would forfeit his dignity; some main- | to experience a frightful catastrophe. taining that he ought to be deposed, But now that the Jesuits are expelled, others that his deposition is the con- and are expiating their crimes in exile, sequence of his having fallen from the the French Revolution, the prelude to faith. Whichever of these opinions so many others, breaks out, and the be admitted, in this case resistance aspect of affairs changes immediately. would become allowable, for this rea- Protestants and unbelievers, the supson, that the Pope would have shame- porters of ancient discipline, the zealous fully departed from the object of his adversaries of the abuses of the Court institution, would have trampled on of Rome, fully comprehending the new the basis of the laws of the Church, situation of affairs, hasten to conform which is her dogmas, and would con- to it. From that moment the Jesuits, sequently have nullified the promises the Catholics, the Pope, are no longer and oaths of obedience made to him. seditious or tyrannicides, but MachiSpedalieri, in adducing this argument, avelian supporters of tyranny, enemies observes, that kings are certainly not of the liberty of the people; and just of higher rank than Popes,—that as a league had been supposed to exist power has been granted to both in ædi- between the Jesuits and the Pope for ficationem non in destructionem; adding, the foundation of a universal theothat if Sovereign Pontiffs authorise cracy, there is now discovered, thanks this doctrine with relation to them- to the investigations of these eminent selves, temporal sovereigns cannot ob- philosophers, and strict incorruptible ject to its application to them. Christians, an infamous pact between the Pope and kings to oppress, enslave, and degrade the unfortunate human race. It is strange that the monarchical zeal of Protestants and incredulous philosophers imputes to the Catholic religion as a crime, that she has allowed The answer to this enigma may be it to be maintained within her bosom, thus briefly expressed. So long as that, in certain cases, the subject may kings maintain their power and the be released from his oath of alle- peaceable possession of their thrones, giance; whilst other philosophers of so long as Providence restrains the the same school reproach it with hav- tempests, and the monarch, raising ing sanctioned despotism by its detes- his proud head towards heaven, comtable doctrine of non-resistance, as Dr. mands the people with a lofty air, the Beattie expresses it. The direct, in- Catholic Church does not flatter him. direct, and declaratory powers of the "Thou art dust," says she to him, Popes have served as an admirable" and into dust thou shalt return; bugbear to intimidate kings; the dangerous principles of theological works formed an excellent pretext for raising the cry of alarm, for representing Catholicism as a nest of seditious maxims. The hour of revolutions was struck,-circumstances were changed, fresh necessities arose, and men adapted their language to the times. The Catholics, a short time ago seditious and regicidal, were then declared abettors of despotism, fulsome adulators of civil power. Recently, the Je-out servility, the Catholics are then suits, leagued with the infernal policy of Rome, were every where undermining thrones, to establish on their ruins the universal monarchy of the Pope; but the secret of this horrid plot was discovered, and fortunately so, for the world was otherwise about power was given thee not unto destruction, but unto edification; thy faculties are great, but not boundless. God is thy judge, as well as that of the lowest of thy subjects." The Church is then accused of insolence; and if any theologian should venture to investigate the origin of civil power, to point out, with generous freedom, the duties to which this power is subject; to write, in a word, with prudence upon public right, but with declared seditious. But the tempest bursts, thrones are overturned, revolution prevails, spills the blood of the people in torrents, cuts off royal heads, and all in the name of liberty. The Church says: "This is no liberty, but a succession of crimes; the fraternity and equality which I have taught, this respect agree with M. Guizot, were never your orgies and guillo- who cannot certainly be accused of tines." The Church then becomes a any want of sympathy for the Reforvile flatterer; her words, her actions, mation. "In Germany," says this have indubitably revealed that the celebrated publicist, "far from deSovereign Pontiff is the surest anchor manding political liberty, it has acof despotism, it has been proved that cepted, I should not like to say polithe Court of Rome has been polluted tical servitude, but the absence of liby an infamous pact. (33.) berty." (Hist. Gén, de la Civil, en Eur. leç. 12.) WE have already seen what has been the conduct of the Christian religion with respect to society; that is to say, that caring but little whether such or such political forms were established in a country, she has ever addressed herself to man, seeking to enlighten his understanding and to purify his heart, fully confident that when these objects were attained, society would naturally pursue a safe course. This is sufficient to obliterate the reproach imputed to her of being an enemy to the liberty of the people. Protestantism has certainly never revealed to the world a single dogma which exalts the dignity of man, nor created fresh motives of consideration and respect, or closer bonds of fraternity. The Reformation cannot, therefore, boast of having given the least impetus to the progress of modern nations; it cannot, consequently, lay the least claim to the gratitude of the people in this respect. But as it frequently happens that people lay aside main points, and set a great value on appearances; and as Protestantism has been supposed to accord much better than Catholicism with those institutions in which it is usual to find guarantees for a high degree of liberty; we must draw a parallel. Besides, we cannot omit it without betraying an ignorance of the genius of this age, and authorising the suspicion that Catholicism cannot derive any advantage from such a comparison. In the first place, I will observe, that those who look upon Protestantism as inseparable from public liberty, do not in I quote M. Guizot, because in Spain we are so accustomed to translations, because we Spaniards have been led is to believe foreigners on their bare to suppose that the best thing for us word; because amongst us, in questions of importance, it is necessary to have recourse to foreign authorities; and hence, a writer who appears to slight such authorities, exposes himself to the risk of being treated as an ignoramus, as one behind the age. Besides, with a certain class of writers, the authority of M. Guizot is decisive. In fact, a multitude of publications have appeared amongst us bearing the title of "Philosophy of History, whose authors, it is quite clear, have used the works of that French writer as their text-books. Is this assertion, that Protestantism is the natural bulwark of liberty, true or false, accurate or inaccurate? What do history and philosophy teach us on this point? Has Protestantism advanced the popular cause, by contributing to the establishment and development of liberal forms of government? To place the question in its true light, and discuss it thoroughly, we must take a view of the state of Europe at the close of the fifteenth century, and at the beginning of the sixteenth. It is incontestable that individuals and society were then making rapid progress towards perfection. We have sufficient evidence of this fact in the wonderful march of intellect at this period, in the numerous measures of improvement effected at that epoch, and in the better organisation every where introduced. This organisation is doubtless still imperfect; but it is nevertheless such as cannot be likened to that of former times. If we carefully examine into the state of society at that epoch, as represented either in the Y rous are the objects it embraces, the relations it bears, the obstacles and difficulties with which it is beset. Considering this question attentively, and comparing it with man's weakness, the mind is ready to lose courage and despond. The problem, however, exists, not as a scientific speculation, but as a real and urgent necessity. In such a case, society is like individuals; it attempts, essays, and makes efforts to get clear of the difficulty as well as possible. writings or in the events of the time, | aim, intelligence, morality, felicity. A we shall observe a certain restless- slight glance at this problem startles ness, anxiety, and fermentation, which, us at its immense extent; so numewhile they indicated the existence of vast wants not yet satisfied, were evidence also of a tolerably distinct knowledge of those wants. Far from discovering in the men of that period a contempt or forgetfulness of their rights and dignity, or any discouragement and pusillanimity at the sight of obstacles, we find them abounding in foresight and ingenuity, swayed by lofty and sublime thoughts, fired with noble sentiments, and animated with intrepid and ardent courage. The progress of European society at that epoch was very rapid; three very remarkable circumstances contributed to render it so: 1. The introduction of the whole body of men to the rank of citizens, as a necessary consequence of the abolition of slavery and the decline of feudality; 2. The very nature of civilisation, in which every thing advances together and abreast; 3. In fine, the existence of a means for increasing its development and rapidity -this means was the art of printing. To make use of a physico-mathematical expression, we may say that the amount of motion must have been very considerable, since it was the product of the mass by the rapidity, and that the mass, as well as the rapidity, were then very considerable. This powerful movement, which proceeds from good, is in itself good, and is productive of good, is, however, accompanied by inconveniences and perils; it raises flattering hopes, but it also inspires apprehensions and fears. The people of Europe are an ancient people, but they may be said to have become young again; their inclinations, their wants, urge them to great enterprises; and they enter upon them with the ardour of an impetuous and inexperienced young man, feeling in his breast a great heart, and in his head the lively spark of genius. In this situation, a great problem presents itself for solution, viz. to find the most proper means for directing society without impeding its progress; and for conducting it by a way free from precipices to the objects of its Man's civil state improves daily; but to maintain this improvement, and to perfect it, requires a means: and this is the problem of political forms. What ought these forms to be? And, above all, what elements can we make use of? What is the respective force of these elements? What are their tendencies, their relations, their affinities? How shall they be combined? Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy— these three powers present themselves at the same time to dispute for the direction and government of society. They are certainly not equal, either in force, means of action, or in practical intelligence; but they all command our respect, they have all pretensions to a preponderance more or less decisive, and none of them are without the probability of obtaining it. This simultaneous concurrence of pretensions, this rivalship of three powers so different in their nature and aim, forms one of the leading features of this epoch. It is, as it were, in a great measure the key to the principal events; and, in spite of the various aspects presented by this feature, it may be signalised as a general fact among all the civilised portion of the nations of Europe. Before proceeding further in our examination of this subject, the mere indication of such a fact suggests the reflection, that it must be very incorrect to say that Catholicism has terdencies opposed to the true liberty of the people; for we see that European civilisation, which, during so many ages, was under the influence and guardianship of this religion, did not then present one single principle of government exclusively predominating. Survey the whole of Europe at this period, and you will not find one country in which the same fact did not exist. In Spain, France, England, Germany, under the names of Cortes, States-General, Parliaments, or Diets; the same thing every where, with the simple modifications which necessarily result from circumstances adapted to each people. What is very remarkable in this case is, that if there be a single exception, it is in favour of liberty; and, strange to say, it exists precisely in Italy, where the influence of the Popes is immediately felt. The names of the Republics of Genoa, Pisa, Sienna, Florence, Venice, are familiar to all. It is well known that Italy is the country in which popular forms at that period gained most ground, and in which they were put in practice, whilst in other countries they had already abandoned the field. I do not mean to say that the Italian Republics were a model worthy of being imitated by the other nations of Europe. I am well aware that these forms of government were attended with grave inconveniences; but since so much is said of spirit and tendencies, since the Catholic Church is reproached with her affinity to despotism, and the Popes with a taste for oppression, it is well to adduce those facts which may serve to throw some doubt upon certain authoritative assertions, adduced as so many philosophico-historical dogmas. If Italy preserved her independence in spite of the efforts of the Emperors of Germany to wrest it from her, she owed it in a great part to the firmness and energy of the Popes. In order to comprehend fully the relations which Catholicism bears to political institutions, in order to ascertain what degree of affinity it bears to such and such forms, and to form a correct idea of the influence of Protestantism in this respect over European civilisation, we must examine carefully and in detail each of the elements claiming preponderance. When we examine them afterwards in their relations with each other, we shall ascertain, as far as possible, where the truth lies in this shapeless mass. Every one of these three may be considered in two ways: 1. According to the ideas formed of them at the period we are speaking of; 2. According to the interests these elements represent, and the part they play in society. We must lay particular stress upon this distinction, without which we should expose ourselves to the commission of serious errors. In fact, the ideas which were entertained upon such or such principles of government did not coincide with the interest represented by this same element, and with the part it acted in society; and although it is clear that these two things must have had very close relations with each other, and could not be disengaged from a real and reciprocal influence, yet it is most certain that they differ considerably, and that this difference, the source of very various considerations, shows the subject in points of view quite dissimilar. CHAPTER LVIII. MONARCHY IN THE SIXTEENTH THE idea of monarchy has ever existed in the bosom of European society, even at the time when the least use was made of it; and it is worthy of remark, that at the time when its energy was taken away, and it was destroyed in practice, it still retained its force in theory. We cannot say that our ancestors had any very fixed notions upon the nature of the object represented by this idea; nor can we wonder at it, since the continual variations and modifications which they witnessed must have prevented them from forming any very correct knowledge of it. Nevertheless, if we peruse the codes in places where monarchy is treated of, and if we consult the writings which have been preserved upon this matter, we shall find that their ideas on this point were more fixed than might have been imagined. By studying the manner of thinking of this period, we find that making laws without consulting general assemblies, which, under different names, represented the different classes of the kingdom? From the moment that we propose this question, we come upon new ground. We have descended from theory to practice; we have brought our ideas into men in general were almost destitute of analytical knowledge, being more erudite than philosophical; so much so, that they scarcely ventured to express an idea without supporting it upon a multitude of authorities. This taste for erudition, which is visible at the first glance into their writings-contact with the object to which they a mere tissue of quotations and which must have been very natural, since it was so general and lasting, had very advantageous results; not the least of which was the uniting of ancient with modern society, by the preservation of a great number of records and memorials, which had it not been for this public taste must have been destroyed, and by exhuming from the dust the remains of antiquity about to perish. But, on the other hand, it produced many evils; amongst others, a sort of stifling of thought, which could no longer indulge in its own inspirations, although they may have been more happy than the ancient ones on some points. However it may be, such is the fact: on examining it in relation to the matter under discussion, we find that monarchy was represented at that time as one single picture, in which there appeared at the same time the kings of the Jews and the Roman emperors, whose features had been corrected by the hand of Christianity. That is to say, the principles of monarchy were composed of the teachings of Scripture and the Roman codes. Seek every where the idea of emperor, king, or prince, you will always find the same thing, whether you look for the origin of power, its extent, its exercise, or its object. But what ideas were entertained of monarchy? what was the acceptation of this word? Taken in a general sense, abstractedly from the various modifications which a variety of circumstances gave to its signification, it meant the supreme command over society, vested in the hands of one man, who was to exercise it according to reason and justice. This was the leading idea, the only one fixed, as a sort of pole, round which all other questions revolved. Did the monarch possess in himself the faculty of are to applied. From that moment, we must allow, every thing vacillates and becomes obscure; a thousand incoherent, strange, and contradictory facts pass before our eyes; the parchments upon which are inscribed the rights, liberties, and laws of the people, give rise to a variety of interpretations, which multiply doubts and increase difficulties. We see, in the first place, that the relations of the monarch with the subject, or more properly speaking, the mode in which government should be exercised, was not very well defined. The confusion from which society was emerging was still felt, and was inevitable in an aggregation of heterogeneous bodies, in a combination of rival and hostile elements; that is, we discover an embryo, and consequently it is impossible as yet to find regular and welldefined forms. Did this idea of monarchy contain any thing of despotism, any thing that subjected one man to the dominion of another by setting aside the eternal laws of reason and justice? No; from the moment that we touch upon this point we discover a new horizon, clear and transparent, upon which objects present themselves distinctly, without a shade of dimness or obscurity. The answer of all writers is decisive: Rule ought to be conformable to reason and justice; if it is not, it is mere tyranny. So that the principle maintained by M. Guizot, in his Discours sur la Démocratie moderne, and in his History of Civilisation in Europe, viz. that the will alone does not constitute a right; that laws, to be laws, should accord with those of eternal reason, the only source of all legitimate power;-that this principle, I say, which we might imagine to be newly applied to society, is as ancient as the world. Acknowledged |