? animated bodies, occasioned by the Memory produces imagination. We presence of a material object. Sensi- form a picture of the things we have bility is the result of an arrangement seen, and, by imagination, transport peculiar to animals. The organs re- ourselves to what we do not see. ciprocally communicate impressions to one another. * Man is born with a disposition to know, or to feel and receive impressions from the action of other bodies upon him. Those impressions are called sensations, perceptions, or ideas. These impressions leave a trace or vestige of themselves, which are sometimes excited in the absence of the objects which occasioned them. This is the faculty of memory, or the sentiment by which a man has a knowledge of former impressions, accompanied by a perception of the distinction between the time he received, and that in which he remembers them. Every impression produces an agreeable or disagreeable sensation. When lively, we call it pleasure, or pain; when feeble, satisfaction, ease, inconvenience, or uneasiness. The first of these sentiments impels us towards objects, and makes us use efforts to join and attach them to ourselves, to augment and prolong the force of the sensation, to renew and recall it when it ceases. We love objects which produce such sensations, and are happy in possessing them: we seek and desire their possession, and are miserable upon losing them. The sentiment of pain induces us to fly and shun objects which produce it, to fear, hate, and detest their presence. We are so constituted, as to love pleasure and hate pain; and this law, engraven by nature on the heart of every human being, is so powerful, that in every action of life it forces our obedience. Pleasure attached to every action necessary to the preservation of life, and pain to those of an opposite nature. Love of pleasure, and hatred of pain, induce us, without either examination or reflection, to act so as to obtain possession of the former and the absence of the latter. Passions are movements of the will, determined by the objects which act upon it, according to our actual form of existence. The intellectual faculties attributed to the soul, are modifications ascribable to the objects which strike the senses. Hence a trembling in the members, when the brain is affected by the movement called fear.* quences or issue. Foresight can only be acquired by experience, and reflection upon the impressions communicated to us by objects. Some men, in this respect, continue infants all their lives, never acquiring the faculty of foresight; and even among the most wise, few are to be found, upon whom, at some periods of life, certain violent impressions, those of love, for example, the most violent of all, have not reduced into a state of childhood, foreseeing nothing, and permitting themselves to be guided by momentary impulses. As we advance in years, we acquire more experience in comparing new and unknown objects with the idea or image of those whose impression memory has preserved. We judge of the unknown from the known, and consequently, know whether those ought to be sought for or avoided. The faculty of comparing present with absent objects, which exist only in the memory, constitutes reason. It is the balance with which we weigh things; and by recalling those that are absent, we can judge of the present, by their relations to one another. This is the boasted reason which man, upon I know not what pretext, arrogates to himself to the exclusion of all other animals. We see all animals possessing evident marks of judgment and comparison. Fishes resort to the same spot at the precise hour in which they have been accustomed to receive food. The weaker animals form themselves into societies for mutual defence. The sagacity of the dog is generally known, and the foresight of the bee has long been proverbial. bears of Siberia, and the elephants of India, seem to possess a decided superiority in understanding over the human savages and slaves, who inhabit those countries. The The impressions once received, it is not in man's power either to prolong or to render Some philosophers suppose the existence them durable. There are certain limits be- of the sense of touch in man, in a superior yond which human efforts cannot exceed. degree than in other animals, sufficient to Some impressions are more poignant than account for his superiority over them. If to others, and render us either happy or misera- that we add, the advantage of a greater lonble. An impression, pleasant at its com-gevity, and a capacity of supporting existence mencement, frequently produces pain in its all over the globe, an advantage peculiar to progress. Pleasure and pain are so much the human species, perhaps we have enumeblended together, that it is seldom that the rated all the causes of superiority which man one is felt without some part of the other. ever received from nature, whatever may be ? his pretensions. Speech, or the power of communicating ideas, is common to almost all animals. Some of them even possess it Man, like every other animal, upon coming into the world, abandons himself to present impressions, without foreseeing their conse CHAPTER IX. other men. To direct the passions to Diversity of the Intellectual Faculties-They kind advantages resulting from its ciety. TEMPERAMENT decides the moral qualities. This we have from nature, and from our parents. Its different kinds are determined by the quality of the air we breathe, by the climate we inhabit, by education, and the ideas it inspires. By making mind spiritual, we administer to it improper remedies. Constitution, which can be changed, corrected and modified, should alone be the object of our attention. Genius is an effect of physical sensibility. It is the faculty possessed by some human beings, of seizing, at one glance, a whole and its different parts. By experience, we foresee effects not yet felt-hence prudence and foresight. Reason is nature modified by experi ence. The final end of man is self-preservation, and rendering his existence happy. Experience shows him the need he stands in of others to attain that object, and points out the means of rendering them subservient to his views. He sees what is agreeable or disagreeable to them, and these experiences give him the idea of justice, &c. Neither virtue nor vice are founded on conventions, but only rest upon relations subsisting among all human beings. If we can only form ideas of material objects, how can their cause be supposed immaterial? To this, dreams are opposed as an objection; but in sleep the brain is filled with a crowd of ideas which it received when awake. Memory always produces imagination. The cause of dreams must be physical, as they most frequently proceed from food, humours, and fermentations, unanalogous to the healthy state of man. The ideas supposed to be innate, are those which are familiar to, and, as it were, incorporated with us; but it is always through the medium of the senses that we acquire them. They are the effect of education, example, and habit. Such are the ideas formed of God, which evidently proceed from the descriptions given of him. Our moral ideas are the fruits of experience alone. The sentiments of paternal and filial affection are the result of reflection and habit. Man acquires all his notions and ideas. The words beauty, intelligence, order, virtue, grief, pain and pleasure, are, to me, void of meaning, unless Men's duties to one another arise I compare them with other objects. from the necessity of employing those Judgment presupposes sensibility; and means which tend to the end proposed judgment itself is the fruit of comby nature. It is by promoting the hap-parison. piness of other men, that we engage them to promote our own. Politics should be the art of directing the passions of men to the good of society. Laws ought to have no other object than the direction of their actions also to the same object. Happiness is the uniform object of all the passions. These are legitimate and natural, and can neither be called good or bad, but in so far as they affect CHAPTER XI. Of the System of Man's Liberty. hinder myself from wishing to drink in a higher degree than man in certain states Will it be said, that in this case I am free? Thirst necessarily determined me to drink; the discovery of poison necessarily determines me not to drink. The second motive is stronger than the first, and I abstain from drinking. But an imprudent man, it may be said, will drink. In this case his first impulse will be strongest. In either case, the action is necessary. He who drinks is a madman; but the actions of madmen are not less necessary than those of other men. A debauchee may be persuaded to change his conduct. This circumstance does not prove that he is free; but only, that motives can be found, sufficient to counteract the effect of those which formerly acted upon him. Choice by no means proves liberty; since hesitation only finishes when the will is determined by sufficient motives; and man cannot hinder motives from acting upon his will. Can he prevent himself from wishing to possess what he thinks desirable ? No; but we are told he can resist the desire, by reflecting upon its consequences. But has he the power of reflecting? Human actions are never free; they necessarily proceed from constitution, and from received ideas, strengthened by example, education, and experience. The motive which determines man is always beyond his power. Notwithstanding the system of human liberty, men have universally founded their systems upon necessity alone. If motives were thought incapable of influencing the will, why make use of morality, education, legislation, and even religion? We establish institutions to influence the will; a clear proof of our conviction, that they must act upon it. These institutions are necessity demonstrated to man. The necessity that governs the physical, governs also the moral world, where every thing is also subject to the same law. CHAPTER XII. Examination of the Opinions which maintain the System of Necessity to be Dangerous. Ir men's actions are necessary, by what right, it is asked, are crimes punished, since involuntary actions are never the objects of punishment? Society is an assemblage of sensible beings, susceptible of reason, who love pleasure, and hate pain. Nothing more is necessary to engage their concurrence to the general welfare. Necessity is calculated to impress all men. The wicked are madmen against whom others have a right to defend themselves. Madness is an involuntary and necessary state, yet madmen are confined. But society should never excite desires, and afterwards punish them. Robbers are often those whom society has deprived of the means of subsistence. By ascribing all to necessity, we are told the ideas of just and unjust, of good and evil, are destroyed. No; though no man acts from necessity, his actions are just and good relative to the society whose welfare he promotes. Every man is sensible that he is compelled to love a certain mode of conduct in his neighbour. The ideas of pleasure and pain, vice and virtue, are founded upon our own essence. ? Fatalism neither emboldens crime, nor stifles remorse, always felt by the? wicked. They have long escaped blame or punishment, they are not on that account better satisfied with themselves. Amidst perpetual pangs, struggles, and agitations, they can neither find repose nor happiness. Every crime costs them bitter torments and sleepless nights. The system of fatality establishes morality, by demonstrating its necessity. Fatality, it is said, discourages man, paralyzes his mind, and breaks the ties that connect him with society. But does the possession of sensibility depend upon myself? My sentiments are necessary, and founded upon nature. Though I know that all men must die, am I on that account, the less affected by the death of a wife, a child, a father, or a friend? Fatalism ought to inspire man with a useful submission and resignation to his fate. The opinion, that all is necessary, will render him tolerant. He will lament and pardon his fellowmen. He will be humble and modest, from knowing that he has received every thing which he possesses. Fatalism, it is said, degrades man into a mere machine. Such language | cannot make the soul think without the is the invention of ignorance, respect- means necessary to acquire thoughts. ing what constitutes his true dignity. The destruction of his body always Every machine is valuable, when it alarms man, notwithstanding the opinperforms well the functions to which ion of the soul's immortality; a sure it is destined. Nature is but a ma-proof that he is more affected by the chine, of which the human species present reality, than by the hope of a makes a part. Whether the soul be distant futurity. mortal or immortal, we do not the less admire its grandeur and sublimity in a Socrates. The opinion of fatalism is advantageous to man. It prevents useless remorse from disturbing his mind. It teaches him the propriety of enjoying with moderation, as pain ever accompanies excess. He will follow the paths of virtue, since every thing shows its necessity for rendering him estimable to others and contented with himself. CHAPTER XIII. Of the Soul's Immortality-The Dogma of a very The idea of death is revolting to man, yet he does every thing in his power to render it more frightful. It is a period which delivers us up defenceless to the undescribable rigours of a pitiless despot. This, it is said, is the strongest rampart against human irregularities. But what effect have those ideas produced upon those who are, or at least pretend to be, persuaded of their truth? The great bulk of mankind seldom think of them; never, when hurried along by passion, prejudice, or example. If they produce any effect, it is only upon those to whom they are unnecessary in urging to do good, and restraining from evil. They fill the hearts of good men with terrour, but have not the smallest influence over the wicked. Bad men may be found among infiTHE Soul, step by step, follows the dels, but infidelity by no means implies different states of the body. With the wickedness. On the contrary, the man body, it comes into existence, is feeble who thinks and meditates, better knows in infancy, partakes of its pleasures motives for being good, than he who and pains, its states of health and dis-permits himself to be blindly conducted ease, activity or depression; with the body, is asleep or awake, and yet it has been supposed immortal! Nature inspires man with the love of existence, and the desire of its continuation produced the belief of the soul's immortality. Granting the desire of immortality to be natural, is that any proof of its reality? We desire the immortality of the body, and this desire is frustrated. Why should not the desire of the soul's immortality be frustrated also? The soul is only the principle of sensibility. To think, to suffer, to enjoy, is to feel. When the body, therefore, ceases to live, it cannot ex-a ercise sensibility. Where there are no -senses, there can be no ideas. The soul only perceives by means of the organs: how then is it possible for it to feel, after the dissolution? We are told of divine power-but divine power cannot make a thing exist and not exist at the same time. It by the motives of others. The man who does not expect another state of existence, is the more interested in prolonging his life, and rendering himself dear to his fellow-men, in the only state of existence with which he is acquainted. The dogma of a future state destroys our happiness in this life; we sink under calamity, and remain in errour, in expectation of being happy hereafter. The present state has served as the model of the future. We feel pleasure and pain-hence a heaven and a hell. A body is necessary for enjoying heavenly pleasures-hence the dogma of resurrection. But whence has the idea of hell. arisen? Because, like a sick person who clings even to a miserable existence, man prefers a life of pain to annihilation, which he considers as the greatest of calamities. That notion was besides counterbalanced by the idea of divine mercy. Did not men, by a happy inconsistency, deviate in their conduct from those insolent ideas, the terrours ascribed to a future state are so strong, that they would sink into brutality, and the world become a desert. Although this dogma may operate upon the passions, do we see fewer wicked men among those who are the most firmly persuaded of its truth? Men who think themselves restrained by those terrours, impute to them effects ascribable only to present motives, such as timidity, and apprehension of the consequences of doing a bad action. Can the fears of a distant futurity restrain the man upon whom those of immediate punishment produce no effect? Religion itself destroys the effect of those terrours. The remission of sin emboldens the wicked man to his last moment. This dogma is consequently opposed to the former. The inspirers of those terrours admit them to be ineffectual; priests are continually lamenting that man is still hurried on by his vicious inclinations. In fine, for one timid man who is restrained by those terrours, there are millions whom they render ferocious, useless, and wicked, and turn aside from their duties to society, which they are continually tormenting. CHAPTER XIV. Of Education-Morality and Laws sufficient to Restrain Man-Desire of Immortality Suicide. LET us not seek motives to action in this world, in a distant futurity. It is to experience and truth that we ought to have recourse, in providing remedies to those evils which are incident to our species. There, too, must be sought those motives which give the heart inclinations useful to society. Education, above all, gives the mind habits, useful to the individual and to society. Men have no need either of celestial rewards or supernatural punishments. Government stands in no need of fables for its support. Present rewards and punishments are more efficacious than those of futurity, and they only ought to be employed. Man is every where a slave, and consequently void of honour; base, interested, and dissim ulating. These are the vices of governments. Man is every where deceived, and prevented from cultivating his reason; he is consequently stupid and unreasonable: every where he sees vice and crime honoured; and therefore concludes the practice of vice to lead to happiness, and, that of virtue, a sacrifice of himself. Every where he is miserable, and compelled to wrong his neighbours, that he may be happy. Heaven is held up to his view, but the earth arrests his attention. Here he will, at all events, be happy. Were mankind happier and better governed, there would be no need of resorting to fraud for governing them. Cause man to view this state as alone capable of rendering him happy ; bound his hopes to this life, instead of amusing him with tales of a futurity; show him what effect his actions have over his neighbours; excite his industry; reward his talents; make him active, laborious, benevolent and virtuous; teach him to value the affection of his contemporaries, and let him know the consequences of their hatred. However great the fear of death may be, chagrin, mental affliction, and misfortunes, cause us sometimes to regard it as a refuge from human injustice. Suicide has been variously considered. Some have imagined that man has no right to break the contract which he has entered into with society. But upon examining the connexions which subsist between man and nature, they will be found neither to be voluntary on the one part, nor reciprocal on the other. Man's will had no share in bringing him into the world, and he goes out of it against his inclination. All his actions are compulsatory. He can only love existence upon condition that it renders him happy. By examining man's contract with society, we shall find that it is only conditional and reciprocal, and supposes mutual advantages to the contracting parties. Convenience is the bond of connexion. Is it broken? Man from that moment becomes free. Would we blame the man who, finding himself destitute of the means of subsistence in the city retires into the coun |