cause they embrace all which we have reasonable ground of assurance was delivered to the Church by our Lord and his Apostles, or with their sanction and authority.

We receive the Apostolic traditions given to us in the Scriptures, because we have sufficient reason to consider them genuine; we receive not, as binding, statements pretended to be derived, through the tradition of the Fathers, from their oral teaching, because their genuineness is altogether incapable of proof. We do not reject them because we have any doubt as to the good faith of the Fathers, but because we know that, in matters of doctrine, men are exceedingly liable to error in their representation of the opinions of others; and also from the utter insufficiency and uncertainty of the documents remaining to us of the antient church, to establish anything like catholic consent; and we may add, the insufficiency and uncertainty of the evidence afforded by even those that do remain, comparatively to what they ought to afford on the hypothesis of our opponents; though at the same time we do not (as our opponents misrepresent us) regard what the Fathers have delivered to us respecting the faith as useless; but, on the contrary, that, properly used, it may be of considerable value.

But, by "the rule of faith," we understand a testimony which shows us infallibly those doctrines which we are bound by our duty to God to receive; and one which has such evidences of its divine origin, as make it binding upon the consciences of all men; and of that rule, therefore, nothing can form a part which has not reasonable evidence of its being the word of God.

And if Holy Scripture is thus the sole infallible and authoritative rule of faith, it follows, of course, that it is to its decision alone that we must appeal, as of absolute authority and infallible in controversies concerning the faith; and hence it is justly called the sole infallible judge of controversies of faith.

We say, also, that Holy Scripture is the sole infallible rule of faith to every individual; because, upon the very

same grounds upon which our opponents admit the right and duty of private judgment in determining between the various forms of religion existing in the world, do we contend for the right and duty of private judgment in determining between the various meanings affixed by nominal Christians to the word of God contained in the Holy Scriptures. "Without private judgment," says Mr. Newman, "there is no responsibility;" and to what individual or community among Christians, I would ask, can my responsibility to God as an individual, with what all grant to be his word in my hands, be transferred? Is there anything besides Scripture that has power over the consciences of individuals?

Nor does the case of an altogether illiterate person overthrow the truth of this as a general rule; which our opponents may perhaps see, by asking themselves what they would do in the case of an illiterate Mohammedan? Would they say, You must give up your religion and receive ours, because we are certainly right; but we cannot allow you, as a very illiterate man, to exercise your judgment upon the matter? He might at once reply, I have been told by those who, for aught I know, may be as good judges as you, that my religion is right; and, therefore, notwithstanding my disadvantages, I must make the best use I can of my private judgment, and pray to God to direct me aright; for as there is so much difference of opinion upon this matter, I cannot follow one guide blindfold, any more than the other. And this holds equally for a choice between the different meanings given to Scripture, as for a choice between the different religions existing in the world.

And this admission of the right of private judgment, be it observed, does not prevent any Church from excommunicating one who, in the view of that Church, errs obstinately in the fundamentals of the faith. They who excommunicate, and he who adheres to his error, both act on their own responsibility, neither pretending to infallibility, either through the possession of patristical tradi

tion, or in any other way; but appealing primarily to the Scriptures, and through them to the great Head of the Church, as the Judge; an appeal which can only be decided at a future day. And when the Church becomes split into various parties of different sentiments, it must be left to the judgment of every individual to determine, as well as he can, as to their tenets and rival pretensions; a judgment which must be grounded upon the word of God in the Scriptures, as the only divine informant; though in forming it, he may derive much help from the records of the Christian Church during the whole of its past course, particularly in the earlier period of it; while he takes care to remember the uncertainties and imperfections attending all informants but Scripture.

"If," says Dean Sherlock, "you ask whose judgment ought to take place, the judgment of the Church, or of every private Christian? I answer, The judgment of the Church of necessity must take place as to external government, to determine what shall be professed and practised in her communion; and no private Christian has anything to do in these matters. But when the question is, What is right or wrong, true or false, in what we may obey, and in what not, here every private Christian who will not believe without understanding, nor follow his guides blindfold, must judge for himself; and it is as much as his soul is worth to judge right."1

We do not, then, be it observed, rest this truth upon any supposed necessity that God must have communicated his will to mankind, through the medium of writing; or that the Scriptures must, of necessity, contain this or that. Such reasoning appears presumptuous and unfounded. We take things as we find them, and reason accordingly. It is not for us to determine what it was necessary for God to do, or what he might do, and suppose it done, but to use the reason which God has given us, in ascertaining what he has done; and we thus find that there is reason1 Discourse concerning a Judge of Controversies, pp. 11, 12.

VOL. I.

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able evidence that Scripture is his Word; and that there is no sufficient evidence for anything else being such.

If, then, the arguments given in the chapter on patristical tradition are a sufficient proof that such tradition cannot be considered an unwritten Word of God, and is thus not a sufficient foundation for faith to rest upon, the truth which we here advocate is by that admission (as far as our present subject is concerned) established.

And it follows from hence,

First, That the doctrines contained in Scripture, have an authoritative claim upon our faith, only as far as they are there revealed; and

Secondly, That no doctrine has any authoritative claim upon our faith, that is not revealed in Scripture.

These two corollaries we shall notice more particularly in our next chapter.

And in the same way it follows that Scripture, being our sole divine informant, is also our sole divinely-revealed rule of practice.

But the truth, for which we here contend, does not rest on the arguments we have already adduced, as its sole foundation; and we shall now proceed to offer to the reader some further considerations respecting it.

I. On its true nature and extent.

II. The additional arguments by which it may be supported, with a reply to the objections by which it is assailed.

We shall first argue the question as to Scripture being the sole divine rule of faith and practice, and then show that it is in like manner the sole infallible judge of controversies in religion. Our remarks will more particularly refer to matters of faith, except where stated; these points forming the most important part of the inquiry.

I. First, then, as to the true nature and extent of this truth, that Scripture is the sole divine rule of faith and practice.

We premise some remarks on this head, in order to guard against those misconceptions, and, I may add, misrepresentations of our views, which are so frequently to be met with.

Let it be observed, then, first, that it is not affirmed by us that we have, in the Holy Scriptures, everything that our Lord and his Apostles uttered; nor that what the Apostles delivered in writing, was of greater authority than what they delivered orally. It is undeniable that we have not all that they delivered. St. Paul, in his Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, appears to allude to information which he had given them orally, and which he does not state in his writings. (2 Thess. ii. 5, 6.) It is likely that this might have been the case in some minor points. Nay, it is possible that the Apostles may have given to some of their converts, on some occasion, a more full and luminous exposition of this or that doctrine, than what we find in Scripture. I will even add that it is possible that as there has been a succession of God's people from the beginning, so the substance, or at least a portion of such additional matter, may have been propagated from one to another, and have thus come to the children of God of our own day, commended to the spiritual mind by its own light; but, as far as regards any direct proof, or external evidence, of its Apostolical origin, utterly destitute of any such claim upon us; though I should rather, with Theodoret,1 attribute any similarity of sentiment that has prevailed among the children of God on such points, to their having all been partakers of the influences of the same Spirit.

But this we do affirm, that having four different accounts of "the Gospel of Jesus Christ," the last written for the very purpose of making the account complete,2 and above twenty Epistles written by the Apostles to explain it still further, to say that anything at all important is omitted, is to cast a foul libel upon that Holy Spirit by

See extracts from Theodoret, ch. 10. below.

2 See Euseb. Hist. Eccl. iii. 24.