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our complex idea usually annexed to it; and bid the reader consider man as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or real essence; that is, by something he knows not what; looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified by the general names, which substances are called by: But because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of specific names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to their received names, and sometimes to no archetypes at all. . Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the signification of their names as to the archetypes; and also to make plain the nature of species, or sorting of things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge, than we at first imagine.
§. 44. Let us suppose Adam in the state Instances of of a grown man, with a good understand- mixed modes ing, but in a strange country, with all things in kinneah
and niouph. new and unknown about him; and no other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adal (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take care that Adah commit not folly : and in these discourses with Eve he makes use of these two new words, kinneah, and niouph. In time
Adam's mistake appears, for he finds Lamech’s trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names kinneah and niouph (the one standing for suspicion, in a husband, of his wife's disloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing disloyalty) lost not their distinct significations. It is plain then that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes with names to them, two distinct species of actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of these two distinct species of actions ? And it is plain it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, Whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the name kinneah to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.
§. 45. These words, kinneah and niouph, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would communicate their thoughts and discourse together. Those therefore of Adam's children, that found these two words, kinneahi and niouph, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds; but must needs
conclude, they stood for something, for certain ideas, abstract ideas, they being general names, which abtract ideas were the essences of the species distinguished by those names.
If therefore they would use these words, as names of species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using the same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery (which I think answer 78up and 9183) stand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what kinneah and niouph stood for in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary signs in every one. $. 46. Let us now also consider, after the
Instance of same manner, the names of substances in
substances in their first application.
One of Adam's
zahab. children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it; and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name zahab, to denominate and mark all substances that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now that, in this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before in forming those ideas of mixed modes, to which he gave the names kinneah Vol. II.
and niouph. For there he puts ideas together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of any thing; and to them he gave names to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract ideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist or no; the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has a standard made by nature; and therefore being to represent that to himself, by the idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable.
§. 47. This piece of matter, thus denominated zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before, no-body, I think, will deny to be a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name zahab is the mark of the species, and a náme belonging to all things partaking in that essence.
But here it is plain, the essence, Adam made the name zahab stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam on farther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: He finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces : he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the essence of the species that name zahab stands for? Farther trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea signified by the name zahab? If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other properties, which any farther trials shall discover in this matter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea, which the name zahab stands for, and so be the essence of the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype, will be always inadequate. $. 48. But this is not all, it would also fol
Their ideas low, that the names of substances would not imperfect, only have, (as in truth they have) but would and therefore also be supposed to have, different significa- various. tions, as used by different men, which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct. quality, that were discovered in any matter by any one, were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea, signified by the common name given it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify different things in different men; since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities in substances of the same denomination, which others know nothing of.
8. 49. To avoid this, therefore, they Therefore to have supposed a real essence belonging to every species, from which these properties cies, a real all flow, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they not
supposed. having any idea of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have; that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence, without knowing what the real essence is : and this is that which men do, when they speak of species of things, as supposing them made by nature, and distinguished by real es
§. 50. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, position is of part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, all gold is fixed, contains nothing but the signification of the term gold. Or else it means, that fixedness, not
fix their spe