1. Is to be had only by sen

sation.

2. Instance, whiteness of this

paper.

3. This, though not so cer-

tain as demonstration, yet

may be called knowledge,

and proves the existence

of things without us.

4. First, because we cannot

have them but by the in-

lets of the senses.

5. Secondly, because an idea

from actual sensation, and

another from memory, are

very distinct perceptions.

6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain,

which accompanies actual

sensation, accompanies not

the returning of those

ideas, without the external

objects.

7. Fourthly, our senses assist

one another's testimony of

the existence of outward

things,

8. This certainty is as great.

as our condition needs.
9. But reaches no farther
than actual sensation.
10. Folly to expect demon.
stration in every thing.

11. Past existence is known by
memory.

12. The existence of spirits
not knowable.
13. Particular propositions con-
cerning existence are know,
able.

14. And general propositions
concerning abstract ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our know
ledge.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from

maxims.

2. (The occasion of that opi

nion.)

3. But from the comparing

clear and distinct ideas.

4. Dangerous to build upon

precarious principles.

5. This no certain way to

truth.

6. But to

compare clear,

complete ideas under stea-

dy names.

7. The true method of ad.

vancing knowledge, is by

considering our abstract

ideas.

8. By which, morality, also,

may be made clearer.

9. But knowledge of bodies

is to be improved only by

experience.

10. This may procure us con-

venience, not science.

11. We are fitted for moral

knowledge, and natural

improvements.

12. But must beware of hypo-

theses and wrong princi

ples.

13. The

1. Our assent ought to be

regulated by the grounds

of probability.

2. These cannot be always

actually in view, and then

we must content ourselves
with the remembrance,
that we once saw ground

for such a degree of assent.

3. The ill consequence of this,

if our former judgment

were not rightly made.
4. The right use of it, is
mutual charity and for-
bearance.

5. Probability is either of

matter of fact, or specula.

tion.

6. The concurrent experience

of all other 'men with ours

produces assurance ap-
proaching to knowledge.
7. Unquestionable testimony
and experience for the
most part produce confi-
dence.

8. Fair testimony, and the
nature of the thing indif
ferent, produces also con-
fident belief.

2. Wherein reasoning con-

sists.

3. Its four parts.

4. Syllogism, not the great

instrument of reason.

5. Helps little in demonstra.

tion, less in probability.

6. Serves not to increase our

knowledge, but fence with

it.

7. Other helps should be

sought.

8. We reason about particu.

lars.

9. First, reason fails us for

want of ideas.

10. Secondly, because of ob.

scure and imperfect ideas.

11. Thirdly, for want of in.

termediate ideas.

12. Fourthly, because of wrong

principles.

13. Fifthly, because of doubt-

ful terms.

14. Our highest degree of

knowledge is intuitive,

without reasoning.

15. The next is demonstration
by reasoning.

16. To supply the narrowness
of this, we have nothing
but judgment upon pro-
bable reasoning.

17. Intuition, demonstration,
judgment.

18. Consequences of words,
and consequences of ideas.
19. Four sorts of arguments:
first, ad verecundiam.
20. Secondly, ad ignorantiam.
21. Thirdly, ad hominem.
22. Fourthly, ad judicium.
23. Above, contrary, and ac-
cording to reason.

24. Reason and faith not op-

posite.

SECT.

1. Necessary to know their

boundaries.

2. Faith and reason what, as

contra-distinguished.

3. No new simple idea can be

conveyed by traditional

revelation.

4. Traditional revelation may

make us know proposi-

tions, knowable, also by

reason, but not with the

same certainty that reason

doth.

5. Revelation cannot be ad.

mitted against the clear

evidence of reason.

6. Traditional revelation much

less.

7. Things above reason,

8. Or not contrary to reason,

if revealed, are matter of

faith.

9. Revelation in matters where

reason cannot judge, or

but probably, ought to be

hearkened to.

1. Love of truth necessary.

2. A forwardness to dictate,

from whence.

3. Force of enthusiasm.

4. Reason and revelation.

5. Rise of enthusiasm.

Enthusiasm.

6, 7.

8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for

seeing and feeling.

10. Enthusiasm, how to be dis-

covered.

11. Enthusiasm fails of `evi-

dence, that the proposi-

tion is from God.

12. Firmness of persuasion, no

proof that any proposition

is from God.

13. Light in the mind, what.

14. Revelation must be judged

of by reason.

r5, 16. Belief, no proof of reve

lation.

СНАР. XX.

Of wrong assent, or errour.

SECT.

1. Causes of errour.

SECT.

1. Three sorts

2. First, Physica.

3. Secondly, Practica.

4. Thirdly, Ensiwrien.

5. This is the first division of

the objects of knowledge.