stand opposed to each other. Now, as the one must be considered final and unalterable, so should the other; and if the righteous are always to possess the kingdom, then will the aionion, fire, be endless with the wicked. Mark iii. 29. "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness but is in danger of aionion kriseos, eternal damnation." Here the word aionion, rendered eternal, is shown to be used in its most unlimited and endless sense, by the connection in which it stands. In the text, forgiveness and damnation are opposed to each other; hence, as he who blasphemes against the Holy Ghost is not forgiven, he must be damned, and as he "hath never forgiveness," he must be damned forever; he is therefore in danger of eternal damnation, aionion kriseos. We will now close this argument,

which stands thus:

1. The proper and grammatical meaning of the original words rendered forever, everlasting and eternal, is endless, or always being or existing.

2. Words are always to be understood in their proper and grammatical sense unless the connection or nature of the subject require a different construction.

3. In the application of the terms in question to the punishment of the wicked, as they are thus applied in the scriptures, there is nothing in the nature of the subject or connection which requires that they should be understood in an accommodated sense, they must therefore be understood in their proper sense, which is endless; and hence, it follows that the scriptures teach the doctrine of endless punishment.

II. The scriptures describe the punishment of the wicked, and the salvation of the righteous in contrast, in a manner which shows that they are opposed to each other, so that those who are punished all their sins deserve cannot be saved. This point has been proved in Chapter IV. the whole of which goes to show that salvation implies a deliverance from the punishment which sin deserves. Now, if we have sustained the argument in the fourth chapter to which the reader is referred, which we think we have beyond all doubt, it must appear that there is an impassable gulf lying between the salvation of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked, and the point is settled, that such as are punished to the

extent of the divine penalty, can never be saved; we shall not therefore repeat the arguments in this place, but simply introduce a few plain scriptural proofs to show that salvation and punishment are described in contrast. Matt. xxv. 46. "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." That this text relates to a future state of being the reader will find ample proof in Argument xv. of the preceding chapter, and that the punishment of the wicked is here opposed to the salvation of the righteous, needs no proof, more than is apparent on the very face of the text. Do those who are said to go into everlasting punishment, go also into life eternal? Just as consistently might it be argued that those who go into life eternal will also go into everlasting punishment. If then those who go away into everlasting punishment, do not go into everlasting life, the contrast between the respective dooms of the righteous and wicked is marked as wide as the space between heaven and hell, and the punishment of the one will be as lasting as the eternal life of the other.

John iii. 15. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life." Here, perishing stands opposed to everlasting life, in a manner which clearly proves that those who perish do not have everlasting life, and that those who have everlasting life do not perish. Now, as perishing can mean nothing more nor less than the just punishment of sin, it follows that salvation and punishment are opposed to each other, so that if a man is punished for his sins all he deserves he cannot be saved. Rom. ii. 6, 7, 8. "Who will render to every man according to his deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life. But unto them that are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath." This text is decisive, as a few remarks must show to every unprejudiced mind.

1. A contrast is clearly drawn between the respective rewards of the saint and sinner: God "will render to every man according to his deeds ;" and this reward will be to the righteous, "eternal life," and to the wicked, "indignation and wrath." Now it cannot with any degree of propriety

be maintained that those who are rewarded with indignation and wrath will also be rewarded with eternal life-this would be a contradiction of the Apostle's declaration; for he asserts that God will render to every man according to his deeds. He then states what reward will be in accordance with the deeds of both saint and sinner; that eternal life is in accordance with the deeds of the righteous, and that indignation and wrath are in accordance with the deeds of them that obey not the truth. To suppose that those who are worthy of indignation, will also receive eternal life, assigns to them a portion which is denied them by the apostle, and must be just as absurd as to suppose that those, who are worthy of eternal life, will also receive indignation and wrath. When the Apostle asserts that eternal life is according to the deeds of the righteous, and that indignation and wrath are according to the deeds of the wicked, he, in effect says, that indignation and wrath are not according to the deeds of the righteous, and that eternal life is not according to the deeds of the wicked. Now, God will render to every man according to his deeds, he will therefore never render eternal life to them that obey not the truth.

2. That this whole subject relates to the future destinies of men appears, not only from the fact that we have already proved that sin will be punished in the future world, but also from the phraseology of the text itself. To whom will God render eternal life? To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and HONOUR and IMMORTALITY." Now, it cannot be supposed that any enlightened christian seeks for immortality as a portion attainable in this world, and as they seek for glory and honor and immortality in the world to come, and as God will render to them according to their deeds, it follows that God will render to them eternal life in the future world, and that this eternal life involves the entire object of their pursuit, glory, and honour, and immortality. As the righteous will have rendered to them glory and honour, in a state of immortality in the future world, and as we have shown above that the wicked, who will receive indignation and wrath, in distinction from this reward, cannot also be made to partake thereof, it follows that such as are punished for their sins, the disobedient who

receive according to their deeds, cannot be made holy and happy. Should it be supposed that the above implies that the wicked will not be rendered immortal, and hence that they will be annihilated, we deny the inference. The most that can be made of the above reasoning is, that the scriptural expression, eternal life, implies glory and honour and immortality, and that the wicked will not enjoy this eternal life. All this we believe. The glory of the saint may consist in the fashion of his person, when his soul shall be cleansed from all sin, and his body be made like unto Christ's glorious body; and his honor may consist in the distinguished rank he shall have assigned him by his judge, while his immortality will confirm him in this state and rank, world without end. Το deny this eternal life to the wicked does not deny their immortality, nor imply their annihilation; for they may be rendered immortal though they do not seek for immortality; and they may possess immortality though they do not possess with it glory and honour, which must be added to it to constitute eternal life in a scriptural sense. But their immortality, with deformity instead of glory, and disgrace instead of honour, will be their heavy curse. Many more scriptures of a similar character might be produced, in proof that the punishment of the wicked and the salvation of the righteous are directly opposed to each other: but we will close the argument by stating it in form.

1. Some men will be punished for their sins according to their deserts. This is a proposition too plain to be denied and has been already established.

2. Those who are punished for their sins according to their deserts, can never be saved. This is the contested proposition in the argument, and has been established not only by the above reasoning, but also by Chapter IV. the whole of which goes to confirm it.

Therefore there are some men who will never be saved, and the doctrine of universal salvation is proved to be false.

III. The scriptures teach that salvation is conditional, and therefore may be lost, by a non-compliance with the terms on which it is proffered. It cannot be denied that whatever is conditional may be lost; the proposition, therefore, which as

s the conditionality of salvation, is the only one in this ar

gument about which there can be any dispute, and this we will attempt to prove.

1. We urge the doctrine of conditional salvation from man's moral agency. If man is a moral agent, and hence, capable of performing moral actions, it will follow from thence that something must be required of him in order to happiness, and salvation will appear conditional. But here also we have to confront the objections of universalists, for they, or many of them, deny the doctrine of moral agency, and assert the doctrine of fate. Now, as we wish to take nothing for granted which our opponents deny, we will here insert a few arguments in favor of moral agency, and against the opposite doctrine of fate.

1st. If man is not a moral agent, that is, free in his volitions, he cannot be the subject of a moral government. To constitute a proper subject of a moral government, man must be capable of moral actions, and in order to render an action moral, it must be performed voluntarily or from choice, under circumstances which would admit of its being otherwise. The circumstance that a man acts freely or from choice, does not, in our view, constitute moral liberty, or give moral quality to action, unless the actor be capable, at the same time, of making a different choice, and of acting differently. Now, as none but moral actions can be recognized by a righteous moral law, none but moral beings, as above defined, can be made the subjects of moral discipline. Taking this view, we see that if man is not a moral agent, he cannot be the subject of a moral government, and, so far as relates to man, God cannot be a moral ruler-cannot maintain a moral government over this world.

2d. If man is not a moral agent, is not free in his volitions, he cannot be accountable for what he does, cannot be either punishable or rewardable for his conduct. To deny the doctrine of man's moral agency, not only annihilates the orthodox hell, but also the restorationist's hell of limited duration, and the universalist's hell of a horrible conscience. If men were not free in their actions there could be no hell of conscience, for nothing is more clear, than that a man can never feel condemnation for having done what he could not have refrained from doing, or for having left undone, what he could not