relations of the maniac. He is held legally responsible to make good, during his lucid interval, whatever injury he has caused to the property of another, while acting under the influence of any insane delusion. This is upon the principle, that as some one is to suffer the loss, it should be he, though innocent, who causes the injury, rather than the other, who has no agency whatever in its production.

Cases involving the greatest difficulty in their decision, are those of partial intellectual mania, in which there is insanity of one or more faculties, or a mental alienation on one or more topics, while, in every other respect, the mind appears to be sane. This is generally termed monomania. Whether intellectual mania of this limited and partial character, does or does not invalidate an act, depends on the intimacy of the connection that subsists between the act and the peculiar derangement. Where the act obviously proceeds from, or is intimately connected with, the insane delusion, the actor is clearly irresponsible, because in respect to such an act he has ceased being a free agent.

A mental disorder, operating upon some particular subjects, so far as those subjects are concerned, is attended with the same effects as a total deprivation of reason. But partial derangement should not be extended beyond its own morbid phenomena; and in all doubtful cases, the enquiry should be reduced to the single point, whether the act complained of in fact proceeded from a mind fully capable, in respect of that act, of exercising a free, sound, and discriminate judgment.

There is often much difficulty in determining what is really embraced within the morbid circle of action; besides, the delusion itself is very subject to change. In estimating the character of an act, we must admit for that purpose the truth of the insane delusion under which it is performed, and then its relation to its cause will generally be apparent. This arises from that law of causation, so universally operative in all the movements of mind, which connects, with bonds so indissoluble, the act with the ideas and motives instrumental in its production.

The sound rule, in regard to this form of insanity, is to establish, 1. The delusion, which must be something entertained as true, which is really false in fact.

2. The act sought to be invalidated must be directly traceable to the delusion, and either actually produced by it, or so intimately connected with it, as to lead to the presumption that it never would have occurred had not the delusion existed.

The same degree and extent of partial insanity, that absolves from contracts, ought also to relieve from the consequences of criminal acts.

The irresponsibility of mind for acts committed under the influence of moral mania, proceeds upon a principle entirely different from that which prevails in cases of intellectual mania. In moral mania there is no delusion; the intellectual faculties may remain as perfect as they ever were, and yet the derangement, or perverted action of the affective or moral powers, embracing the propensities and sentiments, may destroy the control of the individual over himself and his actions.

To estimate actions properly, we must understand them. They are volitions of mind carried to their ultimate limit. In the normal healthy state, an action is evidence of two things.

1. Of the existence of a perfect volition in the mind.

2. Of the ability to manifest itself externally, through the medium of the material organisation.

Volitions are formed under the influencing power of motives, which are presented to, and appreciated by, the affective or moral powers of man. The impulses furnished by the propensities, aided and directed by the emotions and dictates proceeding from the sentiments, are the primary springs of all volitions and actions. The intellect neither impels, guides, or directs; it simply furnishes the material, and enlightens. A volition, and the act by which it is evidenced, is the joint result of the action of the affective faculties, in reference to the materials furnished by the intellectual.

We certainly ought not to hold a being responsible for an action, unless all its essential elements are complete. This cannot be the case, if all or any one of the affective faculties are fatally defective, or deranged in their functional action. Without moral liberty, there can be no responsibility for crime. The true test to determine, în any given case, the existence of moral liberty, is to ascertain whether the volition and the action are or are not irresistible. If they are so, all punishment would be not only useless to the offender, but two of its principal purposes could not be answered. It would neither tend to amend the person punished, nor be productive of a salutary effect upon others, by way of example.

To determine the irresistibility of an act, reference must be had directly to the act itself. Its attendant circumstances must be examined, as also the things and events that preceded and succeeded it. The presumed influences that were brought to bear upon the actor must be scrutinised, and the agreement or contrast of the act itself with his previous character examined. A presumption of insanity arises, if there is observed to be a want of ordinary care and caution-as if an act of a flagitious character be committed in a public place, in open day, and in sight of witnesses.

The records of criminal jurisprudence have furnished many cases

in which much doubt existed as to criminal liability. When, however, death has been caused through the resistless promptings of insane impulse, there are usually many circumstances indicating its true origin or cause. In the first place, the destructive act is motiveless. The unfortunate subject is generally a wife, a child, a parent, or the first living being who presents himself. The accomplishment of death is the immediate object. Nothing beyond it is at all regarded. All within reach are often sacrificed. None of the conveniences of time, place, and circumstance are consulted. The homocidal monomaniac performs his deeds of death as if controlled by some severe and unaccountable destiny.

He

In all these respects the criminal pursues a different course. has in view some definite object-some ulterior aim. Death is with him a means, not an end. He is a creature of motive. He sheds no more blood than is necessary for the accomplishment of his object. Time, place, and weapons, are suited to his purpose. His movements are all consistent, and indicate a plan, regularly commenced, and successfully carried out. Thus a correct knowledge of mental operations, and their development in character, cannot easily fail of leading to tolerably correct conclusions as to whether the act proceeded from a sane or an insane mind. If the act is utterly inconsistent with all the previous developments of the character, it affords strong evidence of insanity, unless the destructive propensity have become morbid and deranged in consequence of its own excessive action.

On a careful review of the whole matter, it is humiliating to witness how trifling has been the real attainment made in the jurisprudence of mental alienation. There is a want of definiteness, a lack of precision, in all the knowledge we now have on that subject. Until recently, sufficient attention has never been paid to facts; nor are facts now observed with sufficient accuracy in this country. In Europe, particularly in France, in the large and well-regulated institutions of the insane, which attest the enterprise and humanity of that lively people, much attention is paid to the different forms of mental alienation. Pinel, Esquirol, and Georget, have successively rendered to humanity a service which future times can only repay by holding them in grateful recollection. Observed facts, to possess value, must be connected with general reasonings. The insane manifestations of the faculties can never be thoroughly understood, until their respective functions in health are well ascertained and definitely settled. The more accurately the true philosophy of mind comes to be understood, the more perfect may we expect our codes of morals, and the more settled, certain and satisfactory, our maxims of jurisprudence.

ARTICLE III.

ON THE PRESENT MODES OF MEASURING THE HEAD, AND THE ADVANTAGES OF A NEW INSTRUMENT.

For the American Phrenological Journal.

As the human head-exclusive of the face-differs in most individuals and especially in children-but little in magnitude, and still less in form, from the encephalon, it is a problem of some interest to determine the exact size and shape of the former. The instruments already in use, and even the eye of the practised observer, will give an approximation sufficiently near to establish the main doctrines of phrenology. But the problem is not solved as rigidly as it must be, if phrenology is to take a place among the more exact sciences. Who can state, numerically, the position of a single organ? I am acquainted with no instrument hitherto used, with which this is professed to be determined. How, in geodesical operations, do we determine the figure and magnitude of the earth? The mere measurement of linear distances on its surface affords no sufficient data. It is necessary to combine this measurement with that of the angular position of different stations. The callipers for measuring the head, are like a chain, without a theodolite or transit instrument, for measuring the earth. It does not even approximately determine the length of any cerebral fibres, except those which have a low and lateral direction, and terminate near the ears. The craniometer which has been used, supplies this deficiency, but is equally destitute of any provision for determining the position of parts. The positions of organs are often defined by their contiguity to others; and a description of the head too much resembles that of land in some deeds of our American ancestors-every man's farm bounded by those of his neighbours.

If the mental powers are modified by the depth of the convolutions, or the thickness of cineritious substance, or the texture of the brain, these modifications would equally affect the conclusions to be drawn from any mode of measurement. So far are they from rendering an exact and proper mode objectionable, that it is by this alone that the existence and total amount of such modifications-separately indeterminable as they are during life-can ever be arrived at.

• A plate of this instrument may be seen in Combe's smaller work on phrenology.

The upper extremity of the medullar oblongata being the radiant point of the encephalic fibres, if-as is generally maintained by Combe and others—the powers of the different pyramidal bundles, or organs, have a relation to the lengths of the axes and the areas of the bases of these spheroidal pyramids, these are the data important to be determined by measurement. The ordinary craniometer-an instrument too much neglected-determines the length of the axis at any point of the surface assumed to be the centre of the base of an organ. But suppose phrenologists to differ, and the views of all to change in regard to the number and location of organs-and this has taken place to a certain extent-then the recorded numerical results of previous measurements are not available for comparison with subsequent ones, nor those of one phrenologist for comparison with those of others.

But if, in addition to the indications furnished by cerebral prominences, and the somewhat vague and empirical reference to certain great landmarks on and near the skull, we determine and record the angular distance of each station of measurement from two determinate co-ordinate planes at right angles to each other, we then have three times as many data as are furnished by the ordinary craniometer, and are able to deduce from them the three grand numerical results required by phrenology as an exact science; to wit: 1st, the lengths of the axes of the pyramids; 2d, their positions; 3d, the distances between the middle points of their bases, and, consequently, the extent of the bases. The ordinary craniometer gives but one single result; viz. the length. The callipers give but one; viz. the base.

An instrument which I have constructed, and exhibited to the New York Phrenological Society, determines the position on the same principle as the astronomer determines that of a star, by its altitude and azimuth, its right ascension and declination, or its latitude and longitude.

Without a precise reference to co-ordinate plans, uranography could not have become an exact science, but must have remained with few other guides than the more empirical ones of the early astrologers, the uncouth figures of men, animals, and monsters, still seen to use Mr. Herschell's expression-" scribbled over" artificial globes. I will not compare these to phrenological maps and busts, as it regards their utility or the artificial character of the divisions, but I must in regard to their availableness for the purposes of numerical comparison.

My instrument consists essentially of two graduated semicircles in planes at right angles to each other. The one answering to the ungraduated semicircle of the ordinary craniometer. The other is