failed to perform this duty, and by his failure brought down on the Church a heavy calamity.

But it will be more satisfactory and will greatly strengthen our case, if we proceed to give an analysis of the Pope's two Letters; and if we print them in extenso at the end of our article, that our readers may be the better able to judge on the correctness of our analysis. We will but premise, that they do not exist in the original Latin; but only in a Greek translalation, and in a Latin translation of that translation. If therefore there is found in them occasional awkwardness or obscurity of expression, there is no reason whatever for thence inferring, that such awkwardness or obscurity is attributable to Honorius himself.

What

He begins his first Letter by praising Sergius warmly for vetoing a new theological term, "which might scandalize the more simple;" and he continues by declaring the dogma of the Incarnation, in terms which remind one forcibly of S. Leo's Dogmatic Letter. We must not however fail to point out that this exposition contains one clause, which is more express in the assertion of Duothelism than is any portion of S. Leo's. He speaks of Jesus Christ as "operating divine acts through the mediation of the sacred humanity,” “ ἐνεργοῦντα τὰ θεῖα μεσιτευούσης τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος.” These words cannot be explained at all satisfactorily, except by the Catholic dogma of two wills. The one illustration of Christ's divine acts, given both by S. Leo and by Honorius, is the working of miracles: Honorius therefore declares that Christ wrought miracles, "through the mediation of the sacred humanity." sense could a Monothelite possibly affix to this phrase? He must say, we suppose, that it refers merely to that utterance of Christ's human organs, which in each case preceded a miracle: to His words, e.g., "Lazarus come forth," or "I will, be thou clean." Now firstly, this is a most meagre explanation of so strong and emphatic a phrase. But secondly and more importantly, in various cases there was no vocal utterance immediately preceding a miracle: as, e.g., when the ten lepers were cleansed on their way to the priest; or when S. Peter found a coin in the fish's mouth; or when our Lord miraculously multiplied bread. No explanation in the least satisfactory can be given of the Pope's teaching, except that which Catholic theology supplies; viz., that in each case Christ's human will echoed, if we may so express ourselves, the command of His divine will, and was the immediate agent of the miracle.

In his second paragraph Honorius inveighs against that detestable tenet of two human and contrary wills in Christ, which

he understood from Sergius to have been originated among some Easterns by the phrase "two operations." He prefaces his denunciation, by declaring that the Hypostatic Union took place," the differences of each nature marvellously remaining unchanged: language which, taken by itself, it is difficult or impossible to reconcile with a notion, that Christ's human nature had lost its operating principle by the union. Because of this ineffable conjunction between the two natures, he adds, on one hand God is said to have suffered; while on the other hand the sacred humanity (of which Honorius has already affirmed once, and presently affirms again, that it was assumed by Christ from the Most Holy Virgin) is said to have come down from heaven with the divine nature. For which reason, he adds, we profess that Christ's will is but one; because manifestly He took "that human nature which was created before the existence of sin." His argument is as follows. This common saying, that the sacred humanity came down from heaven, shows by itself that the humanity assumed was not that of Adam fallen, but of Adam innocent. It is true, as he goes on to say in his next sentences, that the Word was made flesh, and that the word "flesh" sometimes means in Scripture "the carnal mind:" as in three instances which he gives. But the word is also used in Scripture, he points out, to express "human nature "" in general; and of this too he gives three instances. He then repeats emphatically, that in Christ there was no law of the members warring against the law of the spirit.

Here let us pause to consider this paragraph as far as it has gone; since some of Honorius's accusers have marvellously thought that it tells on their side. And firstly, as to the very phrase "one will." Let it be remembered, that the polemical phrase at issue in Honorius's time between Catholics and Monothelites did not speak of" one will" but "one operation." On the other hand, the phrase one will" had been in use for centuries among the orthodox, in that very sense in which we maintain Honorius to have used it; viz., as expressing the absolute harmony between Christ's divine and human wills.*

*Thus F. Schneeman quotes a passage from S. Chrysostom's comment on John vi. 38, in which the Saint says that Christ willed what the Father willed; and that therefore there was not one will of the Father and another of Christ, but "manifestly one will." A still stronger passage has been shown the present writer by a friend, from S. Athenasius's treatise against Apollinaris, c. 2, s. 10. This passage indeed, in its particular mode of expressing a denial that in Christ there was any carnal will, would really appear on the surface to admit a Monothelistic interpretation, which most certainly no line of Honorius's Letters has the remotest appearance of admitting. Yet else

That Honorius therefore should have so used the phrase, is just what might have been expected.

Next, as the argument of the paragraph. Honorius begins by declaring Christ's human nature to be so intimately united with His divine, that the former is commonly said to have come down from heaven with the latter. What inference does he draw from this premiss? "That the sacred humanity had no will," say his accusers: "that it had no carnal will," say his defenders. "In Christ there was but one will," says the Monothelite, "because all His human acts were immediately commanded by the divine will.” "In Christ was perfect unity of will" says the orthodox believer, "because He took the will of Adam innocent." This latter statement involves of course a direct contradiction to the former; and it is Honorius's statement. "Therefore," says the Pontiff, "His will is one; for He took Adam's nature as it was before the fall." "It is true," Honorius proceeds, "that the Word was made flesh but this last expression must not be understood as signifying the carnal will." This was the one thing in the Pontiff's mind, that Christ had no carnal will. It is really plain enough for a child to see, that the very notion of Christ having no human will at all, had never occurred to Honorius (as men say) in his very dreams. And to expound his words as asserting that heretical tenet, shows either that the expositor has not fairly given his mind to the matter, ro else that he is utterly blinded by passion or prejudice.

Honorius next proceeds to notice the argument for two contrary wills, raised from such sayings of our Lord as "non quod volo, sed quod Tu vis;" and the like. As to these passages he says, " Οὔκ εἰσι ταῦτα διαφόρου θελήματος, ἀλλὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τῆς προσληφθείσης.” Here again his opponents try to make great controversial capital out of his sentence. But their interpretation of it is so simply monstrous, that we can imagine no excuse for them, except the undoubted fact that the sentence does not absolutely exhibit on the very surface its true explanation. Before we enter on its exposition, it will perhaps be more satisfactory if we make a short but (we trust) not uninteresting digression. We will consider then how Catholic theologians interpret those sayings of our Lord, to which Honorius refers. No one perhaps has explained the matter more fully and precisely, than Lugo.

We shall be able to set forth the Catholic doctrine more

where (de Incarnatione contra Arianos, c. 21) S. Athanasius says expressly that in Christ there are two wills.

VOL. XII.—NO. XIII. [New Series.]

១

clearly, if we avoid, in the first instance, that complication which arises from Christ's unity of Person, and take our illustration from the Immaculate Mother of God: for she was no less absolutely exempted than her Son from all combat between flesh and spirit. Take any one suffering then inflicted on her by God: e. g. His first announcement to her, that her Son was to die in anguish on the Cross.* She was totally exempt from concupiscence; and there was therefore no emotion, however transient, of discontent or repugnance: still there was the keenest emotion of what we may call resigned sorrow. An act of the will would at once be elicited, in harmony with this emotion; and this act of the will may best be analyzed as a hypothetical act. "If this were not God's will, I should wish it otherwise." There was no shadow of sin or imperfection in such an act; nothing inconsistent with the most spotless sanctity: it was united throughout with the most unreserved and intense submission to God's will.

Let us now apply this to our Blessed Lord. And let us take His words, as reported by S. Matthew. " Pater, si possibile est, transeat a Me calix iste; veruntamen non sicut Ego volo, sed sicut Tu." He experienced the keenest emotion of sorrow which was ever experienced on earth. "Tristis est anima Mea usque ad mortem;" that is, as Lugo explains, His anguish would have destroyed life, except for a miracle: and it issued in the previously unknown prodigy of a bloody sweat. This emotion of resigned sorrow was accompanied, according to the laws of human nature, by a corresponding act of the will; which, as in the preceding case, may be thus analyzed: "If this were not Thy will, I should wish it otherwise." Finally He expressed this act of the will, by praying God that if it were possible-that is, if it were consistent with God's supreme decision-the cup might pass from Him. That this hypothetical act was accompanied all through by the most unreserved submission to God's will, is distinctly and emphatically expressed by the words, "Non sicut Ego volo, sed sicut Tu." Dr. Döllinger indeed, who dares to accuse Honorius of heresy, is himself guilty of a deplorable lapse from orthodoxy, and speaks as follows:-"A passing wish came over Him," says Dr. Döllinger, "that if it were possible the chalice of agony might pass from Him. . . but the next instant the clear returning consciousness of the irrevocable counsel of God triumphed in Him" ("First Age of Chris

*We prescind here of course from the wholly irrelevant question, whether, before the Incarnation, she knew that the Messias would be crucified.

tianity," Mr. Oxenham's translation, vol. i. p. 54). That our Blessed Lord forgot for an "instant" "the irrevocable counsel of God" concerning His death, and that afterwards the "returning" consciousness of that counsel "triumphed " in His soul—these are statements which can only excite the amazement and horror of orthodox believers.

ور

Now the question which Honorius seems to have asked himself is this:-Why are such expressions of Christ recorded, seeing that they may lead unstable souls into the monstrous error, of ascribing to Him two contrary wills? He replies thus:—“Οὐκ εἴσι ταῦτα διαφόρου θελήματος,” “these are no indications of a will at variance with the divine."*"' ̓Αλλὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τῆς προσληφθείσης " : " but they indicate an "oikovója," an "exhibition for our instruction," of the assumed humanity: i.e. they are recorded, for the purpose of impressing on us the vital truth, that Christ has really a human will. And so the next sentence explains the former :"For these things were said for our sake, to whom He has given an example that we should follow His footsteps; teaching His disciples-teacher as He is of godliness-that we should not follow our own will, but each should prefer in all things the will of the Lord." In other words, by submitting so unreservedly His human will to the divine, He set us an example of our also submitting ours: but He could not set us this example, unless He made it unmistakably manifest that He had a human will. The purpose therefore of these expressions having been recorded, was to make unmistakably manifest this essential doctrine.

It is simply impossible to devise any interpretation of the two sentences, substantially different from this most emphatically Duothelistic interpretation. The accusers of Honorius must translate the words as meaning, that Christ so spoke for the purpose of impressing on us a false notion of His assumed humanity. Let any patristic scholar be consulted whether, as a mere matter of language, the word oikovóμia can bear any such sense: meanwhile for ourselves let us consider the thing as a matter of doctrine. Honorius, says Mr. Renouf, accounts such words of our Blessed Lord as "economical expressions used for our sakes" (p. 16). What does he mean by "for our sakes"? "For the sake of producing in us a true" a true" or a "false impression"? If he gives the former answer, he admits at once the perfect orthodoxy of

* As a mere matter of language, the word "diapopov" must signify "at variance," not simply "different in entity." The latter would be "aλλov" or σε ἕτερου.”