lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowlege. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes; nor shall I take notice what a shame it is to the greatest contemners of knowlege, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know. But this, at least, is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen; that however they may think credit, respect, and authority, the concomitants of their birth and fortune; yet they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower condition, who surpass them in knowlege. They who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his understanding.

4. Wrong measures of probability; which are,

1. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken for principles. Propositions looked on as principles, have so great an influence on our opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of truth, and what is inconsistent with them is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence borne to these principles is so great, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses is often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established rules. The great obstinacy that is to be found in men, firmly believing quite contrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof, as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles: so that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their senses,

and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred te

nets.

2. Received hypotheses. The difference between these and the former is, that those who proceed by these, will admit of matter of fact, and agree with dissenters in that, but differ in assigning of reasons, and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that open defiance with their senses as the former: they can endure to hearken to their information a little more patiently; but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things; nor be prevailed on by probabilities, which would convince them, that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are.

3. Predominant passions or inclinations. Let never so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning, and money on the other, it is easy to foresee which will prevail. Though men cannot always openly gainsay, or resist the force of manifest probabilities, that make against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it is the nature of the understanding, constantly to close with the more probable side but yet a man hath power to suspend and restrain its inquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities.

1. That the arguments being brought in words, there may be fallacy latent in them; and the consequences being perhaps many in train, may be some of them incoherent. There are few discourses so short and clear, to which men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt, and from whose conviction they may not without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness set themselves free.

2. Manifest probabilities may be evaded on this suggestion, that I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side; and therefore, though a man be beaten, it is not necessary he should yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind. This is a refuge against conviction, so open and so wide, that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it. But yet there is some end of it; and a man having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability, may in most cases come to acknowlege, on the whole matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein the proofs are so cogent and clear, as to make the fact attested highly probable; neither is there sufficient ground to suspect that there is either fallacy of words, nor equally valid proofs, yet undiscovered, latent on the other side: nor, lastly, can there be any supposition that there is as fair testimony against, as for the matter of fact attested. In all such cases, I think it is not in any rational man's power to refuse his assent; in other less clear cases, I think it is in a man's power to suspend his assent; and, perhaps, content himself with the proofs he has, if they favor the opinion that suits with his inclination or interest, and so stop from farther search. But that a man should afford his assent to that side, on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossible, as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time.

4. Authority, or the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, either of our friends or party, neighborhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty or learning, or number of those of the same profession? as if honest or bookish men could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude. Yet this with most men serves the

turn. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many points by passion or interest under temptation to it. This is certain, that there is not an opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive on this ground. There is no error to be named, which has not had its professors. And a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

But, notwithstanding the great noise that is made in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, there are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed not that I think they embrace the truth, but indeed, because, concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think, that they took them on the examination of arguments, and appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick to a party, that education or interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth, as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing the cause they contend for.

CHAPTER XXI.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, 1. the nature of things, their relations, and their manner of operation; or, 2. that which man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness; or, 3. the ways and means whereby

the knowlege of both of these are attained and communicated; I think science may be properly divided into these three sorts.

1. The knowlege of things, their constitutions, properties, and operations, whether material or immaterial: this, in a little more enlarged sense of the word,. I call quoin, or natural philosophy. The end of this is bare speculative truth; and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies, or any of their affections, as number, figure, &c.

2. IpaкTIKη, the skill of right applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable under this head is ethics, which is the seeking out those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation; but right, and a conduct suitable

thereto.

3. Enμelitikn, or the doctrine of signs: the most usual being words, it is aptly enough termed logic : the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, which the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowlege to others. Things are represented to the mind by ideas; and men's ideas are communicated to one another by articulate sounds, or words. The consideration then of ideas and words, as the great instruments of knowlege, makes no despicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowlege in the whole extent of it.

This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural division of the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the contemplation of things themselves for the discovery of truth, or about the things in his own power, which are his actions, for the attainment of his own ends; or the signs the mind makes use of, both in