can give him bread when I cannot give him a cloak; and therefore there can need no dispensation when the commandment, if it be hindered in one instance, can as perfectly, and to all the intentions of our lawgiver, be performed in another.

5. (4.) In external actions which can be hindered and which cannot be supplied by the variety of the instances in the same kind, yet if the obligation remains, they may be supplied with the internal act, and with the spiritual. Thus if we cannot receive actual baptism, the desire of it is accepted; and he that communicates spiritually, that is, by faith and charity, by inward devotion and hearty desire, is not guilty of the breach of the commandment, if he does not communicate sacramentally, being unavoidably and inculpably hindered. For whatsoever is not in our power, cannot be under a law, and where we do not consent to the breach of a commandment, we cannot be exposed to the punishment. This is the voice of all the world, and this is natural reason, and the ground of justice, without which there can be no government but what is tyrannical and unreasonable. These things being notorious and confessed, the consequents are these:

6. (1.) That there is no necessity that a power of dispensing in the positive laws of Christ should be intrusted to any man, or to any society. Because the law needs it not, and the subjects need it not: and he that dispenses, must either do it when there is cause, or when there is none. If he dispenses when there is no cause, he makes himself superior to the power of God by exercising dominion over his laws: if he dispenses when there is cause, he dispenses when there is no eed. For if the subject can obey, he must obey, and man cannot untie what God hath bound: but if he cannot obey, he is not bound, and therefore needs not to be untied: he may as well go about to unbend a straight line, or to number that which is not, as to dispense in a law, to which in such cases God exacts no obedience.

7. Panormitani affirms that " the Pope hath power to dispense in all the laws of God, except in the articles of faith;" and to this purpose he cites Innocentius" in cap. Cum ad Monasterium, de Statu Monachorum." Felinus affirms that

i Cap. Proposuit. de Concess. Præpend. n. 20.
In cap. Quae in Eccles. Incoust. n. 19, 20.

"the Pope can change the form of baptism, and that he can with one word, and without all solemnity, consecrate a priest, and that he can by his word alone make a bishop:" and though these pretences are insolent and strange, yet in fact he does as much as this comes to: for the Pope gives leave sometimes to a mere priest to give confirmation, which by divine right is only belonging to bishops by their own confession. That the blessed eucharist is to be consecrated in both kinds is certainly of divine right; and so confessed by the church of Rome : but the Pope hath actually dispensed in this article and given leave to some to consecrate in bread only, and particularly to the Norwegians a dispensation was given by Innocent VIII. as I have already noted out of Volaterranus.

8. There are some learned men amongst them who speak in this question with less scandal, but almost with the same intentions and effects. Some of their divines, particularly the bishop' of the Canaries says that "the Pope hath not power to dispense in the whole, or in all the laws of God, but in some only;" namely, where the observation of the law is 'impeditiva majoris boni,'' a hinderance or obstruction to a greater spiritual good;' as it may happen in oaths and vows:"and (Sanchez adds) in the consecration of the blessed sacrament in both kinds: in these, say they, the Pope can dispense; but where the observation of the laws in the particular brings no evil or inconvenience, and does never hinder a greater good, there the laws are indispensable; such as are 'confessions, baptism, using a set form of words in the ministration of the sacraments.' So that the meaning is, the Pope never wants a power to do it, if there be not wanting an excuse to colour it; and then, in effect, the divines agree with the lawyers; for since the power of dispensing is given in words indefinite and without specification of particulars, if it be given at all; the authority must be unlimited as to the person, and can be limited only by the incapacity of the matter; and if there could be any inconvenience in any law, there might be a dispensation in it: so that the divines and the lawyers differ only in the instances; which if we should consider, or if any great interest could be served by any, there can be no doubt but it would be found a sufficient 1 Canus Relect. de Pœnitent. p. 5. ad finem.

cause of dispensation. So that this is but to cozen mankind with a distinction to no purpose; and to affirm that the Pope cannot dispense in such things which yield no man any good or profit: such as is the using a set form of words in baptism, or the like; and they may at an easy rate pretend the Pope's power to be limited, when they only restrain him from violating a divine law, when either the observation of it is for his own advantage, as in confession (meaning to a priest), or when it serves the interest of no man to have it changed, as in the forms of sacraments.

9. But then, that I may speak to the other part; to say that the Pope may dispense in a divine law, when the partieular observation does hinder a greater spiritual good, and that this is a sufficient cause,' is a proposition in all things false, and, in some cases, even in those where they instance, very dangerous. It is false, because if a man can by his own act be obliged to do a thing which yet is impeditive of a greater temporal good, then God can by his law oblige his obedience, though accidentally it hinder a greater spiritual good. Now if a man have promised, he must "keep it though it were to his own hinderance," said David"; and a man may not break his oath, though the keeping of it hinder him from any spiritual comforts and advantages; nay, a man may neglect a spiritual advantage for a temporal necessity; and in the Bohemian wars, the king had better been at the head of his troops, than at a sermon, when Prague was taken.

But I consider (for that is also very material) that it is. dangerous. For when men, to justify a pretence, or verify an action, or to usurp a power, shall pretend that there is on the other side a greater spiritual good, they may very easily deceive others, because either voluntarily or involuntarily they deceive themselves; for when God hath given a commandment, who can say that to let it alone can do no more good to a man's soul than to keep it? I instance in a particular which is of great interest with them. If a man have vowed to a woman to marry her, and contracted himself to her per verba de præsenti;' she, according to her duty, loves him passionately, hath married her very soul to him, and her heart is bound up in his but he changes his mind, and enters into religion; but stops at the very gate, and asks who shall warrant him

Psal. xv.

for the breach of his faith and vows to his spouse. The Pope answers he will; and though by the law of God he be tied to that woman, yet because the keeping of that vow would hinder him from doing God better service in religion, this is a sufficient cause for him to dispense with his vow. This then is the case concerning which I inquire: 1. How does it appear that to enter into a monastery is absolutely a greater spiritual good than to live chastely with the wife of his love and vows? 2. I inquire, whether to break a man's vow be not of itself (abstracting from all extrinsical pretensions and collateral inducements) a very great sin? and if there were not a great good to follow the breach of it, I demand whether could the Pope dispense or give leave to any man to do it? If he could, then it is plain he can give leave to a man to do a very great evil; for without the accidentally consequent good, it is confessed to be very evil to break our lawful vows: but if he cannot dispense with his vow, unless some great good were to follow upon the breach of it, then it is clear he can give leave to a man to do evil, that good may come of it: for if without such a reason, or such a consequent good, the Pope could not dispense, then the consequent good does legitimate the dispensation; and either an evil act done for a good end is lawful and becomes good, or else the Pope plainly gives him leave to do that, which is still remaining evil, for a good end: either of which is intolerable, and equally against the apostle's rule, which is also a rule of natural religion and reason: No man must do evil for a good end. But then, 3. Who can assure me, that an act of religion is better than an act of jus tice? or that God will be served by doing my wife an injury? or that he will accept of me a new vow, which is perfectly a breaking off an old? or that, by our vows to our wives, we are not as much obliged to God as by monastical vows before our abbot? or that marriage is not as great an act of religion if wisely and holily undertaken (as it ought to be), as the taking the habit of St. Francis? or that I can be capable of giving myself to religion, when I have given the right and power of myself away to another? or that I may not as well steal from a man to give alms to the poor, as wrong my wife to give myself to a cloister? or that he can ever give himself to religion, who breaks the religion of vows and promises, of justice and honour, of faith and the sacramental mystery, that he may go

into religion? or that my retirement in a cloister, and doing all that there is intended, can make recompense for making my wife miserable, and, it may be, desperate and calamitous all her lifetime? Can God be delighted with my prayers which I offer to him in a cloister, when, it may be, at the same time my injured spouse is praying to God to do her justice and to avenge my perjuries upon my guilty head, and, it may be, cries aloud to God, and weeps and curses night and day? who can tell which is better, or which is worse? for marriage and single life, of themselves, are indifferent to piety or impiety; they may be used well, or abused to evil purposes; but if they take their estimate by the event, no man can beforehand tell, which would have been the greater spiritual good. But suppose it as you list, yet,

11. I consider, that when God says that "obedience is better than sacrifice," he hath plainly told us, that no pretence of religion, or of a greater spiritual good, can legitimate vow-breach, or disobedience to a divine commandment: and therefore, either the Pope must dispense in all laws of Christ, and without all reason;--that is, by his absolute authority and supereminency over the law and the power that established it, or else he cannot dispense at all; for there is no reason, that can legitimate our disobedience.

12. But then, if we consider the authority itself, the considerations will be very material. No man pretends to a power of dispensing in the law of God but the Pope only; and he only upon pretence of the words spoken to St. Peter, "Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven"." Now did ever any of the apostles or apostolical men suppose, that St. Peter could, in any case, dispense with vow-breach, or the violation of a lawful oath? Was not all that power, which was then promised to him, wholly relative to the matter of fraternal correption? and was it not equally given to the apostles? for either it was never performed to St. Peter, or else it was alike promised and performed to all the apostles in the donation of the Spirit, and of the power of binding, and the words of Christ to them before and after his resurrection; so that, by certain consequence of this, either all the successors of the apostles have the same power, or none of the successors of St. Peter. Or Matt. xviii. 18. John, xx. 23.

Matt. xvi. 19.