matter for explications; and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these moral words, there is no end.

It is needless to remark what obscurity this has brought on the writings of men who have lived in remote ages and different countries, since the numerous volumes of learned men employing their thoughts that way are more than enough to show what attention and study are required to find the true meaning of ancient authors. But there being no writings we have any great concernment to be solicitous about, but those which contain truths to be believed or laws to be obeyed, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors; and if they use not their words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we lay them aside, and resolve with ourselves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

If the names of mixed modes are uncertain for want of standards existing in nature, the names of substances are doubtful for a contrary reason; because they are referred to standards made by nature. In these we must suit our complex ideas to real existences. Here we have patterns to follow; but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain ; for the names must be of doubtful meaning, if they be referred to standards, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.

The names of substances have a double reference. 1. They are made to stand for the real constitution of things, from which all their properties flow. But this real constitution being unknown to us, any sound that is put to stand for it must be very uncertain in its application. 2. The simple ideas that are found in substances being that which their names immediately signify, are the proper standards to which their names are referred. But these archetypes still leave the names with uncertain significations; because the sim

ple ideas united in the same subject being numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex idea, men frame very different ideas about it, and so the name they use comes to have very different significations. He that shall observe what alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive, will not think it strange that I count the properties of bodies not easy to be collected. The complex ideas of substances being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into his complex idea those qualities he has found to be united together. For though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself with color and weight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to be joined to it: others put in fusibility, ductility, fixedness, &c. Each has his standard in nature; and what judge shall determine which of them has established the right signification of the word gold? From hence it follows that the complex ideas of substances will be very various, and the signification of their names uncertain. Besides, there is scarcely any thing which does not in some of its simple ideas communicate with a greater, and in others with a less number of particular beings; in which case who is to determine the collection of simple ideas to be signified by the name; or prescribe which obvious qualities are to be left out, or which more secret to be put into the signification? All which produces that doubtful signification in the names of substances, which causes uncertainty and disputes when we come to a philosophical use of them.

In common conversation, general names of substances, regulated by some obvious qualities, well enough design the things men would be understood to speak of; but in philosophical inquiries, where general truths are to be established, there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found not only not to be well established, but hard to be so. I was once at a meeting of physicians, when there arose a question

nerves.

whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the The debate having been managed by a variety of arguments on both sides, I requested, that before they proceeded farther, they would first establish what the word liquor signified. They were at first surprised at the proposal, but on examination found that the signification of the word was not so settled as they imagined. This made them perceive that their dispute was about the signification of that term, and that they differed very little in their opinion concerning some subtle matter passing through the nerves, though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called liquor or no.

From what has been said, it is easy to observe that the names of simple ideas are least liable to mistakes ; 1. because the ideas they stand for, being but one single perception, are more easily retained than the more complex ones; and, 2. because they are never referred to any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify. White, sweet, yellow, bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them; but what precise collection of simple ideas, modesty, or frugality, stands for in another's use, is not so certainly known; and however we are apt to think we well enough know what is meant by gold or iron, yet the precise complex idea, others make them the signs of, is not so certain.

By the same rule, the names of simple modes are, next to those of simple ideas, least liable to doubt; and in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names.

The disorder that happens in our names of substances proceeding from our want of knowlege of their real constitutions, it may be wondered why I charge this rather on our words than understandings. I must confess, that when I began this discourse, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when I began to examine the

extent and certainty of our knowlege, I found it had so near a connexion with words, that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowlege, which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, it was through the intervention of words, which interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth, that like the medium through which visible objects pass, their obscurity does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes. The fallacies which men put on themselves and others, are in a great measure owing to words; and I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfection of language as an instrument of knowlege more thoroughly weighed, many controversies would cease.

The significations of words, depending much on the thoughts of him who uses them, must be of great uncertainty to men of the same language and country: but when to this natural difficulty shall be added different countries, and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, &c. every one of which influenced the signification of their words then, though now lost and unknown to us; it would become us to be charitable to one another in our interpretations and misunderstanding of those ancient writers, which, though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which, with few exceptions, is not capable, without constantly defining the terms, of conveying the sense of the speaker without uncertainty to the hearer and in discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are of the highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.

The volumes of commentaries on the Old and New Testament are proofs of this. Though every thing said in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader is fallible in understanding it. Nor is it to be wondered.

that the will of God, when clothed with words, should be liable to the uncertainty which attends that conveyance, when his Son clothed in flesh was liable to the inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath given to all mankind a light of reason, that they to whom this written word came not, could neither doubt of the being of a God or of the obedience due to him. Since, then, the precepts of natural religion are plain and very intelligible to mankind; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us in books and languages, are liable to the natural difficulties incident to words; it would become us to be more careful in observing the former, and less magisterial in imposing our own interpretations of the latter.

CHAPTER X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

Besides the natural imperfection of language, men are guilty of several wilful faults and neglects, whereby they render these signs less distinct in their significa tion than they need to be.

The first abuse is using words without clear and distinct ideas, or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified. Of these there are two sorts. 1. One may observe, in all languages, words that stand not for any clear ideas. These have been introduced by the several sects of philosophy and religion: for their promoters, to support some strange opinion, or to cover some weakness of their hypothesis, have coined new words, which, when examined, may justly be called insignificant terms; and when once they become the distinguishing characters of a church or school, few care to examine their precise signification. I need not heap up instances; every one's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him. 2. Others extend this abuse yet farther, that by an unpardonable