the favorable light in which they are presented in the message of the President and in Mr. Everett's letter? Had they forgotten the treatment met at the hands of that officer, by the steamship Ohio, then commanded by Lieutenant Schenck, of the United States Navy, who was refused communication with the shore, and was ordered to anchor under the guns of the Moro Castle, while engaged in peaceful and lawful commerce, and though no charge could be laid against any person on board of her? Had they forgotten that the Falcon, while on her usual passage from Chagres to Havana, had been fired into on the high seas, not far from the island, and was boarded and overhauled under the flippant pretense that the officers committing that indignity were ignorant of the character of the steamer, though she had borne the flag and mails of the United States a hundred times into the port of Havana, and was as well known to the Spanish cruisers and authorities as to American officers in the ports of New Orleans and New York? Had they forgotten the outrage perpetrated on the steamer Philadelphia, while on her route from Aspinwall to New Orleans? This steamer, with mails and two hundred and twenty-five passengers, and the cholera on board, had lost twenty-seven persons, and had many more prostrated and lying in agony. She entered the harbor of Havana in the forenoon of the 27th of June last, and anchored some distance from the coal wharf. The captain immediately reported to the health officer, and informed him of the condition of the ship, stating that it was indispensable to her safety and the lives of the passengers, and to enable him to proceed to New Orleans, to procure supplies of coal, provisions, water, and medicines. He ordered the ship to quarantine at once, whither she proceeded, but, directly after anchoring and blowing off steam, was ordered outside of the harbor by the captain of the port. The captain of the steamer assured him that the fires were out, and that it would take time to comply with the order. The officer said that if he did not go out at once, the guard-ship had her orders, which was understood to mean that she would fire on the steamer. As soon as possible, the Philadelphia proceeded to the outside buoy, perhaps two miles out to sea. The coal lighters, ordered by the company's agent, were towed out and brought alongside; a few tons were taken on board, when the captain of the port gave them forty minutes to complete their coaling and watering; at the end of which time, under the remonstrances of the officers of the steamer and the appeals of the suffering passengers, she was driven off with only a small quantity of coal, and none of the water, the lighter with the latter being within fifty yards of the ship at the time. She had no alternative but to abandon her route to New Orleans, and attempt to make Key West. Had not the captain of the steamer been exempt from the disease, and had not the weather proved favorable, the ship would have been lost, with all on board. Coal could not be procured at Key West; and after much delay, a sailing vessel was chartered to take the mails and a portion of the passengers to New Orleans; the residue were detained, under great suffering, until an extra steamer could be dispatched by the company from New York. The company's agent, through the American Consul at Havana, entered a protest against these proceedings. And how could the President and the Secretary of State have forgotten that a month after the above occurrences, the El Dorado, having left Aspinwall with two hundred and ninety passengers, the California mails for New Orleans and New York, and $1,700,000 of bullion, was also ordered not to enter the port of Havana? The health officer approached her off the Moro, and ascertained that a few deaths had occurred on the voyage, from the Isthmus fever, and that three railroad laborers were sick of that complaint, but that there had been no case of cholera or infectious disease on board. The Captain General, who is president of the board of health, convened the board, and the result was to order the ship to sea forthwith. The captain asked to go into quarantine only long enough to procure supplies; urging that the ship was perfectly healthy. This request was denied. The agent then desired that the ship might remain at her station, a mile outside, until he could dispatch the Empire City,

another of the United States mail steamships, then in port, to her assistance. This was also refused, and all communication between the ship and the shore interdicted. The captain of the port then ordered the ship, in the most peremptory manner, to go to sea immediately. Captain Mitchell had no alternative but to obey, and to proceed to sea, destitute of all necessaries for his voyage. The Empire City was compelled, as soon as possible, to follow and overtake her, and to change her own route to New York instead of going direct to New Orleans, whither she was bound by the company's contract with the Government. This case was also made the subject of a protest by the company's agent at Havana. Such were the dispositions exhibited by the Captain General-dispositions which seem to have conciliated to him the good will and approbation of the American Government. But, strange to say, while our rulers here were heaping censure and condemnation on the company's President, (Mr. Law,) and on the officers and employees on board the mail steamers, the Captain General himself, satisfied with Purser Smith's affidavit, was revoking the order excluding Purser Smith, and any vessel which might have him on board, from the shores of the island. Mr. Law's course in this whole matter, though made by some the object of severe censure, was but that of a spirited and independent American. Conscious that no fault could attach to the officers on board of his ships, and that the Cuban authorities, in the language of the President, had not even a good presumptive ground for the line of conduct which they had adopted, he hesitated not to vindicate at all risks, and to maintain unflinchingly, his rights, and the rights of those under him.' And is it for this that he is unmercifully branded, in the very Hall of the Senate, as a dangerous and reckless intermeddler, and as an enemy to his country? Nor had he acted incautiously. In a letter dated October 6, 1852, he sets forth his grievances, and asks to be advised as to whether the Government of Cuba is justifiable in the course it has been pursuing. He reiterates the same request in a second letter, bearing date the 27th of the same month. What answer is given him? Why, the Government declines giving any; and Mr. Law, left to his own judgment, hears no more of the Government, except through President Fillmore's letter to Hugh Maxwell, through the orders transmitted by the Postmaster General to the postmaster in New York, to withhold the mails from his ships, and through the dismissal from their command of officers allowed him from the United States Navy.

In all this the Government is invariably on the side of Spain, and against our citizens. Such had been its attitude in the deplorable affair of the Lopez expedition. When approached by Commodore Parker, and when asked why had the Atarez victims been executed without being allowed a trial within the guarantees stipulated in our treaty with Spain, Captain General Concha answers that it is because he considered them as pirates, they having been so denounced in the proclamation of

the President of the United States." And when Consul Owen makes a solemn appeal to his clemency, the unbending proconsul rebukes him by the remark, that "he is doing what he must know to be against the wishes of his Government.'

But we are told that the conduct of the Captain General, in the matter of the Crescent City," has been made the subject of serious remonstrance at Madrid." Has it, indeed? We may easily anticipate what the answer of the Spanish Cabinet will be. Will they not say: We claim the benefit of those principles of the public law under which, according to your own admission, we stand sheltered? There can be no departure from the comity of nations imputed to us as long as we remain thus protected by your own avowals? And here, as in the case of the Lopez followers, we will be told: You have absolved us-cease to complain.

And now, recurring again to the commendations which Senators have so lavishly bestowed upon the President's course, I will ask leave to know if those commendations be meant as an endorsement of the President's proclamation-of the Havana butcheries under it-of the Government's forbearance under the insults offered to our flag-of Galiano's edict-of the Secretary of State's letter to

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Mr. Law-and of the President's letter to Hugh Maxwell?

But though Senators are unwilling to wrest Cuba from Spain in any manner that might be construed into a violation of the high pledges repeatedly made to the contrary, yet they will not have the President to repudiate its acquisition on account of any scruple he may entertain as to its expediency. And here Senators find themselves again at points with him. They are for purchasing at any time and for any price; the President is against purchasing at present. His unwillingness, Senators will see, is not absolute. He finds difficulties in his way:

"Were the island comparatively destitute of inhabitants, or occupied by a kindred race, the President should regard it as a most desirable acquisition; but under existing circumstances, he should look upon its incorporation into the Union as a very hazardous measure :-"

And he is opposed to acquiring it at present, even with the free assent of Spain. His very able and shrewd Secretary of State goes somewhat further, and urges domestic reasons as militating against time when, such reasons existing no longer, it may its acquisition at present. Is there, then, to be a become desirable to acquire it? For it is admitted that its acquisition might, in certain contingencies, be almost essential to our safety. Let southern Senators, especially, ponder upon this, and ask themselves, what are those domestic reasons which exist now and may not exist hereafter? Are we to wait until Lord Palmerston's views with respect to the policy which should prevail in the Spanish councils concerning Cuba, be realized? Shall we wait that measures be adopted for con'tenting the people of Cuba, with a view to secure the 'connection between that island and the Spanish Crown;

6

as it must be evident that if the negro population of 'Cuba were rendered free, that fact would create a 'most powerful element of resistance to any scheme for annexing Cuba to the United States, where slavery exists?" Do southern Senators understand that even in the opinion of Mr. Fillmore, and of his Secretary of State, Cuba is bound to be eventually ours? And hear they not the portentous warning sent forth through the Heraldo of Madrid, which proclaims that "it is well for all to know, whether native or foreign, that the Island of Cuba can only be Spanish or African," adding that, "should the day come when the Spaniards should be found to abandon her, they will do so by BEQUEATHING THEIR SWAY TO THE BLACKS."

Are Senators sincere in their professions? Do they mean seriously to purchase Cuba? They give up, then, the settled policy of the past, and belie the repeated asseverations made by America's statesmen, that her only wish was that Spain should retain its possession. We play into the hands of those British writers who denounce our duplicity to the world, and maintain that while we seemed to suspect the intentions of foreign Powers against Cuba, we had all along an eye on making

ours.

It is not an uncommon occurrence that we are taunted, and unsparingly taunted, with the charge of hypocrisy, and with being addicted to uncontrollable grasping propensities. And we are called by ugly names, indeed; and one can hardly suppress a smile when meeting with the vulgar abuse with which we are so often assailed by the British press. I have already alluded to the vast system of buccaneering pursued by England in East India, and by France in Algiers. They are both welcome to find fault with us on account of the pretended filibustering tendencies exhibited by our people. If such tendencies do actually exist, we have from whom to claim the inheritance. I hold in my hands a most curious and interesting scheme of buccaneering, bearing no earlier date than May 14th, 1739, originally deposited in the Archives of England, and the original of which, under circumstances which it is unnecessary I should state, has found its way to this continent. It is worth perusing, and I hope I shall not be deemed intrusive while imparting it to the Senate. Here it is:

A Proposal to take the Island of Cuba with very little Expence to England by a Force rais'd in the American Colonys.

If the Crown of England could become posses'd of the Island of Cuba, that Key of all America, no man of knowledge can denye but that Great Britain, in that case, must become posses'd of the whole Trade of the Spanish Empire there; and if the simple Priviledge of trading with those

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People, upon very high Terms, is now become one of the greatest Prizes contended for by all the Powers in Europe, sure England will not neglect any oppertunity whch is offer'd of acquiring such a possesion as must Infallibly Secure that whole Invaluible trade to its Subjects alone, especially since Great Britain is now in a fair way of loosing all the Trade She has hitherto had with those parts. It is propos'd, therefore, to take Cuba without puting England to any Material Expence, or trouble, in ye following manner, (viz:)

For a person of conduct and experiance to be Commission'd from hence, for the Chief Command in this Expedition, to take Cuba, &cd. That as soon as such person is so Commiss'd and properly instructed, He is to repair, with all Expedition, to America, and at the same time another proper person should be Commission'd & sent to America, with Instructions, to begin at the most Northren Colony, and proceed from one Province to another, and apply to ye several Governments for each of them, according to their Respective Capacitys, to furnish their Quota of proper Transports with 6 months provisions in each for as many men as they will severally carry; and that each Province, according to the number of Transports they severally furnish, shall raise a suffitient number of men to fill them, compleately arm'd with amunition, &cd. That the number of men thus rais'd and armin'd shall consist of 10,000; and at the same time yt such persons are commission'd and sent away it will be necessary to send Instructions, of the same Import, to the several Governers in America to Issue orders, and give their best assistence, to fitt out, with all Expedition, such Transports, &cd, and men so equip'd.

That when each Province has furnish'd their Quota of Transports and Men, according to their abilitys, these shall imediately repair to one Place appointed, which may be at South Carolina, and from thence proceed, under the command and direction of the person to be Commission'd from bence. They may (if it shall appear advisable) in their passage make a faint to take St. Augustine, and having manag'd that stratigem properly, they are to proceed to the Island of Cuba, and Land in the Bay of Matances, that being a good Harbour and not Guarded, yet lying the nearest of any other proper one to ye Havana. Here they shall land 7 or 8000 meu, more or less, as necessity shall require, and with that Force to March down and pich at a proper distence to surround the Havana and cutt of all manner of provisions going thereto by land, at the same time that some ships shall lye before the town to prevent any provisions or relief coming to it by sea; in which situation that Important Place must surrender in a very short time. In order to render this Conquest both sure and Expeditious, it will be necessary to send 6 or 8 60-guns Ships and 2 Bomb Keches, with about 2,000 Troops on Board them, which, if necessary, may be joyn'd by some of ye station ships now in America. These Ships of Warr are intended, some to lye before the Havana to play against ye town and cutt off all relief and provisions by sea, while the American Forces Besicges it by Land; and the rest of the Ships are to take care of the Gard da Coaste.

These 10,000 men being furnish'd & maintain'd by ye several Colonies in America will render ye Conqt. of this Important Place not only secretly secure, but very cheap to England; for that number of Forces being rais'd there will, with greater certainty, Conqr. that Place than 40,000 men would to be sent from Britain, because they are Inur'd to the American Climate, and will live soberer than Britains can be prevail'd to do. By these Forces, and by them only, every man of judgment, who knows ye situation of that place, and will speake with truth and candour, will lay it down as a Fact that it is to be gain'd, with great certainty, in ye way propos'd; and if it can be thus gained, upon such easy terms to England, it would be offering an affront to ye understanding of every man of sense to pretend to recount the unlimited advantages which must accrue to Great Britain from its being posses'd of the Island of Cuba alone.

If the Conquest of Cuba is effected, a small part of the Forces which does that, may, with very little trouble, take Porto Rico, & St. Augustine if it will appear advisable so to do. The British Colonys in America lying so near the object in view, before ye knowledge of ye propos'd attempt can reach to Europe ye whole designe will be executed."

It may be asked, how it is possible to go upon ye proposed Expedition without its being known by Inquisitive deligent foreign spies, since ships of Warr are to be sent from England? In answer to that, 'tis to be hop'd England can be as Politic as Her Neighbours, (vizt:) look one way and steer ye contrary. It may, for this purpose, be given out by some that England is going to reinforce some of its Colonys, by others that she is going to resume the settlement of Darien, &c. In short there's no human appearence of this attempts miscarrying if the knowledge of it is confin'd to a Cabinet Council, & a fitt person appointed for ye Chief Command. The proposor is so well assur'd, of his own knowledge, that the American People can be brought, by proper managm't, to fitt out the Transports, and raise the men proposed, that he will undertake to accomplish it by his own personal application without either view or inclination of Cuting out or accepting of any Place or Command of profit in ye whole Transaction.

If there be an inclination to attempt this Greatest of Acquisitions it is presum'd no material objection can be made to the nature of the Proposall. It may be urged, indeed, yt it will be Dishonorable to make such an attempt while there's a Treaty on Foot with Spain; but such an objec tion must stand or fall by the Wisdom and at ye Discretion of His Majestys Ministers; tho' 'tis humbly presum'd if the word Politick be not an empty sound, that objection, nor none like it, can hold. It is to be observ'd that if yé preparation of ye Transports and men propos'd is not to be set on Foot 'till it is seen that nothing can be done with ye Court of Spain, by Treaty, for the advantage of ye British nation, it will then be too late to begin to prepair and colect them: It is presum'd they should be prepair'd as soon as possible, in order to be colected, and ready to go upon the Attack when necessity may make it proper; and if it shall appear that there will be no occasion to make such an attempt, after they are got in readiness, the design may be

laid aside without inconveniency to England in either case. It may be ask'd, were Cuba taken, how it would be Garrison'd without-Forces from England? for 'tis to be understood that ye American People who are propos'd to be rais'd must not be compell'd to stay in ye Garrison against their own inclination. In answer to yt 'tis suffi't now to say that ye propos 'r has also conceived a pretty certain method to Garrison, not only that, but all ye Places mention'd, if they are taken, wthout much expence to England, but weh he begs leave to reserve to himself, it being too long to incert here, 'till he sees how this proposall will be approved off. J. H. Endorsed Proposall for taking Cuba in America. In Mr. Hamilton's of May ye 14, 1739.

Had I suppressed but the date of that document, Senators might have supposed that I was reading from some stray paper, fallen from the portfolio of General Lopez. But it is truly a British conception; and that it was entertained by the British Government, Senators will have but little doubt, when, upon perusing the correspondence sent us yesterday by the Executive, they will come to that part of it which brings to light a letter from Sir William Pultney to Admiral Vernon, bearing date August 27th, 1740, where, speaking of Cuba, "TAKE AND HOLD" is said to be the cry, and in which the bold adventurer boasts that "when we (the British) are possessed of IT, the whole world will not be able to dispossess us again.'

Nor should Spain show herself over-sensitive about such undertakings. Know we not that but a few years ago a general of some repute (Flores) found the coffers of the Queen Mother open to him, that he might organize an expedition to conquer Ecquador, and establish a monarchy there, under one of Christina's sons by the Duke of Rianzares? If the papers of that day deserve any credit, Isturitz, who was then at the head of the Spanish Cabinet, so far favored the undertaking that he allowed Flores to take from the ranks of the army some of the best officers, furnishing them with passports that they might engage in the adventure without losing their rank at home. Men, under their lead, gathered from all parts of the kingdom,

and assembled to the number of two thousand at Santander, where they could publicly be seen during two entire months, parading with Flores's colors. The whole scheme was afterwards defeated, through the agency of the British Government, which, dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Spain, and especially with certain transactions in which Christína was supposed to have favored the interests of France, stopped the gathering of an equal number of troops already enrolled, and about to depart on board of the two steamers then in the Thames, seized the steamers, and defeated the whole plan. Have we not seen the identical vessels, restored afterwards to Queen Christina, in part compensation for her disbursements, come and ply in the waters of the Havana, under the names of the Cetro and Tridente? Why, I am afraid there was something of the "filibuster" in the American general, who, in 1812, misreading the instructions given to him by Mr. Monroe, then Secretary of State, took forcible possession of Amelia Island and Pensacola; and even in Mr. Monroe himself, who, while disavowing the act of the unmindful general, advised the retaining of the points taken for an amicable adjustment with Spain.

In his letter of April 10th, of the same year, to Mr. Mitchell, Governor of Georgia, Mr. Monroe says:

"The policy of the law and of the President is not to wrest the province forcibly from Spain; but only to occupy it with a view to prevent its falling into the hands of any foreign Power, and to hold that pledge under the existing peculiarity of the circumstances of the Spanish monarchy, for a just result in an amicable negotiation with Spain."

He was a "filibuster" (Hamilton) who, in 1797, strove so hard to organize an invasion of the Spano-American colonies under the protection of this Government, and in concert with General Miranda, with a view to help those colonies towards their independence. There were "filibusters" among those who, in 1819, 20, and '21, rushed from our shores to the Mexican main, with arms and ammunition, and so efficiently assisted in bringing about the overthrow of the Spanish rule there, and among those who, in 1836, could be seen parading publicly in the streets and thoroughfares of New Orleans, under the inspiring eye of General Andrew Jackson, preparatory to their joining the Texans in their struggles against Mexico. Ay, sir, I have shown that there might

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be found some "filibustering" in the President's message. But I assure you that there is much of it in Mr. Everett's letter-a document which needs no eulogies of mine, as it goes now the rounds of the country, escorted by the well-deserved commendations of the highest intellects of this body. In it the Secretary of State disdains to confine himself to the mere contingency of a disposition on the part of Spain to alienate Cuba. He boldly approaches the very heart of the question, and claims at the outset that "THE CONDITION OF CUBA IS MAINLY AN AMERICAN QUESTION." This, I suppose, is intended to be a sufficient reply to the assertion in Mr. de Turgot's instructions to Mr. de Sartiges," that the condition of the island is of no less importance TO THE RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN THE GREAT MARITIME POWERS than to the interests of Spain herself." And he proudly declines entering into obligations that would impose a permanent disability on the American change of circumstances, from doing what has been so Government, and prevent it, "under any future often done in time past ;" for the possession of the island might, under certain contingencies, "BE ALMOST ESSENTIAL TO OUR SAFETY. He vindicates the law of progress, which is "as organic and vital in the youth of States as of individual men.'

But mark how careful he is to remind Spain that while the President will never, by word or

deed, question her title or shake her possession, he is unwilling that she should indulge deceitful dreams. Speaking of the present condition of the island, he asks the question whether "it can be expected to last very long?"-adding, with marked emphasis, "Can it resist the mighty current in the fortunes of the world?" And lastly, referring anew to the onward tendencies of our people, how contemptuously he touches upon the impotency of

conventions to arrest "THE LAW OF AMERICAN GROWTH AND PROGRESS!"

commendation which has been bestowed upon that But while I am most willing to join in every most important document, I cannot overlook its remissness in not rebuking the impertinent threat implied in the very first sentences of both the communications sent to Messrs. De Sartige and Crampton by the Cabinets of Paris and St. James. With the exception of the paragraph through which Mr. de Turgot reminds the American Govment of the orders sent to the British and French naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico, with a view to protect the Island of Cuba against new attempts at invading it, and wherein he asserts that the great maritime Powers have, in the destinies of that island, an interest equal to that of Spain herself-with that exception, the two communications are identical. And the presumptuous intermeddlers hesitate not to declare that we are to be made responsible for any repetition of such "atCuba by lawless bands of adventurers from the United tacks as have lately been made on the Island of States;" for "those attacks have engaged the serious attention of their Majesties' Governmentsthe more especially as they are most anxious 'that the friendly relations now existing between 'those Governments and the United States SHOULD NOT BE ENDANGERED, as they might be by a rep'etition of such attacks."

Are you not struck, Mr. President,—are not Senators struck,-with the haughty tone which pervades these communications? Do we mean to bear that England and France should speak to us in so arrogant and menacing a language? Are we to bend submissively to their dictation? And must we put up with such revolting indignities? Had we met them as it behooved a mighty nation like ours, when they presumed to career their fleets over the Gulf, and to cruise with them between Cuba and our shores, with the avowed design of constituting themselves the supervisors of our movements in those waters, and of inquiring into and determining “with what intent" adventurers of ANY NATION might attempt to land on the Island of Cuba;-had we insisted upon those explanations being given which Mr. Crittenden, then Acting Secretary of State, had required at the hands of the British Minister-it will hardly be supposed that we would at this day be approached in the supercilious style with which we are given to understand that we must henceforth hold ourselves responsible for any attempt which it may please adventurers of any nation to make on the Island

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and might be unwilling to accept even their liberation, if purchased at such a sacrifice of what they deemed to be their dignity and honor. Were it not better for Spain to take counsel from the past, and turn to profit the lessons of the history of her own relations, as well as that of the relations of England, with the colonies of this continent? What has it availed them to resist the wisdom of those statesmen who advised a reconciliation of their mutual interest and wishes upon the basis of the independence of the colonies? Had she not better bravely face the future, and ask herself if it be not time for her to realize that mighty boast of Canning with respect to what remains of her colonies within the waters of this continent, and to call a new nation into existence? Might she not, by treaty, secure what there is valuable in the commerce of that island with the

mother country? And would not this political child of her old age willingly come forth, and, assuming its share of the burdens which so heavily load her, aid towards the restoration of her finances, and thereby facilitate those improvements which of late have marked a new era in the tendencies of Spain, and may prepare for her destinies worthy of her past?

To us, Mr. President, the independence of Cuba is just as desirable as her annexation to this Confederacy. That there is a spirit amongst its inhabitants which must, sooner or later, rouse them to a decisive stand against their present rulers, cannot be the subject of a doubt with any thinking man. The very disasters which have befallen those who, in times past, hoisted the banner of rebellion, will be but new inducements for renewing the attempt. Misfortune but nerves those whose breasts shelter noble aspirations; and while great and powerful emotions spring from impending dangers, a host of virtues rise in arms to brave

them.

Let not Spain be deceived. Let her not slumber, wrapt in deceitful security. It would not do for her to indulge in enervating dreams. One cannot repel the invasion of advancing years by the remembrances of youth. Cuba cannot long be hers; and its becoming African, would not redeem its loss. We can have no wish that it become a bone of contention between her and us. As long as the Powers of Europe shall not presume to interfere with the relations which its proximity to our shore, and the possibility of its being made an obstruction to one of our great commercial outlets, create between her and us, she need apprehend no tampering on our part with any scheme that may be devised against its remaining longer under her dominion. Should, however, her sons assert and vindicate the eternal rights of freemen, and, being grown to manhood, claim to be their own rulers, let her not take offense at our pursu ing towards them the course which we pursued towards her other colonies when they were preparing for their independence. When a country reaches that amplitude of consequence and power which reveals its ability to suffice to its own government, we deem that it becomes of right entitled to independence of State.

I am also unwilling to disguise that by suffering England and France to assume over her a kind of tutorship, and to become the guardians and sponsors of her sovereignty, Spain has surrendered her main title to the dominion of such possessions as she thus places under the strong arm of those Powers. The complications arising from that very state of things are but too well calculated to produce the very necessity which, under peculiar circumstances, and with the law of nations pleading for us, might justify on our part one of those decided measures which are not uncommon in the history of nations, and might entirely invert the relations in which we stand to her. This I most earnestly wish to avoid. And whatever there is in reserve for us, in a more or less distant future, I am willing to leave for the untrammeled wisdom of those in whose keeping our destinies will soon be.

But let not Spain be unmindful of her true position, and think that she can, by unworthy devices, protect her possessions against their impending doom. In vain would she direct her Ministers to let the island sink into the ocean rather than see it transferred to any other Power. Should the hurricane rage, the island would still be found

looming above the waters, and smiling upon the angry wave, while her sovereignty might disappear in the storm. When the time comes, neither the surges of the sea, nor her forts, nor her cannon, nor her garotes, nor the edicts of her Galianos, will save her from our mighty grasp. Hear the historian: “ In vain did Sabinus place ancestral statues upon the threshold of the gates of the Capitol, that they might prevent the enemy from penetrating, torch in hand. The very eagles supporting 'the arches took fire, and communicated it to the 'edifice."

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touch the subject before the Senate, for that must be determined upon its own merits, and not upon the authority of names, never, however, to be slightly regarded; but it touches the fame of Mr. Monroe as a practical and enlightened statesman, for such he truly was; but upon this construction of his views he did not comprehend the consequence of his own positions, and could not see that the grounds of his policy extended beyond the single case then more immediately before him. His principles were unquestionably called out by the peculiar danger of the South American States, and by the claims of Russia on our north-western coast. These circumstances led him to this investigation into the principles of our position with respect to this continent, and the result we have this farfamed message.

Mr. CASS. Mr. President, I should be unwilling to address the Senate upon the general subject at this time, when we have just listened to the eloquent remarks of the honorable Senator [Mr. SOULE] who has but now resumed his seat—in remarks which I have not heard surpassed in this body, either in power or beauty. I do not intend to commit the folly of provoking a contrast, under such circumstances; but I have prepared extracts from several documents, touching the question, which has been raised of the extent and duration of the Monroe doctrine, and I desire to accompany them with some brief observations, which I will now submit to the Senate, if I can be favored with its attention for a few minutes.

For thirty years the world, at any rate the American portion of it, and a good deal of the European, has talked of the MONROE DOCTRINE, and every school-boy thought he understood it, and that it was founded upon a great principle, that the destiny of this hemisphere should be controlled by the people inhabiting it, and that European influence should be excluded from it, as far and as fast as existing rights would permit. Mr. Monroe, in 1823, presented, in a message to Congress, his general views of the relations of the Powers of Europe to this continent, as well with respect to their interference with its independent States, as to projects of new colonization. To be sure, as has been remarked, these two topics are to be found in different parts of the same message, but merely because each connected itself more directly with different practical measures; but both together formed his DOCTRINE, which was founded on the great principle advanced by Mr. Jefferson, that "America, North and South, has a set of interests 'distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her

'own.

She should therefore have a system of her 'own, separate and apart from that of Europe.' And by Mr. Polk, "that the people of this continent have a right to decide their own destiny.'

Mr. Polk, in 1848, when the "Holy Alliance" was a matter of almost remote history, in a message to Congress on the subject of the application of the Government of Yucatan for aid against the Indians, reaffirmed the Monroe doctrine, and observed:

"According to our established policy, we could not consent to a transter of this dominion and sovereignty either to Spain, Great Britain, or any other European Power. In the language of President Monroe, in his message of December, 1823, We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their systein to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. Our own security requires, that the established policy thus announced should

guide our conduct, and this applies with great force to the

peninsula of Yucatan."

It would be a mere waste of time to comment upon these views of Mr. Polk. They speak for themselves with equal force and clearness, and they were avowed more than a quarter of a century after Mr. Monroe had promulgated his doctrine, thus considered by Mr. Polk as the permanent American policy. The principles it asserts are perpetual in their obligation, and the policy itself challenges our attention and enforcement, in all time, present and to come.

It is now said that this Monroe doctrine, so far as respects the independent States of the continent, embalmed, as it was and is, in the hearts of the American people, instead of being a great system of policy, as enduring as our political condition, was but a temporary measure, applicable only to the anticipated design of the "Holy Alliance," as it was unholily called, to restore the recently-emancipated American States to the dominion of Spain. Instead of being a great principle of action, worthy of this Republic, it would thus become a mere expedient, passing away with the occasion, that called it into being. Whether this be so or not is a question which does not

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And generally, it happens in the policy of nations, that particular exigencies call forth the discussion and assertion of great principles; but while the former disappear in the march of events, the latter remain to be reasserted and maintained, under all circumstances to which they are applicable. As the foundation of his doctrine, he assumed the then existing status or condition of the continent, disclaiming all intention of interfering with existing rights, but maintaining principles which denied to the Powers of Europe the assumption to interfere with any independent State at any time thereafter, or ever plant or establish new colonies. Upon these general principles, European influence might decrease in this hemisphere, but could not increase; for independence, once obtained, then and thereafter, the States so obtaining it passed from the danger of European subjugation, and would be beyond the reach, not of Spain merely, but of France, or England, or any other transatlantic Power. And I may remark here, as a proof that Mr. Monroe considered both of the topics in his message but parts of one plan of policy, that in the anti-colonization passage he makes no reservation of existing colonial rights, but declares, that these would be respected, in that part of the message where he protests against the subjugation of the Spanish States, thus showing the intimate relation of the whole subject in his mind. This inquiry into the origin of this doctrine belongs, in truth, to the domain of history, and not to that of our permanent policy; for the name of the doctrine, whether Monroe, or Polk, or Jefferson, or yet better, American, matters little; the true question being whether it shall be enforced, now and hereafter.

But Mr. Monroe, in his message of December, 1824, a year after the one containing the views referred to, renewed the subject, and in such language as leaves no doubt, but that this DOCTRINE, in his view of it, was perpetual, and to be made part of our national code of policy. He said:

"Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European Governments, nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn, in its various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every Power, and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European Governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to, which are vital, without affecting us. Indeed, the motive, which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear equally applicable to us."

Now, it will be seen, that these principles had no peculiar relation to the "Holy Alliance," as it is contended those of the first message had, but they extend to all time, and to all the European Governments. Indeed, we learn from Mr. Clay, in some remarks made in the House of Representatives in June, 1824, that the fear of the action of that alliance upon these States had given way, and "that if such a purpose were ever seriously entertained, it had been relinquished.' Mr. Monroe, in fact, in the passage from which the above extract is taken, considers the condition of these States much improved and strengthened, and his observations evidently bear upon future difficulties, not then foreseen, but which might happen, and would then have to be met. We may yet have to meet them.

Mr. Monroe, it is well known, was in the habit of consulting Mr. Jefferson in all grave conjunctures, and fortunately he consulted him on the subject of his doctrine, and we have the senti

32D CONG.....2D SESS.

ments of that patriarch of the Democratic faith in relation to it. These are to be found in a letter from him to Mr. Monroe, dated October 24, 1823, a few weeks before the message appeared, written in answer to Mr. Monroe's application for his opinion.

Mr. Jefferson said:

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous, which has ever been offered to my contemplation, since that of independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass, and points the course, which we are to steer through the ocean of time. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe; the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism-our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom."

Can one man be found, who will contend, that these noble sentiments, worthy of him who uttered them, and now become a precious legacy for the American people,-can one man, I say, be found, who will venture to contend, that these words of wisdom and patriotism are temporary in their force and application, belonging only to the passing hour, and confined to the efforts of a league, which, I believe, died before the writer, short even as was his tenure of life? Thus to narrow down a great national principle, is wholly to mistake the liberality and far-reaching policy of this, the greatest of American statesmen, after the first and the dearest, Washington. "HIS OCEAN OF TIME OPENING UPON US" was bounded by no such contracted limits. It was a true ocean, and not a mere duckpond.

And this same letter of Mr. Jefferson exhibits, in a still more signal manner, the vast importance he attached to this principle of never suffering Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs. Why, sir, he was actually ready, even then, to go to war for its practical maintenance. He was far ahead of all of us, and I must confess that I have seldom been more gratified, than to find myself thus not only supported, but anticipated by a name, which will five in the hearts of the American people as long as they cherish a reverence for real patriotism, true Democracy, and the highest qualities of our nature, ennobled by a life devoted to his country. I can now stand proudly upon this position, pointing to Mr. Jefferson's declaration, that he was willing to fight even along side of England in such a cause-"not that I would purchase," he says, "her amity at the price ' of war. But the war in which the present prop'osition might engage us, should that be its con'sequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system of keeping out of our land all foreign Powers, of NEVER, (not to-day,) of NEVER permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our 'nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not 'to depart from it." Any question of the justice or expediency of the first of these resolutions, I may hereafter consider a question between the objector and Mr. Jefferson, and not one between the fornier and myself.

The opinion of Mr. Adams, who of course could not but understand the views of Mr. Monroe, as he was then Secretary of State, and of Mr. Clay, who took a deep interest in this matter, and introduced a joint resolution into the House of Representatives on the 29th of January, 1824, affirming the non-interference doctrine of Mr. Monroe, are distinctly shown in the instruction of Mr. Clay to Mr. Poinsett, dated March 25, 1825, wherein Mr. Monroe's message and principles are referred to, and their existing force asserted and assumed. Mr. Clay, while reporting these instructions to Mr. Adams, for transmission to the House of Representatives, observes, "that 'all apprehension of the danger to which Mr. 'Monroe alludes, of an interference by the allied 'Powers, (otherwise the Holy Alliance,') to 'introduce their political systems into this hemisphere, have ceased." But notwithstanding this, in these instructions to Mr. Poinsett, he is told that the great principle of non-interference "was declared in the face of the world" (by Mr. Monroe) "at a moment when there was reason to appre'hend, that the allied Powers were entertaining

Colonization in North America-Mr. Cass.

The President, [Mr. Adams,] who then formed a part of it, continues entirely 'to coincide in both, and you will urge upon the Government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principles on all proper occasions.

What principles? Not a single one, so narrow and temporary, as to be confined to a mere passing occurrence, to a league which had as much passed away from any operation on this continent as the Grecian league for the destruction of Troy. If Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay did not wholly misunderstand Mr. Monroe's doctrine, it was precisely the doctrine enunciated in the resolution before the Senate. One fact stated by Mr. Clay upon the authority of Mr Adams, shows, that this declaration of Mr. Monroe was a Cabinet measure, fully considered, and no doubt amply discussed. Indeed, without this authority, judging from the cautious character of Mr. Monroe, it would have been safe to conclude, that so important a step would not have been taken by him without consultation with his confidential advisers. And especially, as it is known that his messages, before being sent to Congress, were always read, and, if occasion required, discussed, paragraph by paragraph, at Cabinet meetings; and such indeed was the practice of his predecessors.

SENATE.

Thirty years have produced a wonderful change in the world, since these remarks of Mr. Jefferson. They have produced none in our interestand our desire to procure Cuba, when we can do it justly, nor in our willingness, that it should become independent. But as to any fear that England would oppose us in taking possession of Cuba, under a voluntary arrangement with Spain, or under any other proper circumstances, it is a feelng which will never, I trust, enter into our public councils, certainly never into the hearts of the American people. Events since that period have augmented our power in a mighty ratio, and have taught us to use it when our honor and interest require the exertion. Mr. Jefferson, when he wrote this letter, undoubtedly supposed that Cuba would follow the example of the other Spanish provinces, and become independent.

Mr. Clay appreciated the importance of Cuba, as well as of Porto Rico; for we find, in a letter which he wrote to Mr. Middleton, on the 26th of December, 1825, that Minister was directed to inform the Russian Government that "we cannot 'allow the transfer of these islands to any Euro'pean Power;" and the same determination was avowed, in still stronger terms, in a dispatch to the American Minister to Paris, to be made known to the French Government, "that we would not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European Power than Spain, under any

'circumstances whatsoever.

Now, sir, I shall pursue this topic no further, satisfied that these resolutions are not only just in themselves, but that they assert a system of policy sanctioned by the opinions of some of the highest names in our political history. It will appear, in looking back to the extracts I have made from the letter of Mr. Jefferson, that I am supported by the weight of his opinion in the following propoembodied in or connected with these reso

lutions:

First. That European Powers should not be permitted "to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs," meaning thereby those affairs which relate to the political condition of the people of this continent, and accepting the reservation of Mr. Monroe that existing colonial rights should not be interfered with.

Second. That this doctrine should be adhered to, even, if necessary, at the expense of war.

Mr. Clay states that the declaration of Mr. Monroe had been useful. Still its efficiency was limited by the considerations already adverted to, that it was the act only of the Executive Depart-sitions, ment, which could not pledge the nation to any particular course of policy. Congress alone could do that; and the propriety of its action was so obvious, that both Mr. Clay and Mr. Poinsett introduced resolutions into the House of Representatives affirming the doctrine. It is probable, that the reason given by Mr. Clay for not pushing the one presented by him to a final vote, operated also on others; and that was that the apprehended danger from the "Holy Alliance" had disappeared, and I suppose, then, as now, the difficulty of carrying such a measure increased, as the cause of apprehension decreased. We stopped short in our true work, and waited for another expedient before proclaiming a principle. Mr. Jefferson also, with his sound practical wisdom, saw that Mr. Monroe's declaration, in order to attain its object, needed the support and authority of Congress; and he therefore recommended to him, in the letter already referred to, that "as it may lead to war, 'the declaration of which requires an act of Congress, the case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting, and under the 'reasonable aspect, in which it is seen by himself," (the President.)

Third. That the United States have a deep interest in the acquisition of Cuba, and that if we cannot obtain possession of it without too great a cost of blood or treasure, it must be secured (especially from the control of England) by its independence. And we may add, now, since circumstances have much changed, and the immediate dangers, then impending over the island have passed away, that it may with safety remain in the possession of Spain, so long as she can hold it, and takes no step to convert it to our injury.

Fourth. That it is proper, that declarations upon these subjects should be submitted to Congress, in order to procure their coöperation, as, without it, such declarations might be fruitless.

Fifth. In addition to these propositions, there is another opinion advanced by Mr. Jefferson in this

With respect to Cuba, I am glad to be able to fortify my position by the opinions of both Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Clay. No man will now ac-letter, which I confess I have read with unmixed cuse either of those distinguished statesmen with being influenced by any other motives, than a love of country, and a desire to promote her interest in a spirit of justice.

Mr. Jefferson, in the same letter, said:

"I candidly confess I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition, which could ever be made to our system of States. The control, which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well being. Yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her [Spain's] own consent but by war, [he means a war with England from her opposition to the measure,] and its independence, [that of Cuba,] which is our second interest, and especially its independence of England can be secured without it, I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and accepting its independence, with peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association [query: accession?] at the expense of war and her entity."

It is due to Mr. Jefferson to state, that at the time he wrote, free institutions through the world seemed to have much to apprehend from this Holy Alliance, and believing that England was really desirous of thwarting their views, he was therefore the more willing to act in concert with her.

satisfaction, for it confirms in full the propriety of the proposition, which I submitted to the Senate at our last session, to declare our protest against the atrocious violation of the rights of nations by the interference of one Power, the Emperor of Russia, in the internal affairs of another, the Hungarian kingdom. Mr. Jefferson's words deserve to be held in perpetual remembrance. Here they are:

"Nor is the occasion to be slighted, which this proposi tion offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violation of the rights of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawess alliance, calling itself holy."

Here we have the principle distinctly asserted of the propriety of a national protest upon such an occasion, and we have the authority of the very author of the expression" entangling alliances," so triumphantly appealed to last session as a reason for our inaction, for denying its applicability to the case; which, indeed, ought to have been obvious enough, without this exposition of his own doctrine, unless it could be shown, that we could form an alliance without allies, and that allies are created simply by a protest against an assumption