Collapse of Turkish Resistance.

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soon entered by the victorious Russians. So, too, the positions of the Tchekmedge, pronounced by Von Moltke to be impregnable, and Constantinople, in itself a place that could be made a stronghold of the first order, had been occupied by Turkish troops; but dread of the conquerors was the prevailing sentiment in the councils of the Porte, and it succumbed in an instant. Negotiations began soon after the decisive success obtained by Gourko, and an armistice, after long delays, led to the conclusion of a peace with Russia which has virtually blotted out the Turk in Europe. This memorable compact was signed within sight of the shores of the Bosphorus and of St. Sophia, in the presence of thousands of the victorious army; and, in fact, the jealousies of Europe alone have kept the Russians out of the city of Constantinople. It is scarcely necessary to make comments on the closing scenes of the eventful contest. The allies were certainly in immense strength, but had the Turkish forces been even tolerably led, and had the Porte retained the vigour of old times, the campaign might have been protracted for months. But the inexplicable surprise of the Ottoman army, which caused its destruction near the Shipka Pass, and, above all, the extraordinary advance of Suleiman into the jaws of the enemy, deprived the Turks of their best resources, and the struggle thenceforward became hopeless. Independently of this, it is the nature of the Turk, at least of the corrupt Turkish government, to collapse suddenly when danger is imminent; the character of the Moslem accepts disaster as the irresistible decree of fate; a state torn by intrigue and faction yields when it feels the enemy is at its gates; and a set of corrupt pashas, when themselves threatened, think only of saving the relics of their power, and of prolonging their régime of selfishness. Brave, therefore, as were the Turkish soldiery, it is not surprising that the Porte gave in as soon as Adrianople fell, and it was idle to expect from Ottoman rulers the constancy of a European nation. As for the operations of the allies in this war, they were well conceived and very ably carried out; and though they had the advantage of preponderating force, and they were advancing on the flood-tide of success, large praise is due to their daring leaders and to their patient, devoted, and tenacious troops. The march of Gourko across the Balkans, indeed, was a military exploit of real grandeur. What general remarks shall we make on the conflict, the course of which we have briefly traced? Looking at the subject from its mere military side, it will be observed that in spite of their weakness, of their incapacity, and of their

want of system, the natural advantages possessed by the Turks were necessarily of great value to them. There could never be a doubt of the comparative strength of the forces of the belligerent powers; and, even in the hour when they were in danger, we felt certain the Russians would at last conquer. But the mountain barriers, the intricate defiles, the water lines, and the ill-opened tracts which, whether in Europe or in Asia Minor, formed the approaches to the Ottoman Empire, were obstacles of a truly formidable kind; and the immense distances which the Russians were compelled to cross before they could reach their enemy, threw extraordinary difficulties in their way. The command of the sea possessed by the Turks, which enabled them to place with comparative ease a force upon any endangered point, proved, moreover, of the greatest use to them, and more than once it had a direct influence on the fortunes of the eventful struggle. Unquestionably the chiefs of the Porte were unable to turn to account their vast advantages; they knew not how to defend the Danube, the Balkans, or the Armenian frontier; their dominant fleets served as transports only; kut still the characteristics of the theatre of war, and some of the conditions of the strife, were all in their favour. The superiority, too, of the Turkish weapons showed itself ccnspicuously in defensive warfare; and the victories of Zewin and of Plevna were due, in a great measure, to the Turkish breechloader. These advantages, conjoined to Russian errors, enabled the Turks to prolong the contest for a longer period than had been thought possible, and for some months they held out against an enemy immeasurably stronger and better prepared. It is, however, a complete mistake to imagine, as some have argued, that the campaign indicates that offensive strategy is less efficacious than it was, or that defensive strategy is now the best. The conditions of a rapid and bold offensive were not existing in the late contest; the Russian force was at first too weak, and natural obstacles checked its progress; and in these circumstances we cannot wonder that their efforts were long without success. But this does not show that offensive war is productive of less results than of old; the contrary, we think, is the real truth; and as armies increase and roads multiply, the offensive, as a rule, advances in power. On the other hand, though defensive tactics on the field of battle have more effect than they had in the time of the old weapons, defensive strategy, we believe, has declined in importance as respects great contests. Of what avail, in the long run, was the defence of the Soganlook and Plevna?

Concluding Remarks.

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and what is the use of merely resisting an enemy, if you do not attempt to attack him in turn?

The operations of the war, considered as a whole, are not remarkable for a display of genius or of military skill of the highest order. They show no conceptions of extreme brilliancy like those which marked the career of Napoleon; they are not characterized by the mature forethought, the admirable method, the sagacious judgment, which distinguish Von Moltke as a commander. The strategy on both sides was, to a great extent indeed, a series of errors and shortcomings; it was repeatedly an instance of what ought not to have been done. The Russians at the outset fell into the mistake of underrating the resources of the Turks; and, whether in Europe or in Armenia, this over-confidence frustrated their plans and for a time exposed them to real danger. It is true that in this they shared the opinions of military critics throughout Europe, but it was their peculiar business to have ascertained the facts, and their false estimate cannot be lightly excused. The movements, too, of the invaders in the campaign often disclosed a want of insight and purpose. Much time was lost in reaching the Danube; the first advance across the Balkans was rash; it was unpardonable not to have secured Plevna; the generalship on the Lom and in the Shipka Pass was neither judicious, cautious, nor able; and the attacks on Zewin on the 25th of June, and on Osman's forces in July and September, deserved to be, as they were, defeats. Yet when all this is said, it would be a mistake to assert that great ability and remarkable power were not occasionally shown by the Russian chiefs, though it was shown, as it were, by fits and starts. The passage of the Danube was a very skilful exploit; the whole conduct of the Imperial staff, inspired, no doubt, by Todleben's mind, was characterized after the middle of October by patience, method, and knowledge of war; the generalship of Skobeloff was brilliant in the extreme, and Gourko has proved himself a leader of consummate vigour and remarkable power. The same observations generally apply to the performances of the Russian armies and to the qualities of the Russian soldiery. These armies, no doubt, were far from perfect; their organization was not very good; in the special arms there were many defects; they were, on the whole, inferior to the armies of the West. But they gave proof of excellent inherent qualities; on several occasions they achieved great things; and they were pitted against troops not easy to rival in constancy, endurance, and stubborn valour.

Turning from the Russian to the Turkish side, we see, also, great strategic mistakes and a whole series of military errors. The frontiers of the Empire were not defended; the immense advantages the defenders possessed were nowhere turned to the best uses; the hesitations, the delays, the negligence of the first weeks of the struggle, astounded Europe; and the conduct of several of the Turkish leaders, more especially of Suleiman Pasha, seems scarcely consistent with sense or good faith. What, however, most distinctively marks the operations of the Ottoman troops, and what made their fortunes, as it were, hopeless, was that they never seemed to have been taught by defeat; that they evidently distrusted and disliked each other; that they scarcely ever acted in concert. Osman Pasha, no doubt, is a great soldier, a grand military figure among the ruins of the Porte; Mukhtar Pasha has shown considerable resource; and Mehemet Ali probably is a general of real insight and prudence. But the Turkish commanders, taken as a whole, reflected the ignorance, the unprogressive torpor, the ruinous jealousy, intrigues, and hatreds, which have been the bane of the government of the Turk; and hence it was that they were so far behind antagonists who could learn from disaster, who generally seem to have been true to each other, who, ultimately at least, were chosen for merit by a nation controlled by public opinion. As for the Turkish soldiery, we should be the last to detract from their admirable qualities as born warriors, and the best excellences of the Ottoman race were unquestionably nobly displayed by them. But the Turkish armies, as instruments of war, were, generally speaking, of very little value; they could sit down and defend positions, but they could not move with effect in the field; in offensive warfare they could not accomplish much, and in this, as in other things, they resembled the backwardness of the State they served. The truth is, that if we regard it as a whole, the contest brought out and threw into relief, as frequently has occurred in like instances, the essential qualities of the belligerent powers, and it is this perhaps which gives it its highest interest. It shows that Russia has yet much to learn, that she is far behind the civilization of the West, but, nevertheless, that she is a rising state, full of young energy and of real promise. It showed that the Turk, though still a fighting man, has no place in the march of the progress of Europe, that his rulers are mere imbecile tyrants, that he has probably played his part in the world's history.

ART. V.-Future Punishment.

(1.) The Doctrine of Retribution. The Bampton Lecture for 1875. By W. JACKSON, M.A., F.S.A., &c.

(2.) Life in Christ. By EDWARD WHITE. Third Edition. 1878. (3.) Salvator Mundi; or, Is Christ the Saviour of all Men? By SAMUEL COX. 1877.

(4.) The Second Death and the Restitution of all Things. By ANDREW JUKES. Fourth Edition.

(5.) The Doctrine of Annihilation in the Light of the Gospel of Love. By JAMES BALDWIN BROWN. Second Edition.

(6.) Eternal Hope. Five Sermons preached in Westminster Abbey. By the Rev. Canon FARRAR. 1878.

In this age of free inquiry and discussion, no subject seems likely to undergo more eager examination on all sides than the profoundly solemn question of man's eternal hereafter. What scenes of retribution, or of manifold discipline, soon to be entered on by each one of us, lie behind the veil which no human hand has lifted? What is the true import of those glimpses of this mysterious region which revelation is believed by many to afford? Are they lit up with the sweet radiance of a morning without clouds,' at least in the faroff future with that unmingled triumph of love and truth and goodness which the poet's soul longs to see, and sings its gladdest notes in anticipation of its coming? Or is the prophetic vision-though full of heavenly splendour-fringed with a dark border of lamentation and sadness that will never fade away? Many an earnest mind, many a devout soul, many a loving heart, is now anxiously, painfully exercised with questionings of this order. That good will finally conquer the forces of evil, is doubted by no one, least of all by believers in the truth of Christianity. Nor can such believers be troubled with any hesitancy as to the sure and certain hope possessed by all who, on the arena of time, honestly and courageously combat on the side of right against wrong, of truth and mercy against falsehood and hatred. But when the great trumpet peals forth the note of final victory, what of those who are defeated? What shall be their fate whoduring this brief period of their life-trial-have criminally chosen the worse side, or have fatally drifted along with the dark current of evil, through sheer indifference and indecision? The prevalent view, until recently, has been that their doom is sealed beyond reversal by the moral attitude in which death finds them. It is an appalling thought-this