THE SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS.

a. ON THE SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

1. REASON AND REVELATION.

THE question, whether Reason or a Supernatural Revelation, is the highest source of religious knowledge, had already been discussed in the former period. Rationalism appeared most strongly in Manicheism. The Antiochian and Alexandrian Schools were distinguished by a rationalist and supernaturalist tendency. But both held the Bible to be the highest source of religious knowledge. Augustin endeavoured to establish the claims of revelation in opposition to his earlier Manicheism and to Platonism, and on the other hand to prove the harmony of ratio and fides. In his epistle to Consentius, who maintained that not Reason, but the Authority of the saints was to be followed, he says, that he ought to retract his accusations against Reason, and endeavour to discern by the light of Reason what he already maintained on the ground of faith. Far be it from us to imagine that God hates that in us, by which he has distinguished us from all other living creatures. In fact, we could not believe, if we had not souls endowed with Reason.

2. SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

We have seen that in the preceding period, Tertullian in the Western Church regarded Tradition as the controlling priuciple, and made the Exposition of Scripture dependent upon it; while on the contrary, the Alexandrians, who were the representatives of the Greek standpoint, regarded Holy Writ

Ep. ad. Consentium, 119, 120.-Vide ergo secundum hæc verba tua, ne potius debeas, maxime de hac re, in qua præcipue fides nostra consistit, solam sanctorum auctoritatem sequi, nec ejus intelligentiæ a me quærere rationem. Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed ut ea quæ fidei firmitate jam tenes, etiam rationis luce conspicias. 3. Absit namque ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Absit, inquam, ut ideo credamus, ne rationem accipiamus sive quæramus, cum etiam credere non possemus, nisi rationales animas haberemus. ergo in quibusdam rebus ad doctrinam salutarem pertinentibus, quas ratione nondum percipere valemus, sed aliquando valebimus, fides præcedat rationem, qua cor mundetur, ut magnæ rationis capiat et perferat lucem, hoc utique rationis est.

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independently of Tradition, and advocated a more free interpretation of it.

We can trace the same difference pervading the period now under review. As to the doctrine of the normative value of Holy Writ, there were several among the Oriental teachers who expressed themselves most decidedly on the authority that was due to it alone; thus Cyril of Jerusalem commends the Creed because it was taken directly from the Bible. As all were not able to read the Sacred Volume, the whole doctrine of faith was here comprised in a few words; the Creed was confirmed by the whole of Scripture. Respecting the doctrines he further says.† that we must not believe the least point without evidence from Holy Writ. Chrysostom and the other Antiochian Teachers gave prominence to the authority of Scripture. He represents it frequently as the highest source of knowledge to which all persons must resort for instruction ;‡ thus he says, Suppose a heathen comes to me and says, wish to become a Christian; but I know not to whom I must join myself; there are so many sects among you Christians, and I know nothing of the Scriptures. This, he rejoins, is exactly in our favour; if we required you to follow our reasonings, you might be perplexed; but we tell you, that we believe in Holy Writ. If a person objected that one man maintains that it stands thus in Scripture, and another that it is different, Chrysostom does not refer him to the authority of the Church, but asks him, “Hast thou no reason? do what thou oughtest according to the voice of thy Conscience; seek truth from God in a rational manner, and he will certainly reveal it to thee." We find similar authority attributed to the Holy Scriptures by the Western Teachers in various passages thus Augustin says,§ "The writings of the Prophets and the Apostles are the only ones, on which we do not venture to pass sentence, but according to which we must judge all others." Further, "we show honour to Holy Writ, in allowing no possibility of error to it; and if we find something apparently erroneous, either there is a mistake in the manuscripts, or we do not understand the passage; we believe other writers because they prove what they affirm either from Cateches. 5, 12. + Ibid. 4, 17.

Hom. in Acta, 33, 4, p. 258.

§ Contr. Cresconium Donatist. ii. 39.

SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

Holy Writ or from Reason."*

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Yet we should conclude too

much if we inferred that he admitted of no other source of knowledge of Christian doctrine but the Bible, and depended entirely upon that. In the West generally, Tradition and the Authority of the Church were of peculiar weight, and Augustin himself was led by the course of his mental training to join in their recognition. Bewildered by Scepticism, he was met by the thought, Must not God have made provision for the erring, and given them a sure external authority by which. they may obtain the confident knowledge of the Truth? He expected to find such an authority in the Church; and having searched after the truth it was no longer doubtful to him, whether Christ was to be really acknowledged as a teacher of truth; even the Manicheans allowed this; the point in dispute was, where the true doctrine of Christ was to be found. The Manicheans asserted that this doctrine had been already falsified in all the apostolic writings by Jewish elements and interpolations. Hence the question shaped itself to Augustin, Where am I to find the genuine original records of the Christian doctrine?" Critical aids and principles were wanting to him by which he might have been rendered independent of Tradition; he had therefore no resource left, but to find a pledge for the true form of the Canon in the tradition of the Church. The spread of Christianity, the victories of the Church over all persecutions and heresies, - the fact that through it the highest truth had become the common property of the people at large,—all the signs by which proofs might be found for the divine origin of the Gospel, were to him arguments for the divinity of the Church.

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This determined him to resign himself entirely to the authority of the Church, and to receive from it the Canon and

* Ad Hieron. ep. 82, cap. 111, tom. ii frag. 144. -Ego enim fateor caritati tuæ solis eis Scripturarum libris, qui jam canonici appellantur didici hunc timorem honoremque deferre, ut nullum eorum auctorem scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam Ac si aliquid in iis offendero literis, quod videatur contrarium veritati, nihil aliud, quam vel mendosum esse codicem, vel interpretem non assecutum esse quod dictum est, vel me minime intellexisse, non ambigam. Alios autem ita lego, ut quantalibet sanctitate doctrinaque præpolleant, non ideo verum putem, quia ipsi ita senserunt, sed quia mihi vel per illos auctores canonicos vel probabili ratione, quod a vero non abhorreat, persuadere potuerunt.

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the doctrines of the Faith, and it was specially the African Church to which he thus submitted himself. The maxim fides præcedit intellectum was applied by him in the following manner: A man must first of all humbly receive and practice the doctrines of the Faith on the authority of the Church, and then he will be capable of developing genuine Christianity by Scripture and Reason.* And this continued to be the Catholic doctrine till the Reformation. On this ground we are enabled to understand that pregnant sentence, Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicæ ecclesiæ commoveret auctoritas. Protestant Theologians have been disposed to explain it as meaning, "I was first led to the Bible by the tradition of the Church;" but without doubt it rather means, The authority of the Church is the witness for the divinity of Holy Writ; how could I convince unbelievers, if I were not permitted to appeal to the authority of the Church? I must depend upon it to know what the canon of Holy Writ is, and its right Interpretation." It deserves notice in what a circle he moves; for in arguing against the Donatists he proves the authority of the Church from the Scriptures. When they, according to their subjective tendency, appealed on behalf of the authority of their Church, to the miracles wrought within it, he would allow no argument to be valid but the objective one taken from the Scriptures. We also, he says, lay claim to Faith; we do not assert that we form the Church of Christ, because our church is recommended by an Ambrose and others, or because it is rendered illustrious by the councils .of bishops; we do not even appeal to the miracles which are performed throughout the world but to the testimony of Holy Writ. Christ, who after his resurrection allowed his body to be touched by his disciples, nevertheless appealed to the testimony of the Law and the Prophets.‡

In the preceding period, persons might abide by the general Tradition of the Church as they would by a more private one; but in this age a special organ of that Tradition was added,

* De Utilit. Cred. cap. 21.-Nam vera religio nisi credantur ea quæ quisque postea, si se bene gesserit dignusque fuerit, assequatur atque percipiat et omnino sine quodam gravi auctoritatis imperio iniri recte nullo pacto potest.

+ Contr. ep. Manich cap 6.

De Unitate Eccles 50.

the General Councils, of which the decisions expressed the general Church consciousness as witnesses of the truth. For if the bishops, as successors of the Apostles, were the organs of the Holy Spirit, and their convocation a representation of the Church, it seemed that the guidance of these organs by the Holy Spirit might be relied upon. The decisions of the General Councils were therefore esteemed as the certain utterances of the Holy Spirit. Hence a subjective view, which at an earlier period might be held without the reproach of being heretical, became a heresy after the decision of a General Council, since it appeared to be the duty of every one to submit to that judgment in which the voice of the Holy Spirit was heard. The opinion of individuals which would assert its claims against such a general decision would be condemned as subjective self-will. We find this principle developed in Augustin; it was not his view, that Truth was revealed to the Council by a fresh inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but that by continued theological inquiry under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the result was evolved, and that the Councils were only the organs ordained by God to express this result. He ascribes to General Councils the prerogative of correcting the expression of individual Church teachers of eminence. Yet he also says: General Councils will be improved by later ones, if truth comes to light by investigation.* He, therefore, regarded them as relatively the most perfect expression of the Christian consciousness for the time being. But in what does he suppose this improvement to consist? Probably he only thought that additions were made, or did he admit that errors which occurred in former decisions might be corrected?

Next to Augustin, in reference to the doctrine of the Catholic Church on Tradition, we have to notice a distinguished writer, VINCENTIUS LIRINENSIS, who shortly after Augustin's death, about A.D 435, wrote his Commonitorium, or Tractatus pro Catholicæ fidei Antiquitate et Universitate adversus Profanas Novitates, in which he systematically carried out Augustin's principles. He sets in opposition to the Heretics, the authority of the Divine word, and the Tradition of the Catholic Church. He starts the question, If the Bible be the only sufficient source of knowledge, of what use * De Baptismo c. Donatist. ii. 3.