and Westminster and Shrewsbury, and Marlborough and Wellington, and Merchant Taylors' and Cowbridge, and the Charterhouse and St. Paul's. Indeed, from the first dawn of intelligence, the young mind finds itself under the control of that very same principle which at Oxford and Cambridge manifests itself in its fullest perfection (pp. 16, 17).

Have they [Catholics who wish to be influenced by Oxford] measured the spirit of the times, the freedom of thought, the irreverence of intellect, the mental pride, the impatience of authority, the independence of judgment in things the most sacred and august, the poison that exudes from every pore of the monster University, mixing itself in science, in literature, in society, pouring itself into the minds and the hearts, by its tenderness, its delicacy, its sensitiveness, its refinement, by its gentleness of manner, its charming address, its convincing, reasoning, and embellished style

"Impia sub dulci melle venena latent?" (p. 34.)

We have been dwelling on that careful and elaborate instruction in the Catholic view of things secular, which is peremptorily needed, unless Catholic higher education is to be an inexpressible calamity. But much more than this is really required a certain and not inconsiderable portion of direct doctrinal teaching is absolutely indispensable, if students are to be retained as loyal Catholics. Dr. Murray's remarks are especially deserving attention on this head:

Religious knowledge is, both as to extent and kind, painfully low among that very class of young men by whom it is most needed: young men who are destined for some liberal profession; and still more perhaps those who are destined for no particular calling except that of enjoying a comfortable patrimony; and still more, certainly, that very considerable and, in not a few of its members, very influential class of persons, who are by choice or circumstances destined for a merely literary life (p. 240).

When I speak of a deficiency of religious knowledge, I do not mean a knowledge of such articles of faith as are of precept to know and believe; nor a knowledge of the usual topics and arguments of what is called religious controversy. I at present mean by religious knowledge that which implies a clear and full insight into the spiritual nature and authority and destiny of the Church; which implies a perception intimate and sound not only of isolated dogmas but of the leading principles of Catholic doctrines and of the spirit that pervades them and combines them into one perfect whole; so that one adequately appreciates their truth and grandeur and connexion with each other and adaptation to the spiritual wants of man, and, still more, sees in their clear light the utter absurdity of all that contradicts them and the utter deformity of all that caricatures them (pp. 240, 241).

In the present day it is more than ever necessary that those who cultivate secular learning should have acquired a stock of sacred learning sufficient to counteract the tendency to judge the supernatural by the natural, the ways of God by the ways of man, the wisdom that is from above by the wisdom

that is of this world. Such learning is, alas! rare indeed among those who require it most (p. 243).

It is now more than four years since we ourselves dwelt earnestly on this theme (See Oct. 1864, pp. 377-384); on the amount of religious instruction which should rank as an indispensable part of Catholic higher education. We may be permitted to repeat part of what we then said:

No Catholic then can consider an education as really liberal, unless it comprise those verities which express the highest and truest of all relations, -the relations between the Creator and the creature, the Church and the world, things eternal and things temporal. Moreover, it is quite proverbial that the mere torpid reception of truth is no adequate educational result. The Catholic cannot be said to have learned those verities to which we just now referred, except in proportion as he may have so mastered them that he views under their light, and estimates by their standard, the whole range of facts which comes within his cognisance, psychological, historical, political, and social (p. 377).

There is no more virulent disease of the intellect-none, we may add, whose remedy more characteristically appertains to the higher education— than the inveterate habit of accepting truth otiosely and speculatively, without practically holding what is professed, or even understanding what is meant by it. . . . This intellectual fault is more or less to be dreaded in all scientific pursuits: but there is no object of knowledge in regard to which it is so flagrant and so prejudicial (and that, as we believe, in consequence of man's moral corruption) as in religious truths. All Catholics, for instance, admit speculatively that one additional grade of spiritual perfection is more valuable than the loftiest intellect, the most aristocratic birth, or the largest wealth: yet some of them continually imply just the opposite of this in the various judgments which they form on the individual events of every-day life; in their speculation on their children's future; in their estimate of political events; and in a thousand other practical ways. They hold one doctrine as a general truth, and they hold a doctrine precisely contradictory on almost every particular which that general truth comprises. And so in the case before us. It is very easy, no doubt, to induce a Catholic student to accept speculatively such truths regarding the Church's office and claims as those which we stated above; but as it is very easy, so also it is very useless. What we need is, that those great truths shall spread fruitfully through his whole intellect, not remain barren in one little corner of it; that they shall habitually affect his whole attitude of mind towards Rome and towards England; that they shall pervade his views of history, of politics, of literature; that they shall be his very stand-point for estimating the whole range of social phenomena (pp. 382-3).

It is impossible, within our limits, to enter on any detailed statement as to the character and extent of this doctrinal instruction: we must content ourselves with two remarks. It would differ in many important respects from the professional teaching received by clerics, and would, of course, be

contained in much smaller compass; while it would include, nevertheless, some real and careful study of the great Catholic verities, in their relation to each other, to the dicta of reason, and to the facts of experience. On the other hand, the bearing of Catholicity on the various secular sciences would be imparted much more fully to these laymen than to ordinary clerics, from the very fact that with the former secular science is so far more prominent a pursuit (p. 379).

Here then we bring to a close what we had to say on the second and most important particular which-as we earnestly submit-should be carefully secured in all Catholic higher education worthy the name: we mean the effective and vigorous inculcation of religious truths, both speculative and practical. We have argued that for Catholics to receive a higher education of which this should not be an integral part, would be an immeasurably greater calamity than for them to receive no higher education at all.

The third and last principle of Catholic higher education on which we would insist, is its bringing the student into as close contact as possible with his contemporary fellow-countrymen. This must by absolute necessity be done, unless Catholics are prepared to give up all idea of intellectually influencing the non-Catholic mind, and to aim at no other end than that of protecting their own children from perversion. A Catholic of this country, when he grows up, will have active dealings with men of the nineteenth, not of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and with Englishmen rather than with Italians, French, or Germans. But he cannot influence these-he cannot take up a position of intellectual equality with themunless his culture has been similar to theirs. Every time and place has its own peculiarities; and those who are not able to appreciate those peculiarities, cannot leave their mark on the age. When S. Thomas, e. g., wrote his "Summa," formal logic was the chief recognized means for discovering and ascertaining truth. Even had he been exceptionally gifted with such knowledge of criticism and history as is now common, his treatise would not have influenced his contemporaries had it prominently exhibited those accomplishments. On the other hand-invaluable as is the study of the "Summa" to a theologian -no one will say that Catholics intellectually trained on its exclusive model could properly play their part in modern society. Weexpressed this principle towards the beginning of our article. It is of less importance, we said, that the intellectual discipline of Catholics be in itself the very best atttainable, than that it be similar in character to that elsewhere prevalent in England. Even if it were true-we think it most false that physical science afforded a better intellectual discipline than classics

and mathematics, so long as Protestants are trained on the latter basis, it is important that Catholics should in that respect resemble them.

The principle which we are defending will be so readily admitted by all, that two brief illustrations will amply suffice. The present idea of historical study, e. g., is very far deeper and truer than that which prevailed a century ago. That study is now founded throughout on facts ascertained by strict and searching criticism; every contemporary authority is examined in order that those facts may be set forth in their picturesque fulness as they actually took place; and they are carefully compared and co-ordinated with each other, with a view to trustworthy scientific conclusions. It is by historical studies so conceived that the Faith is assailed: it is by historical studies so conceived that the Faith must be defended.

Our second illustration shall be from philosophy. In Italy, Belgium, and Germany, serious danger is to be dreaded from the error called ontologism: from that false, shallow, and sceptical system, which maintains that man cannot obtain the knowledge of necessary truth, unless God be presented directly to his mind as an object of thought. Of course Catholic students, in England no less than elsewhere, must be duly guarded against this and all other errors: we would only urge, that in this country the philosophical error to be chiefly dreaded is not ontologism, but another quite different. There are very few Englishmen, Catholic or Protestant, who hold that the mind thinks of God before it can think of anything else: but there are great numbers who maintain that there is no such thing as necessary truth at all, either thought of or existing. This is the fatal philosophical error of our time in England, and it is the fruitful parent of a large atheistic progeny. We venture to maintain-submitting our opinion with much deference to those whose office it is practically to decide that there is no philosophical doctrine in which English students should be more carefully and elaborately trained, than in all which concerns necessary truth: the proofs that such truth exists; the full bearing and import of the term; the various further philosophical truths, a knowledge of which will result from our holding it; the absolute scepticism which must ensue from its denial.

Now, no Catholic philosophers whatever deny either the existence of necessary truth or man's power of knowing it; for those who deny this can be no Theists. Nor again can there be any Catholic philosophers who, if questioned, would deny the indispensable necessity of Catholics rightly appre

hending all those doctrines which concern necessary truth.* But on the Continent of Europe they often write with the fear of ontologism before their eyes, as of the great threatening danger. Consequently they often lay by far their principal stress on proving the undoubted verity, that man's conviction of necessary truth does not arise from his direct thought of God. They are far more occupied, we say, with enlarging on this, than with explaining what is the true and sufficient basis of the above-named all-important conviction. In so writing, it is very possible that they judge rightly on the philosophical needs of their own respective countries. On this we can form no judgment. But we would earnestly submit, that here in England a different course is imperatively called for. We have now said all which appeared essential, on the three principles which we desire to recommend. A good Catholic higher education, we have argued, (1) will duly cultivate and invigorate the various faculties; (2) will adequately imbue the students with Catholic truth, both as to religious doctrine, and as to things primarily secular; and (3) will specially perform the task of training its recipients to exercise intellectual influence on their non-Catholic fellowcountrymen. We are far from denying of course that there are other principles, of greater or less importance, to be carried in mind; but we think it is these three which bear prominently on the critical and cardinal questions of practice, which will certainly arise.

Here therefore we should naturally conclude; for our purpose has been, as we said at starting, to speak in our present article of principles and not of their application. But the "Month" has so many admirable remarks in the article which we have repeatedly quoted-and has generally indeed done so much service by drawing attention again and again to the great momentousness of the subject that its practical recommendations will naturally and legitimately carry with them considerable weight. There is on this account greater danger, lest the particular plan which it has brought forward may find acceptance, for a brief space of time, with some of its readers. We are unwilling therefore to delay, even for a quarter, entering against that plan our earnest and emphatic protest. We well know of course that the writer has had no other motive, than that of making a suggestion

*It is sometimes thought by their opponents that upholders of the scholastic philosophy deny the existence of self-evident necessary truth. But on the contrary no writers can by possibility more expressly testify the existence of such truth than do Kluitgen in Germany, and Canon Walker in England.