are thought to concern, religion, that we have not ourselves examined, and how inexcusable it is to do this in cases wherein we may be able, with a little pains, to judge for ourselves.

The first article of natural theology, in which the heathen were deficient, according to Mr. Locke, was the knowledge of one God, maker of all things. He admits, at the same time, that the works of nature, in every part of them, sufficiently evidenced a deity; and that, by the impressions of himself, God was easy to be found. These assertions do not seem very consistent, and therefore it is added, that the world made so little use of their reason, that they saw him not--sense and lust blinded their minds. But the rational and thinking part of mankind, he confesses, found the one Supreme, invisible God, when they sought after him. If this be true now, as it is most certainly, the heathen world made as good use of their reason, for aught I can see, as the Christian world. In this, it is not the irrational and unthinking, but the rational and thinking part of mankind who seek, and find the true God; and just so we are told, that it was in the other. Besides, if this be true, it follows, that this great and fundamental article of natural theology is discoverable by a due use of human reason; and Mr. Locke acknowledges accordingly again, that God, was found by the wise and virtuous, which is a limitation of no great significancy to his purpose, since the vicious would have sought him in no state of mankind, nor the foolish have found him. But says this writer, the wise and virtuous had never authority enough to prevail on the multitude, and to persuade the societies of men, that there was but one God. If he had proved, as well as affirmed this, he would only have proved, what no man denies, that sufficient means to reclaim men from polytheism and idolatry, and to establish the belief of one God, appear to have been wanting in general, and to a great degree, as far as the memorials we have of ancient nations can show. He would not have proved, that the light of nature was insufficient, nor that the religion of nature was defective in this respect. He would not have proved, what he had in view to establish, that the belief and worship of one God was the national religion of the Israelites alone, and that it was their particular privilege, and advantage, to know the true God and the true worship of him; whilst all other nations, from the beginning, adored the host of heaven, as Eusebius asserts very confidently, though he is far from proving it.

Eusebius took much pains, and used much art, I might say artifice, to spread an opinion that this knowledge, and all good theology were derived from the Jews, and from their Scriptures; nay that the philology and philosophy of the whole learned world were purloined from thence, and the heathen were pla

giaries, who lighted their candles at the fire of the sanctuary, as some modern Eusebius or other, Gale, I think, expresses himself. Josephus had gone before Eusebius in the same design: for thus far Jews and Christians made their cause common, and he had begun to falsify chronology, that he might give his nation a surprising antiquity. Eusebius did the same, and without taking the trouble of descending into particulars, many of which are acknowledged by learned and orthodox writers, I may say, that from that time to this, or to the time when by the revival of letters, and the invention of printing, which made the knowledge of antiquity more easy and common, much the same practice was continued with much the same success. Ancient memorials have been forged and altered for this particular purpose, mere assumptions have been delivered as facts, and nothing has been neglected to give not only antiquity, but illustration, to a nation that never had much of the latter out of their own writings, and those of Christianity. As the history of the Jews was committed to the care of their scribes; so the propagation of every learned system that could tend to the confirmation of it, by reconciling anachronisms, and by coloring improbabilities, has been the charge of a particular order of men among Christians, who had the monopoly of learning for many ages, and who have had a great share of it since. This has been imposed on the bulk of mankind, prepared by their prejudices to acquiesce under the authority of great names, and frightened from examining by the enormous piles of Greek, and Latin, and eastern languages, in which such authors seem to entrench themselves.

Notwithstanding this, I will say, and, if I know any thing, I say it on knowledge, that these entrenchments are not tenable. They cannot be battered down always, perhaps, by the same arms by which they are defended, but sure I am they may be undermined, and he who searches their foundations will find that they are laid on sand. Josephus and Eusebius will be of great use to him, against themselves. Their writings are repertories of valuable fragments, and of such as would be more so, if more credit could be given to the fidelity of those who cite them. I have sometimes thought, that we might apply properly enough to the Jew, and the Christian author, what La Bruyere says, in his characters, of Perault, that he quoted so many passages from ancient writers, whilst he attempted to prove the superiority of the moderns, that his works were read for the sake of these passages.

Thinking in this manner, I could not fail to be surprised when I found such assertions, as are mentioned above, in a treatise written by Mr. Locke. The common herd of writers copy one another in every point that makes for their common cause, about

which alone, and not about truth, they seem to be concerned.They affirm over and over so positively, and so long, things destitute of proof, or evident falsities, that even the last grow into belief, according to the practice of the court of Rome, as father Paul represents it, in her usurpations. I should not have easily suspected Mr. Locke of such a proceeding, nor of affirming dogmatically what he had not sufficiently examined. But he has written below himself in this instance, by going out of his way, and has assumed the spirit of those who write on the same subject, much like Sir Isaac Newton, who lost himself in the vague probabilities of chronology, after having pursued with so much success the certainty of mathematical demonstration.

I meddle not here with any thing that is said concerning that clear knowledge of their duty, which was wanting to mankind, as Mr. Locke affirms very untruly, before the coming of Christ, nor with the theological part of this treatise. I confine myself to these propositions, that all the heathen were in a state of darkness, and ignorance of the true God, and consequently that the belief and worship of one God was the national religion of the Israelites alone. Now here I observe a want of that precision, which this great man is so careful to keep in all his other writings. As he does not distinguish enough the want of a sufficient knowledge of natural religion, and the want of sufficient means to propagate it, which he rather confounds in all he says about them, so he uses these two expressions, the true God, and one God, as if they were exactly synonymous; whereas they are not really so, and the explanation, and justification of the distinction, in the present dispute, will set the matter on a very different foot. It is not unity alone that constitutes the complex idea, or notion of the true God. There is, there can be but one such Being, and yet a monotheist may be as far from the knowledge of the true God as the rankest, and most superstitious polytheist. I have taken notice, in the precedent essay, how the belief of one God, and of many, was reconciled in the heathen theology several ways; and what I have touched transiently, may be seen made out fully in the intellectual system. A polytheist, who believes one self-existent Being, the fountain of all existence, by whose immediate or communicated energy all things were made, and are governed, and who looks on all those other beings whom he calls gods, that is, beings superior to man, not only as inferior to the Supreme, but as beings all of whom proceed from him in several subordinate ranks, and are appointed by him to the various uses and services for which he designed them in the whole extent of the divine economy; such a polytheist, I say, will approach nearly to true theism, by holding in this manner nothing that is absolutely inconsistent with it: whilst

the monotheist, who believes that there is but one God, and ascribes to this God, whom he should conceive as an all-perfect Being, the very worst of human imperfections, is most certainly ignorant of the true God, and as opposite to true theism as the atheist, nay he is more injuriously so. Mr. Locke would have done like himself, if he had made these reflections before he had joined in the common cry; and he might have thought, perhaps, in that case, that the coming of Christ was necessary to give the Jews true notions of God, as well as to convince the Gentiles of his unity.

Instead of this, he takes the common opinion for granted, supposes what is in question, and does not so much as attempt a proof. He says indeed, that "there was no part of mankind that had a greater light of reason, or that followed it farther in all sorts of speculations, than the Athenians; and yet we find," he adds, "but one Socrates amongst them that opposed and laughed at their polytheism and we see how they rewarded him for it." He quotes in the same place the reproach that St. Paul made to this people. "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious, for as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, тO THE UNKNOWN GOD." If these were meant for proofs of what he asserts, they were unluckily chosen. Matter of fact is mistaken in one, and in neither of them is there the least color of argument. Socrates was so far from opposing the religious worship established at Athens, that he held it to be the duty of every citizen to follow the religion established by the laws of his city, as we know upon good authority, that of Xenophon; and if we turn to the Euthypro in Plato, we shall find him declaring, in his zeal for polytheism, against all the traditions which he judged to be unworthy of the gods, though they were believed and respected by the vulgar. This was his crime. He neither opposed, nor laughed at polytheism, though he certainly believed the unity of the Supreme Being. But the zeal of bigots in those days, as in ours, made it no less criminal to reject the abuses of religion, than to profess atheism; and a faction in the state took advantage of this, to put him to death.

But if we suppose, for argument sake, that he was put to death for opposing and laughing at polytheism, and idolatry; if the Athenians were superstitious, as they were undoubtedly, and if they dedicated an altar to the unknown God, what will all this serve to prove? It will only prove that men are apt, and even the most judicious, sometimes, to erect their scanty knowledge of a few particulars into a supposed general, and certain knowledge of any subject. A little tract of land passes with them for the whole world, two or three nations for all mankind,

and two or three thousand years for all antiquity. Are we able to compare the Athenians very exactly in this respect, or in any other, with the people who flourished at the same time, and of whom we have some accounts in history and tradition? How much less are we able to compare them with so many other nations, of whom not so much as the names are come down to us, or were known to them? What argument then can be drawn from the polytheism, idolatry and superstition of this little state, to that of the whole world, which is the point to be proved? or from the Athenians in the days of Socrates, or St. Paul, even to the Athenians themselves in the ages whereof the priests of Sais talked to Solon: nay, to the whole race of mankind in these, and still more ancient ages; for even these were not deemed the first?

I might leave the argument here, since the author of the reasonableness of Christianity offers no other proofs of the facts he advances. But I think myself obliged to justify my opinion, so contrary to his, and to that of the whole crowd of scholars, on whose authority he rests. Great men take great liberties, and expect to be believed on their words, and the disciples of Mr. Locke have as good a right, as the disciples of any philosopher, to use the avròs on. But for me, who cannot allow it to any in matters which I am able to examine, and who should think myself obliged to give my reasons even for agreeing with him in all such matters, it seems still more incumbent upon me to give those which induce me to differ from him; and I shall do so, without repeating much of what has been said by me already.

I have said in the former essay, and I have given my reasons for it, that I do not believe mankind discerned the unity of God in the first dawnings of knowledge. But the impressions of the Creator are so strongly marked in the whole extent of the creation, and the idea of an all-wise, and all-powerful Being, first cause of all things, is so proportionable to human reason, that it must have been received into the minds of men as soon as they began to contemplate the face of nature, and to exercise their reason in such contemplations; and this was long before the commencement of any tradition that we find out of the books of Moses. Profane memorials show us the whole world, and sacred memorials except the patriarchs, and the Israelites alone out of this dark scene, involved in polytheism, superstition, and idolatry. But still both sacred and profane concur in showing us some gleams of light that break through these clouds, some notices of the knowledge and worship of the true God, that were kept up among the sons of men. They appear faintly, and very imperfect they were in these times, perhaps early to us, though late with respect to the beginning of our mundane,