pointed out in various ways the significance which the manifestation of God in the flesh must have, independently of sin and its effects, as the perfection of creation, and crown of humanity.2

1 See Wessel in the preceding §, note 9.

2 Comp. vol i. p. 176. "The question, whether Christ would have assumed the nature of man if there had been no sin, was not discussed until the middle ages, being started, as it appears, for the first time by Robertus Abbas Tuitiensis, S. 12." Dorner, p. 134. The language of Thomas Aquinas sufficiently shows that he too felt disposed to look upon the incarnation of Christ as being in one respect the perfection of creation. In his Comment. on the Sent. Lib. iii. Dist. 1. Qu. 1. Art. 3, he said, that the incarnatio had not only effected the deliverance from sin, but also humanæ naturæ exultationem et totius universi consummationem. Comp. Summæ, P. iii. Qu. 1. Art. 3.: ad omnipotentiam divinæ virtutis pertinet, ut opera sua perficiat et se manifestet per aliquem infinitum effectum, cum sit finita per suam essentiam. Nevertheless, he thought it more probable (according to P. iii. Qu. 1. 3.) that Christ would not have become man if there had been no sin. This notion obtained generally, and theologians preferred praising (after the example of Augustine) sin itself as felix culpa (thus Richard of St Victor de incarnat. verbi. c. 8), to admitting the possibility of the manifestation of the Son of God apart from any connection with it. Duns Scotus, however, felt inclined rather to adopt the latter view, which was more in accordance with his entire Pelagian tendency,a Lib. iii.

a This was done in later times by the Socinians. Nevertheless, the theory in question may be so strained, "that sin is made light of, and mankind exalted, rather than the dignity of Christ augmented." (Dorner, p. 137.) But whether the notion of a felix culpa, by which sin is made to appear as 9:oróxos, might not lead men so far, as to worship it on pantheistic grounds, and at the same time to make light of it in the moral point of view, is another question. And on the other hand, if we, looking at sin in a serious light, regard the incarnation of Christ merely as something which has become necessary in order to repair the damage, its happy aspect will be lost sight of, and the joy we might experience at Christmas will too soon be changed into the weeping and wailing of the Passion-week. This is the principal fault of Anselm's theory. But with respect to the exaltation of mankind at the expense of the dignity of Christ, the latter, so far from being endangered by the theory of Wessel, is raised by the idea that Christ has assumed humanity not on account of man, but for his own sake, an idea by which the pride of man is humbled.

On the other hand,

Sent. Dist. vii. Qu. 3. and Dist. xix. Wessel, whose sentiments were by no means those of Pelagius, took the same view (de incarn. c. 7 and c. 11, quoted by Ullmann, p. 254.) In his opinion the last cause of the incarnation of the Son of God is not to be found in the human race, but in the Son of God himself. He became man for his own sake; it was not the entrance of sin into the world which called forth this determination of the Divine will; Christ would have assumed humanity even if Adam had never sinned: Si incarnatio facta est principaliter propter peccati expiationem, sequeretur, quod anima Christi facta sit non principali intentione, sed quadam quasi occasione. Sed inconveniens est, nobilissimam creaturam occasionaliter esse introductam, (quoted by Dorner, p. 140.)

49

FIFTH SECTION.

THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.

§ 183.

PREDESTINATION.

(The Controversy of Gottschalk.)

Cellot, L., historia Gotteschalci. Par. 1655, f. + Staudenmaier, Scotus Erigena, p. 170, ss.

HOWEVER great the authority of Augustine was in the West, the prevailing notions concerning the doctrine of Predestination contained more or less of the Semipelagian element.1 Accordingly, when in the course of the ninth century Gottschalk, a monk in the Franciscan monastery of Orbais, ventured to revive the rigid doctrine of that Father, and even went so far as to assert not only Predestination, but also Reprobation, he exposed himself to persecution. He was, in the first instance, opposed by Rabanus Maurus,3 and afterwards condemned by the Synods of Mayence (A. D. 848), and of Chiersy (Carisiacum, A.D. 849).1 Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, took part in the transactions of the latter Synod. Though Prudentius of Troyes,5 Ratramnus, Servatus Lupus,7 and several others, pronounced in favour of Gottschalk, or at least,

D

of rigid Augustinism, John Scotus Erigena, by an ingenious piece of argument, contrived to preserve, in appearance, the orthodoxy of Augustine, by asserting, with the support of quotations borrowed from his writings, that evil being something negative, could not, as such, be predestinated by God. The objections advanced by Prudentius and Florus (Magister) were as little heeded as the steps taken by Remigius, Archbishop of Lyons, in behalf of Gottschalk. On the contrary, the second Synod of Chiersy (A.D. 853) laid down four articles in accordance with the views of Hincmar,10 which were again zealously defended by the latter,11 when several bishops at the Synod of Valence drew up six other articles of a contrary tendency, which were confirmed by the Synod of Langres (A.D. 859).12 Gottschalk, the victim of the passions of others, bore his fate with that fortitude and resignation which have at all times characterized those individuals or bodies of men who had adopted the doctrine of Predestination.

1 The theologians of the Greek Church retained the earlier definitions as a matter of course. John Damasc. de fide orthod. ii. c. 30: χρὴ γινώσκειν ὡς πάντα μὲν προγινώσκει ὁ θεὸς, οὐ πάντα δὲ προορίζει προγινώσκει γὰρ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οὐ προορίζει δὲ αὐτά. (Comp. § 177, note 1). Respecting the opinions entertained by the theologians of the Western Church; see vol. i. p. 306, ss. The venerable Bede (Expositio allegorica in Canticum Cantic.) and Alcuin (de Trinit. c. 8) adopted, in the main, the views of Augustine, but rejected the prædestin. duplex. Comp. Münscher, edit. by Von Cölln, p. 121-22. They were, however, unconscious of the difference between themselves and Augustine, see Neander, Kirchengeschichte, iv. p. 412, ss.

2 Respecting the history of his life, and the possible connection between it and his doctrine, see Neander, l. c. p. 414, ss. Staudenmaier, 1. c. p. 175, [and Gieseler, ii. § 16.] His own views, as well as those of his opponents, may be gathered from:

Guilb. Maugine vett. auctorum, qui saec. ix. de prædestinatione et gratia scripserunt, opera et fragmenta. Paris, 1650. Tomi. ii. 4. (in T. ii.: Gotteschalcanæ controversiæ historica et chronica dissertatio.) In the libellus fidi which Gottschalk presented to the synod of Mayence, he asserted: Sicut electos omnes (Deus) prædestinavit ad vitam per gratuitum solius gratiæ suæ beneficium......sic omnino et reprobos quosque ad æternæ mortis prædestinavit supplicium, per justissimum videlicet justitiæ suæ judicium (according to Hincmar, de præd. c. 5.) In his confession of faith (given by Münscher, ed. by Von Cölln, p. 122) he expressed himself as follows: Credo et confiteor, quod gemina est prædestinatio, sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem. But he referred the prædestin. duplex not so much to evil itself, as to the wicked. Compare the passage quoted by Neander, p. 418: Credo atque confiteor, præscisse te ante sæcula quæcunque erunt futura sive bona sive mala, prædestinasse vero tantummodo bona. On the connection subsisting between his views and those of Augustine, see Neander 1. c. p. 417 ss.

3 Epist. synodalis Rabani ad Hincmar, given by Mansi T. xiv. p. 914, and Staudenmaier, p. 179: Notum sit dilectioni vestræ, quod quidam gyrovagus monachus, nomine Gothescale, qui se asserit sacerdotem in nostra parochia ordinatum, de Italia venit ad nos Moguntiam, novas superstitiones et noxiam doctrinam de prædestinatione Dei introducens et populos in errorem mittens; dicens, quod prædestinatio Dei, sicut in bono, sic ita et in malo, et tales sint in hoc mundo quidam, qui propter prædestinationem Dei, quæ eos cogat in mortem ire, non possint ab errore et peccato se corrigere, quasi Deus eos fecisset ab initio incorrigibiles esse, et pœnæ obnoxios in interitum ire.-As regard the doctrine of Rabanus Maurus himself, he made the decree of God respecting the wicked depend on his prescience, see Neander, 1. c. p. 421.

4 Mansi T. xiv.-On the outrageous treatment of Gottschalk, see Neander, 1. c. p. 426 ss.

5 Prudentii Trecassini Epistola ad Hincmarum Rhemig. et Pardulum Laudunensem (which was written about the year 849, and first printed in Lud. Cellotii historia Gotteschalci. Par. 1655.) He asserted a twofold predestination, but made the predestination of the wicked (reprobation) depend on the prescience of God.

1