ceed that of most of our moderns as much as our knowledge of physics exceeds theirs.

White is either ignorant of their language or studiously misrepresents its meaning; he plays upon the word substantial, and is guilty of a dishonest quibble in its use, or he knows nothing of the language of schoolmen. The only difference which exists between us and them, is in the mode of expression. In our language at present, substantial does not mean what it did in the schools; and any person who would attach to the word in the schools the same meaning which it has in present common usage would be grossly in error. In the schools it means real, not chimerical. Appearances or secondary qualities of bodies which affect our senses, are by modern philosophers said to be nothing in the body, but are effects produced by the body upon us; thus heat, according to some, is a sensation of the soul produced by the disposition of the parts of that body which is said to be hot. I find several bodies of unlike substance but of the same temperature; iron, brass, lead, stone, cotton are all different substances, but all have the same degree of heat. The schoolman said that the accident of heat existed absolutely in each of them, that they all had the same substantial form of heat: a modern will tell you that they all emit the same quantity of caloric: another will tell you that they are all so configured as to produce the same sensation of heat in fact they are but different modes of expressing the same idea; the expression being accommodated to the philosophical theory of the day, which theory is as yet fluctuating and unsettled. White then asserts what is not the fact when he informs his readers that the schoolmen supposed the "forms of qualities" to possess a real and "substantial being" if by substantial he would have us believe any thing different from or beyond what the modern mean by the same real existence of those qualities. I shall give an illustration. In the book of Josue it is stated that an angel appeared to that leader, in the shape of a warrior: there was here an angelic substance clothed with human appearance. The schoolman would say, the substance of a man was not there, but the substantial form or absolute accidents of a man were there, and clothed the angelic substance which was really there; thus the figure, color, and so forth, of a human being existed where the substance did not: a modern philosopher would tell you that those secondary qualities cannot exist but in the substance of a human being, that therefore as the substance of a human being was not here, these accidents which can exist only in that substance did not exist here: but he acknowledges that the angelic substance was really there, and that God miraculously caused the impressions upon the senses of Josue to be the same as if

the substance of a human being and not that of an angel were present. Thus the modern and the ancient differ only in their mode of expressing the same identical idea, which is "the substance of an angel appeared as that of man. Before the doctrine of substantial forms or absolute accidents found its way into the schools, Christians believed that Christ was really present in the Eucharist by virtue of a change produced by God: when this philosophy prevailed, the schoolmen said that the substance was changed, but the absolute accidents remained: when a new philosophy succeeded, it was still taught [that] the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of Christ; but [that] after consecration, God produces upon our senses the same impressions by the new substance that he would by the old, if no change had taken place; thus all the parade of our philosopher is of no avail; the same idea was still expressed in other terms suited to the age: the doctrine remained unchanged. I doubt if many members of the holy alliance have seen it before, but White does not understand Aristotle's definition of the matter. Upon his next paragraph I shall make little comment: it is the following:

"The idea of a general mass shaped by these substantial forms or moulds, is so agreeable to the external impressions of mankind, and so analogous to the operations by which what we call materials are converted into objects fitted for peculiar uses; that the words in which the school philosophers expressed them, have been incorporated with all the European languages." 21

The good gentleman, I am convinced, knows just as little of the scholastic authors, and of the Aristotelic philosophy, as he does of the materials of the moon. I shall leave him and Bishop Kemp to get, as well as they can, out of transubstantiation of their own Churches. Of one thing I must avow my own perfect ignorance, upon which perhaps, some one might condescend to inform me, viz. "What is the doctrine of the Church of England or what is the doctrine of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States respecting the nature of the Eucharist." Do they believe the doctrine of the real presence? If they do, which is it, by consubstantiation with the Lutherans, or by transubstantiation with the Greeks and Latins? If they do not believe the real presence of Christ's body how can they eat it? Can we eat what they

21It is curious to trace to the same source even the word elements, which seems to have been chosen by the Protestants as the most independent from the theory of conceived to bear the qualities of things. Omnium elementa possunt invicem in se transmutari, non generatione, sed alteratione. The bread and wine were elements because they were supposed to be changed into the body and blood of Christ. See Brucker, Hist. Philos. part ii, lib. ii, c. vii."

have not present? What is the difference between eating and believing? Do the two phrases mean the same, "I eat," "I believe"? How could the word elements be chosen to avoid expressing transubstantiation, if bread and wine were called elements because they were supposed to be changed into the body and blood of Christ? I can understand the doctrine of Zuinglius, who says that after consecration there is only what was before; but that in eating the bread and drinking the wine, you eat and drink what you have present, viz. bread and wine, that in doing so you may call to mind a former occurrence, and that for doing so, you may receive grace from God: but this is not eating Christ's body. I can understand the doctrine of the Catholic Church, which says that at the consecration although no apparent change occurs, yet a substantial change takes place, and now Christ's body and blood assume the appearance of bread and wine, or have the substantial forms, or absolute accidents of those substances or matters: in this case I eat Christ's body which is present, but I eat not bread which has ceased to be present, and I only require the power of God to perform the change, which is within that power. I can understand the doctrine of the Lutheran Church which states that the body of Christ is placed together with the substance of the bread under its appearance, for in this case I can conceive two substances, under one appearance; it requires more extensive miraculous interference than does the Catholic doctrine, because it requires that two bodies shall occupy the same space; but in this case the communicant eats the body of Christ, as also bread, because both are present. But I cannot understand the person who tells me; "You eat what is not present, you eat Christ's body although it is not there.' Nor is the proposition made intelligible by informing me that the mode in which I eat the absent body is by Faith, because faith is belief, and eating and believing are not in fact synonymous. Hence I have always looked upon the doctrine of Bishop Kemp's Church on this sacrament to be too abstruse for my conception, or to be sheer nonsense: it might however be owing to my own stupidity.

We now come to the last paragraph of the note, page 245:

"That the doctrine of transubstantiation could not have been established without the aid of Aristotle, any one who examines the technical words of the Roman Catholic divines, upon that question, will readily perceive. Of this they were so fully convinced but a short time ago, that I recollect the opposition to which the modern system of natural philosophy was still subject in my youth, as depriving the Roman Catholic faith of its chief support, by the rejection of the substantial forms. Indeed, transubstantiation conveys either no meaning at all,

or one entirely the reverse of what Rome intends; unless we suppose the separableness of substance, and forms or qualities. The substance of the bread and wine, it is said, is converted into the body and blood of Christ, which, translated into any language but that of the schools, means that the body of Christ (I wish to speak reverently) chemically analyzed in the consecrated bread and wine, will be found to consist of every thing which constitutes bread and wine, i. e. the body and blood of Christ will be found to have been converted into real bread and wine. What else do we designate by bread and by wine but two aggregates of qualities, identical to what the analytical process will show after consecration? Substance without qualities is a mere abstraction of the mind; with qualities, it is that which the qualities make it. So here we have a mighty miracle to convert Christ into bread and wine; for such would be the substance of his body if it changed its qualities for those of the two well known compounds which the Roman Catholics adore. If it is said that Christ occupies the place of the bread and wine, and produces the impressions peculiar to them on the senses, the supposed miracle should change the name of transubstantiation into that of delusion. Surely transubstantiation has for its basis the most absurd philosophical system which ever disgraced the schools of a barbarous age!"

The first proposition here is altogether untrue, upon the old maxim of the schoolmen, ab actu ad posse valet consecutio. The doctrine was established long before the aid of Aristotle was sought to explain its philosophy. Ages succeeding ages saw it spread through nations before the principles of the Greek philosopher were applied to the subject; and it now exists where that philosopher has been rejected, of which the selfcontradicting White himself bears evidence in this very passage; for he admits that the modern system of philosophy co-existed with the belief in the Spanish universities, though some advocates of the Aristotelic system raised the difficulties which he states. Did he deny what he here admits, I am prepared with abundant evidence to show the co-existence of the doctrine of transubstantiation, and of the modern theory of natural philosophy in the great majority of European universities, and in some of them long before the birth of White, who avows his own idleness, and consequently his own ignorance. Some of the most steady believers in the doctrine have been some of the best contributors to modern science in France, in Italy, in Germany, and even in Spain itself.

But of all the miserable attempts to put on the semblance of learning that ever fell under my eye, the following is the most abject. "What do we designate by bread and wine but two aggregates of qualities iden

tical to what the analytical process will show after consecration." And this is the man who laughed at substantial forms and absolute accidents! Surely he ought to have known that bread and wine are substances, and not qualities, nor aggregates of qualities!!! Bread is an aggregate of identical qualities!! Bless him for the discovery! He has at last gone beyond my reach, "substance without qualities is a mere abstraction of the mind." Granted, good Sir; and so are qualities without substance, or as the old schoolmen would call them absolute accidents, also an abstraction of the mind; and yet White gives us this abstraction, this aggregate of qualities for bread! "With qualities, it is that which the qualities make it." By no means, good Sir; it is the substance which produces the qualities, or, if you will, make them; and not they that make the substance:

and

You must, in all natural cases, have the substance of gold before you will have its color, gravity, taste, and so forth. It is not the taste and smell which make the wine, but the wine which makes, or produces, or causes them. Such is the case according to the laws of nature, hence, though the qualities do not make the substance, we will generally, but not universally arrive at a knowledge of the substance itself, by ascertaining what the qualities are; this, I suspect, is what the philosopher was blundering to express, when he compiled this paragraph of jargon. I said this was not universally the case; for there are several instances where our knowledge is so limited, that we draw our inferences too hastily; the principle upon which they are drawn is analogy, and this is not the most easily ascertained, our observation is not sufficiently close, nor experience sufficiently extensive, nor acquaintance with nature sufficiently intimate to save us from mistakes, and those of the most serious, and not unfrequently of the most fatal description. But in miraculous cases, it is totally inapplicable. I shall instance but one or two. The "aggregate of qualities" in the apparition of the angel of Josue would lead to the conclusion, that the substance was that of man. Did the qualities make the substance in this case? The "aggregate of qualities" would have made the Holy Ghost the substance of a dove in one instance;23 and the substance of fire in another.24 Will Bishop Kemp hold to the "identical analytical process?" In those cases, the substance was neither made nor detected by the qualities. And yet there was no delusion, because there was a mode afforded for discovering by the declaration of God and by faith, what could never have been detected or

22 Josue v, 13.

23 John i, 32. 24 Acts ii, 3.

22