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every family, and the major-domo' was the priest, and God was worshipped by consumptive oblations: and to this they were prompted by natural reason, and for it there was no command of God. So St. Chrysostomi: Où yàp Teņi TIVOS μαθὼν, οὐδὲ νόμου περὶ ἀπαρχῶν διαλεγομένου ταῦτα ἀκούσας αλλ' οἴκοθεν καὶ παρὰ τοῦ συνειδότος διδαχθεὶς, τὴν θυσίαν ἐκείvnv ȧvývɛykɛ“ Abel was not taught of any one, neither had he received a law concerning the oblation of firstfruits; but of himself and moved by his conscience he offered that sacrifice"-and the author of the Answers ad Orthodoxos'



in the works of Justin Martyr affirms, Οὐδεὶς τῶν θυσάντων τὰ ἄλογα θυσίαν τῷ Θεῷ πρὸ τοῦ νόμου μετὰ τὴν θείαν διάταξιν ἔθυσε, κἂν φαίνεται ὁ θεὸς ταύτην προσδεξάμενος, τῇ ταύτης ἀπος δοχῇ δεικνύων τὸν θύσαντα εὐάρεστον αὐτῷ, “ They who offered to God, before the law, the sacrifice of beasts, did not do it by a divine commandment, though God by accepting it gave testimony, that the person who offered it, was pleasing to him." What these instances do effect or persuade, we shall see in the sequel; in the meantime I observe, that they are men of differing persuasions used to contrary purposes. Some there are that suppose it to be in the power of men to appoint new instances and manners of religion, and to invent distinct matters and forms of divine worship; and they suppose that by these instances they are warranted to say, that we may in religion do whatsoever by natural reason we are prompted to;' for Abel, and Cain, and Enoch, did their services upon no other account. Others that suspect every thing to be superstitious that is uncommanded, and believe all sorts of will-worship to be criminal, saythat if Abel did this wholly by his natural reason and religion, then this religion, being by the law of nature, was also a command of God; so that still it was done by the force of a law, for a law of nature being a law of God, whatsoever is done by that is necessary, not will-worship, or an act of choice and a voluntary religion.

28. Now these men divide the truth between them. For it is not true that whatsoever is taught us by natural reason, is bound upon us by a natural law: which proposition, although I have already proved competently, yet I shall not omit to add some things here to the illustration of it, as being Ad Quest. 82.

12 de Statuis.

very material to the present question and rule of conscience. Socinus, the lawyer, affirmed reason to be the natural law, by which men are inclined first, and then determined to that which is agreeable to reason. But this cannot be true, lest we should be constrained to affirm, that God hath left the government of the world to an uncertain and imperfect guide; for nothing so differs as the reasonings of men, and a man may do according to his reason, and yet do very ill. "Sicut omnis citharœdi opus est citharam pulsare, periti vero ac probe docti recte pulsare: sic hominis cujuscunque est agere cum ratione, probi vero hominis est recte cum ratione operari;" so Aristotle': "It is the work of every musician to play upon his instrument; but to play well requires art and skill: so every man does according to reason; but to do righteous things, and according to right reason, must suppose a wise and a good man." The consequent of this is, that reason is not the natural law, but reason when it is rightly taught, well ordered, truly instructed, perfectly commanded; the law is it that binds us to operate according to right reason, and commands us we should not decline from it. He that does according to the natural law, or the law of God, does not, cannot, do amiss: but when reason alone is his warrant and his guide, he shall not always find out what is pleasing to God. And it will be to no purpose to say, that not every man's reason, but right reason, shall be the law. For every man thinks his own reason right, and whole nations differ in the assignation and opinions of right reason; and who shall be judge of all, but God? and he that is the judge must also be the lawgiver, else it will be a sad story for us to come under his judgment, by whose laws and measures we were not wholly directed.) If God had commanded the priests' pectoral to be set with rubies, and had given no instrument of discerning his meaning but our eyes, a red crystal or stained glass would have passed instead of rubies: but by other measures than by seeing we are to distinguish the precious stone from a bright counterfeit. As our eyes are to the distinction of visible objects, so is our reason to spiritual, the instrument of judging, but not alone: but as reason helps our eyes, so does revelation inform our reason;

Ethic.lib. 1. cap. 7.-The words, quoted by Bp. Taylor, seem to be a free paraphrase of the original: see Wilkinson's edition, page 22. (J. R. P.)

and we have no law, till by revelation, or some specific com→ munication of his pleasure God hath declared and made a law.

m Now all the law of God which we call natural, is reason, that is, so agreeable to natural and congenite reason, that the law is, in the matter of it, written in our hearts before it is made to be a law. "Lex est naturæ vis, et ratio prudentis juris atque injuriæ regulæ:" so Cicero". But though all the law of nature be reason: yet whatsoever is reason, is not presently a law of nature. And therefore that I may return to the instances we are discoursing of, it follows not that although Abel and Cain and Enoch did do some actions of religion by the dictate of natural reason, that therefore they did it by the law of nature: for every good act that any man can do, is agreeable to right reason, but every act we do is not by a law; as appears in all the instances I have given in the explication and commentaries on these two last rules. Secondly, on the other side it is not true, that we may do it in religion, whatsoever we are prompted to by natural reason. For although natural reason teaches us that God is to be loved, and God is to be worshipped, that is, it tells us he is our supreme, we his creatures and his servants; we had our being from him, and we still depend upon him, and he is the end of all who is the beginning of all, and therefore whatsoever came from him must also tend to him; and whosoever made every thing, must needs make every thing for himself, for he being the fountain of perfection, nothing could be good but what is from, and for, and by, and to, that fountain, and therefore that every thing must, in its way, honour and serve and glorify him :-now I say, although all this is taught us by natural reason, by this reason we are taught

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Lex Dei mentem nostram incendens, eam ad se pertrahit, conscientiamque nostram vellicat, quæ et ipsa mentis nostræ lex dicitur. Damascen. lib. 4. cap. 23. de Fide. Ubi Clichtovæus sic exponit, lex mentis nostræ est ipsa naturalis ratio Dei legem habens sibi inditam, impressamque et insitam, quà bonum à malo interno Jamine dijudicamus.-S. Hieronymus epist. 151. ad Algasi. q. 8. hanc legem appellat legem intelligentiæ, quam iguorat pueritia, ne scit infantia, tunc autem venit et præcipit, quando incipit intelligentia.-B. Maximus, tom. 5. Biblioth. centur. 5. cap. 13. Lex naturæ est ratio naturalis, quæ captivum tenet sensum ad delendam vim irrationalem. Hoc dixit imperfectè, quia ratio naturalis, tantùm est materia legis naturalis.Rectius S. Augustinus, lib. 2. de sermone Domini in monte, Nullam animam esse quæ ratiocinari possit, in cujus conscientia non loquatur Deus: quis enim legem naturalem in cordibus hominum scribit nisi Deus? hoc scilicet innuens non rationem solam, sed Deum loquentem ex principiis nostræ rationis sanxisse legem.--Idem dixit explicatius, lib. 22. contr. Faus, cap. 27. legem æternam esse divinam rationem vel voluntatem ordinem naturalein conservari jubentem, perturbari vetantem.

" De Legibus, i. 6. Wagner, p. 27.

that God must be worshipped; yet that cannot tell us how God will be worshipped. Natural reason can tell us what is our obligation, because it can discourse of our nature and production, our relation and minority; but natural reason cannot tell us by what instances God will be pleased with us, or prevailed with to do us new benefits; because no natural reason can inform us of the will of God, till himself hath declared that will. Natural reason tells us we are to obey God; but natural reason cannot tell us in what positive commandments God will be obeyed, till he declares what he will command us to do and observe. So though by nature we are taught, that we must worship God; yet by what significations of duty, and by what actions of religion this is to be done, depends upon such a cause as nothing but itself can manifest and publish.

29. And this is apparent in the religion of the old world, the religion of sacrifices and consumptive oblations; which it is certain themselves did not choose by natural reason, but they were taught and enjoined by God: for that it is no part of a natural religion to kill beasts, and offer to God wine and fat, is evident by the nature of the things themselves, the cause of their institution, and the matter of fact, that is, the evidence that they came in by positive constitution. For 'blood' was anciently the sanction' of laws and covenants, 'Sanctio à sanguine' say the grammarians; because the sanction of establishment of laws was it which bound the life of man to the law, and therefore when the law was broken, the life or the blood was forfeited; but then as in covenants, in which sometimes the wilder people did drink blood, the gentler and more civil did drink wine, the blood of the grape; so in the forfeiture of laws they also gave the blood of beasts in exchange for their own. Now that this was less than what was due is certain, and therefore it must suppose remission and grace, a favourable and a gracious acceptation; which because it is voluntary and arbitrary in God, less than his due, and more than our merit, no natural reason can teach us to appease God with sacrifices. It is indeed agreeable to reason that blood should be poured forth, when the life is to be paid, because the blood is the life; but that one life should redeem another, that the blood of a beast should be taken in exchange for the life of a man, that no reason naturally can teach us. "Ego vero destinavi cum vobis in altari

ad expiationem faciendam pro animis vestris: nam sanguis est, qui pro anima expiationem facit," said God by Moses: "The life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." According to which are those words of St. Paul, “Without shedding of blood there is no remission;" meaning, that in the law, all expiation of sins was by sacrifices, to which Christ by the sacrifice of himself put a period. But all this religion of sacrifices, was, I say, by God's appointment; "Ego vero destinavi," so said God; "I have designed or decreed it:" but that this was no part of a law of nature, or of prime essential reason, appears in this, 1. Because God confined it among the Jews to the family of Aaron, and that only in the land of their own inheritance, the land of promise; which could no more be done in a natural religion than the sun can be confined to a village-chapel. 2. Because God did express oftentimes that he took no delight in sacrifices of beasts; as appears in Psalm xl. 1. li. and Isa. i. Jer. vii. Hosea, vi. Micah, vi.-3. Because he tells us, in opposition to sacrifices and external rites, what that is which is the natural and essential religion in which he does delight; the "sacrifice of prayer and thanksgiving, a broken and a contrite heart;" that we should walk in the way he hath appointed;' that we should do justice and judgment, and walk humbly with our God:''he desires mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings.' 4. Because Gabriel the archangel foretold that the Messias should make the daily sacrifice to cease. 5. Because for above sixteen hundred years God hath suffered that nation, to whom he gave the law of sacrifices, to be without temple, or priest, or altar, and therefore without sacrifice.


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30. But then if we inquire why God gave the law of sacrifices, and was so long pleased with it; the reasons are evident and confessed. 1. Sacrifices were types of that great oblation which was made upon the altar of the cross. 2. It was an expiation which was next in kind to the real forfeiture of our own lives: it was blood for blood, a life for life, a less for a greater; it was that which might make us confess God's severity against sin, though not feel it; it was

• Dan. ix.

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