered into the contest chiefly for the purpose of contending against authority in matters of faith, M. Guizot would have had some reason to notice their proceedings as constitut-thority was itself a radical change in ing a new era; but, strange to say, opinions, and a revolution in received their propositions do not appear to doctrines; for the authority of the have been drawn up with a view to Church was in itself a dogma, and advocate the independence of thought, formed the basis of all religious benor against authority in matters of lief, as experience has satisfactorily faith; it was not for such an attempt, shown, since the appearance of Probut for other errors, that the Church testantism at the commencement of condemned them. Where, then, are the sixteenth century. But let us althe accuracy and historical truth which low the historian to proceed: "The we should expect from such a man as disciples of Abelard, as he himself M. Guizot? How could he venture, tells us in his Introduction to Theology, in addressing a numerous audience, required of him philosophical arguthus to substitute his own thoughts ments, and such as would satisfy reafor facts? The fact is, he well knew son, requesting him to teach them not that these were matters generally merely to repeat his instructions, but treated very superficially; that to to understand them also; for no one gain the sympathy of superficial men can believe what he does not underit would suffice to speak in pompous stand, and it is ridiculous to preach to terms of the liberty of thought, to others things that neither the teacher pronounce certain names probably nor his pupils understand. heard by many for the first time, What object can the study of philosuch as Erigena and Roscelin, and sophy have but that of leading the especially to mention the unfortunate mind to the contemplation of God, to lover of Heloïse. whom all things are to be referred? Why are the faithful allowed to read works treating of worldly affairs and the books of the Gentiles, except to prepare them to understand the sacred Scriptures, and to furnish them with the skill necessary for their defence?

M. Guizot, unable to conceal from himself that his observations upon this period were somewhat feeble, tries to apply a remedy by inserting a passage from the Introduction to the Theology of Abelard, which, in my opinion, is very far from answering the purpose of the publicist. His object, in fact, is to show that from that very period a vigorous spirit of resistance to the authority of the Church in matters of faith had sprung up, and that the human mind was even then longing to burst asunder the fetters in which it had been held. He would have us believe that Abelard, yielding to the importunities of his own disciples, had the courage to throw off the yoke of authority; and that his writings were, to a certain extent, the expression of a necessity long felt, of an idea with which many minds had long been agitated. The following is the passage referred to: "If we seek the dominant feature of this movement, we shall find that it was not a change of opinion, a revolt against the system of

For this purpose alone we should avail ourselves of all our reasoning powers, lest, on questions_so difficult and complicated as those that form the object of Christian faith, the subtilty of our opponents should too readily injure the purity of our faith."

It cannot be denied, that in Abelard's time a lively curiosity aroused men's minds to employ all their powers to be able to give a reason for what they believed; but it is not true that the Church threw any obstacle in the way of this movement, considering it as a scientific method, and so long as it did not overstep legitimate bounds, and attack or undermine the articles of faith. It is impossible to take a more unfavourable view of the Church than M. Guizot has here taken of her; nor could any one more com

pletely overlook, I will even say distort, facts.

pares it with the sacred deposit of truth confided to her; if the doctrine is not inconsistent with Divine truth, she allows it free circulation; for she is not ignorant that God has given up the world to the controversies of men; but if it is opposed to the faith, its

"The importance of this first attempt at liberty," says he, "of this revival of the spirit of inquiry, was soon felt. The Church, though engaged in effecting her own reform, took the alarm nevertheless, and at condemnation is irremissible, without once declared war against the new reformers, whose methods menaced her with more evils than their doctrines."

concern or regret. Were the Church to act otherwise, she would contradict herself, and cease to be what she is, the jealous depository of Divine truth. Thus is the Church represented as If she allowed her infallible authority conspiring against the progress of to be questioned, that moment she thought, repressing with a strong arm would forget one of her most sacred the first attempts of the mind to ad- obligations, and would lose all claim vance in the path of science, and lay- on our belief; for, in betraying an ining aside questions of doctrine to con- difference for truth, she would prove tend against methods; and all this, we herself to be no longer a religion deare told, as if it were something new scended from heaven, but a mere deand wonderful. 66 For," says M. Gui-lusion. zot, "this was the great event which occurred at the end of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth centuries, at a time when the Church was under theocratic and monastic influence. It was now that, for the first time, a serious struggle commenced between the clergy and the freethinkers. The quarrels of Abelard and St. Bernard, the Councils of Soissons and Sens, in which Abelard was condemned, merely give expression to this event, which has occupied so large a space in the history of modern civilisation."

Still the same confusion of ideas. I have said already, and must repeat here, that the Church has condemned no method; it was not a method, but error, that the Church condemned, unless by a method be meant an assault upon the articles of faith, under pretence of breaking the fetters of authority, which is not merely a method, but an error of the very highest import. In rejecting a pernicious doctrine, subversive of all faith, and denying the infallibility of the See of St. Peter in matters of doctrine, the Church did not put forth any new pretensions; her conduct has always been the same ever since the time of the Apostles, and is the same still. The moment a doctrine is propagated that appears in the least degree dangerous, the Church examines it, com

Precisely at the time of which M. Guizot speaks, we observe a fact which proves that the Church allows free scope to the exercise of thought. The high reputation which St. Anselm sustained during his whole career, and the great esteem in which he was held by the Sovereign Pontiffs of his time, are well known; yet St. Anselm philosophised with great freedom. In the introduction to his Monologue, he tells us that some persons entreated him to explain things by reason alone, without the aid of the sacred Scriptures. The Saint was not afraid to comply with their request, and he accordingly wrote the little work we have just named. In other parts of his works, too, St. Anselm adopts the same method. Very few persons concern themselves now-a-days about ancient writers, and doubtless very few have read the works of the holy doctor of whom we are speaking. They display, however, such perspicuity of thought, such solid reasoning, and above all, such a discreet and temperate judgment, that we are surprised to find the human mind, at the very commencement of the intellectual movement, attaining to so high an elevation. In him we find the greatest freedom of thought combined with the respect due to the authority of the Church; and far from impairing the vigour of his ideas, this respect aug

ments their force and perspicuity. | sarily so: for all the faculties of man From his works we learn that Abelard receive their development according was not the only one who taught, not to the circumstances that surround merely to repeat his lectures, but also to understand them; for St. Anselm, some years previous, followed the same method with a clearness and solidity far beyond what could be expected at that time. We there discover, also, that in the bosom of the Catholic Church men carried the operations of reason to the greatest possible extent, though always within the bounds prescribed by its own weakness, and with reverential regard to the sacred veil that shrouds august mysteries.

him; and as his health, his temperament, his strength, his colour even, and his stature depend upon climate, food, mode of life, and other circumstances affecting him, so in like manner his moral and intellectual faculties bear the stamp of the principles which predominate in the family and society of which he forms a constituent part. Now, in Europe, religion was the predominating element; in every thing religion made herself heard and felt; nowhere was there a principle of life or action discoverable unconnected with religion. It was quite natural, therefore, that in Europe all the faculties of man should have their development in a religious sense. A little attention will show us that this was the case not with the intellect only, but likewise with the heart, with the passions even, and with the whole moral man; just as, in whatever direction we go in Europe, we meet at every step with some monument of

The works of St. Anselm prove that Abelard was not exactly the man to teach the world that the end of philosophical studies is to lead the mind to the contemplation of God, to whom all things should be referred; and that we should avail ourselves of all our reasoning powers, lest on questions so difficult and complicated as those that form the object of Christian faith, the subtilties of our opponents should too readily injure the purity of our faith. But from the Saint's profound sub-religion; so whatever faculty we examission to the authority of the Church, from the candour and ingenuousness with which he acknowledges the limits of the human mind, we see that he was persuaded that it is not impossible to believe what we do not comprehend; and, in fact, there is a wide difference be-progressed towards a state of perfectween the conviction that a thing exists, and a clear knowledge of the nature of the thing in the existence of which we believe.

CHAPTER LXXI.

RELIGION AND THE HUMAN MIND IN
EUROPE.

mine in the individual European, we find upon it the impress of religion.

And the case was the same with families and society as with individuals; religion was equally predominant in both. Wherever man has

tion, we observe a similar phenomenon; and it is an invariable fact in the history of the human race, that no society ever entered on the road to civilisation, save under the direction and impulse of religious principles. True or false, rational or absurd, wherever man is on the road to improvement, these principles are found. Some nations, indeed, may well excite our pity at the monstrous As we have undertaken to examine superstitions into which they have what was, in the eleventh and twelfth fallen; but we still must acknowledge centuries, the conduct of the Church that, under these very superstitions, in reference to innovators, we will lay concealed germs of good that did avail ourselves of the excellent oppor- not fail to produce considerable betunity afforded by this epoch for no-nefits. The Egyptians, Phoenicians, ticing the progress of the human mind. Greeks, and Romans, were all exIt has been said that in Europe intel-tremely superstitious; yet the prolectual development was exclusively gress they made in civilisation and intheological. This is true, and neces- tellectual culture was such, that their

What is the reason of so striking a

monuments and memorials strike us mixture of a young with a decrepit even yet with admiration. It is easy society, of rude and ferocious nations to smile at an extravagant observance with others that were civilised, cultior a senseless dogma; but we should vated, or rather effeminate. Hence, remember that the growth and pre- amongst the ancients the imagination servation of certain moral principles was developed before the intellect, cannot be otherwise secured than un- whilst amongst Europeans the intelder the protecting shade of religious lect came before the imagination. belief. Now, these principles are most With the former, poetry came first; indispensably necessary to prevent with the latter, what is termed dialecindividuals from being monstrously ties and metaphysics. changed, and to maintain the social and family ties unbroken. Much has difference? When a people are yet been said against the immorality tole- in their infancy, either an infancy rated, permitted, and sometimes even properly so called, or having lived taught by certain forms of religion; long in ignorance, in a state similar and certainly nothing is more lament- to that of an infant people, we find able than to behold man thus led them rich in sensations, but very poor astray by that which ought to be his in ideas. Nature, with her majesty, best guide. Let us, however, look her wonders, and her mysteries, affor a reality beneath these shadows, fects such a people the most; their which appear at first so gloomy, and we shall soon discover some rays of light that may lead us to regard false religions, not indeed with indulgence, but with less horror than those infamous systems which make matter non-existent, and pleasure the only divinity.

To preserve the idea of moral good and evil, an idea without meaning except on the supposition that there exists a Divine power,-is itself an inestimable advantage. Now this advantage adheres inseparably to every form of religion, even to those that make the most monstrous and most criminal applications of the idea of good and evil. Doubtless the people of antiquity, and those of our own time who have not received the light of Christianity, have gone most deplorably astray; but, in the midst of their very wanderings, there always remains a certain degree of light; and this light, however dimly it shines, however faint and feeble its rays, is incomparably better than the thick darkness of atheism. Between the nations of antiquity and those of Europe there is this very remarkable difference, that the former passed from a state of infancy to a state of civilisation; while the latter, from that undefinable state which, in Europe, was the result of the invasion of the barbarians, of the confused

language is grand, picturesque, and highly poetical; their passions are not refined, but, on the other hand, they are very energetic and violent. Now an intellect that ingenuously seeks the light, loves truth in its purity and simplicity, confesses and embraces it readily, neither lending itself to subtilties, artifices, nor disputes. The least thing that makes a vivid impression upon the senses or the imagination of such a people fills them with surprise and wonder; you cannot inspire them with enthusiasm without setting before them something heroic and sublime.

On the first glance at the state of the people of Europe in the middle ages, we perceive in them a certain resemblance to an infant people, but, at the same time, a very striking difference on several points. Their passions are very strong, they are pleased beyond every thing with the wonderful and the extraordinary, and, for want of realities, their imagination conjures up gigantic phantoms. The profession of arms is their favourite occupation; they rush eagerly into the most perilous adventures, and meet them with incredible courage. All this indicates a development of the feelings of sensibility and imagination, inasmuch as they produce intrepidity and valour; but, strange to say, together with these. dispositions,

chief distinctive mark between them and the people of Europe at the period we are speaking of. In fact, ideas at that time abounded in Europe; and hence the purely intellectual was held in such repute even amidst the most profound ignorance. Hence, also, the intellect strove to shine even before its time appeared to have arrived. Sound ideas respecting God, respecting man and society, were already every where disseminated, thanks to the incessant teaching of Christianity; and as there still remained numerous traces of the wis

Pagan, the consequence was, that every man possessed of a little learning had, in fact, a great fund of ideas.

we find a singular taste for things | phical era. From this it follows, that the most purely intellectual; with the nations in their infancy think little, most lively, ardent, and picturesque as they want ideas; and this is the reality, we find associated a taste for the coldest and barest abstractions. A knight, with the cross on his shoulder, gorgeously clad, covered with trophies, beaming with glory won in a hundred combats; a subtle dialectician, disputing on the system of the Nominalists, and urging his skilfullydevised abstractions till he becomes unintelligible; -1 these are certainly two characters very dissimilar, and yet they exist together in the same society; both have their prestige, receive the greatest homage, and are followed by enthusiastic admirers. Even when we have taken into ac-dom of antiquity, both Christian and count the singular position of the European nations at that period, it is not easy to assign a cause for this anomaly. We can easily understand how the people of Europe, emerging, for the most part, from the forests of the North, and engaged for a long time either in intestine wars or in conflicts with vanquished tribes, should have preserved, together with their warlike habits, a strong and lively imagination and violent passions; but it is not so easy to account for their taste for an order of ideas purely metaphysical and dialectical. When, however, we come to look deeply into the matter, we discover that this apparent anomaly had its origin in the very nature of things. How is it that a people in their infancy have so much imagination and sensibility? Because the objects by which these faculties are naturally excited abound around them; because individuals, being continually exposed to the influence of external things, these objects operate upon them more forcibly. Man first feels and imagines; later he understands and reflects: this is the natural order in which his faculties begin to operate. Hence, with every people the development of the imagination and of the passions precedes that of the intellect; the passions and the imagination finding their object and aliment before the intellect. This accounts, also, for the fact that the poetical always precedes the philoso

It is clear, however, that these advantages, great though they were, could not save men's minds from the confusion and the bouleversements naturally resulting from wide-spread ignorance occasioned by a long succession of revolutions, amid the chaos of erudition and philosophy in the midst of which they were placed. They could not possess sufficient discrimination and judgment to pursue all at once, and with success, the study of the Bible, of the writings of the holy Fathers, of the civil and canon law, of the works of Aristotle, and of the Arabian commentaries. Yet these were all studied at the same time; on all these disputes were zealously maintained; and the errors and extravagances which in such a state of things were inevitable were accompanied by the presumption that is invariably inherent in ignorance. To succeed in explaining certain passages of the Bible, of the Fathers, of the codes, and of the works of philosophers, great preparatory labours were necessary, as the experience of subsequent ages has proved. It was necessary to study languages, to examine archives and monuments, to collect together from all parts an immense mass of materials; then, to reduce these to order, to compare them together, and to discriminate between