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The judgment takes up the thought, and it consists of so many principles which have been already formed, and which the rational mind. considers as so many truths. These principles are so many intellectual ideas, and are formed from conclusions arising from the ideas of thought. The liberty of the judgment is not of so much extent as the liberty of thought; for before things are admitted into the judgment, that they may be considered as things judged, only those things are elected which we believe to be truths; or if we do not believe them to be truths, we can, from the intuition and balancing of several kinds of love by which we are affected, so temper and moderate the analysis of our thoughts, that they may appear, as it were, true, or under a becoming human aspect. The mind may then contemplate the present not only from the past, but also from the future; for one equation is, as it were, formed in which all things are, and which can even contemplate and judge, as to possibility at least, of the future. Wherefore the liberty of the judgment is more restricted to a certain natural order than the liberty of thought, which, not being under such restraint, is accustomed to wander. There may, however, be deeply hidden in that liberty of the thought a love, which from the fear of losing another love can be restrained. But to enter upon this subject now would be too prolix.

The conclusion immediately follows the judgment; for we come to a conclusion in order that what we conclude may be remitted to the will, and by that be determined into act. Thus the conclusion is, as it were, a line drawn under the equation, or under the sum, which is soon again to be resolved into its parts. In the conclusion it is clearly perceived of what nature the liberty is, or what it had been in the judgment, and what in the thought. For in the conclusion there are all things together, and if they do not come forth into act, they are nevertheless there, so that it is only a contemplation of future consequences, and hence a fear lest the desired end and object should not be attained, which fears act as so many resistances, and, as it were, impossibilities, which delay or prevent the act; but immediately these fears are removed, the act rushes forth. Our mental liberty, therefore, is under much restraint; and in order that it may be restrained, there are civil laws and penalties, the estimation in which we desire to be held by others, misfortunes, and other things which refrain. But the mind, when in its conclusions, is to be considered as already in its acts. The mind, however, still retains its liberty of dissolving and changing its conclusions, and of forming new ones. But this liberty is very feeble, since there is generally within it the love of self; consequently the love of one's own ideas, which it estimates as truths.

To this liberty succeeds the liberty of resolution, that is [to carry on the figure between the calculus and resolution of equations and numbers] the equation is now to be actually and successively resolved into its parts. And as the particular things which are in the conclusion are to be successively evolved, or brought out by actions, either of the members of the body, or of the face or of the tongue, or by the speech, there remains no liberty [as it were] to this faculty, for it depends on the essential principles which are in the conclusion; since the faculty itself of resolving the equation is not any intellectual operation, but a purely organic one, and dependent solely on the intellect. If any thing be determined without the intellect, it is considered as something animal, which is not regarded as virtue or vice, or considered as worthy of praise or of blame. I shall treat on the will below.

11. From what has been now said, it appears that there is a liberty of thinking and a liberty of acting; and that in the middle between these two there is, as it were, the liberty of judging, or of determining (arbi trandi, in which properly free will consists); and that our mind is not capable of determining whether the objects of the senses, and their exciting influences, both from the body and the world, shall flow in or not; but it is capable of determining whether these sensations and excitements shall flow out and be realized in act.

12. In respect to the liberty of thinking and judging, it is almost absolute, but such as is the state of the intellect, such is the thought, and the consequent liberty. (See above, 3.) Essential freedom consists in controlling the thought itself, lest it rush forth whither cupidities would urge it. For if cupidities are admitted into the thought, and are not checked and restrained on the very threshold, they easily take possession of the entire mind, which in that case is no longer its own master. Hence true liberty consists in the ability of governing one's own mind, and of casting off the yoke of one's own animal cupidities and affections. It may also be physiologically demonstrated how this is effected.

13. But the liberty of acting is much restrained, since there are innumerable things which prevent every thought from coming into act. Thus there are civil laws and penalties; there is the sense of honour and decorum; there are perverse, ambitious propensities which are adorned with the pretexts of truth; there is the respect we have for persons whom we must obey; there are the necessaries of food and clothing, for the acquiring of which there are innumerable means, which, when the ends are considered, are regarded [as restraints upon the thoughts coming into act]. There are certain kinds of love which prevail in the mind, to which special loves are subject, and other things

which are also restraints. There is, moreover, the conscience itself, which is a peculiar bond of restraint, and also a code of laws, in which are inscribed those things which restrain the mind. All these things are to be considered as necessary restraints, which take away from liberty the power of expatiating [in the ways of licentiousness]. Therefore as to the thought itself, there is entire liberty; but as to the act there are many limitations and restraints, which however exist and operate that we may enjoy true liberty, and that we may not abuse it. The highest liberty, as already stated, consists in governing our own minds, so that we may live in harmony with the order of nature, and, on this account, liberty is given to us. But how insane the human mind becomes when it is governed by an inferior master, or by the propensities of the animal mind, is abundantly evident from experience. Thus it is evident that our desires must be restrained by laws; and we ourselves often fear lest that which is operative in our minds, should by some characteristic mark break out in our actions, our speech, or our looks;—the greatest art is employed in concealing one's own mind.

14. But the liberty of determining, which is free-will, coincides with the liberty of judging, and properly signifies that state when the mind is balanced between two kinds of good, or two loves, and can choose that which appears to it best, and determine it into act. For this purpose intellect, together with liberty, is given to us, although some men, in the use of this faculty, determine it against truths or against their better conscience. This happens when the loves of the animal mind prevail (which is sometimes attributed to human weakness); but by this abuse of our liberty we inflict injury upon our conscience. Therefore liberty itself, or the faculty of freely thinking, consists solely in that ability by which the mind can put on whatever changes of state it pleases, and thus proceed from one state into another. For every change of state produces an idea, either simple or compound; thus there are as many changes of state as there are varieties of thoughts and judgments. These things are said concerning the essential nature of liberty.

15. But it was observed above, that there are loves which perpetually govern our intellect, and that no thought whatever can exist and subsist without some love as a companion which enkindles it; for love is the very life of thought. But how loves operate in the mind shall be considered and explained in what follows. From this, however, the inference might seem to be warrantable, that if our rational mind is perpetually governed by certain loves, desires, and ends, there can be no liberty, or only of such a character as to be subject to some love which governs or com

mands it; on which account there appears to be a certain necessity in every particular [of the mind]. It is also most true, that in so far as the mind is governed by perpetual desires, without which it would be no mind, it is not its own master, and the arbiter of its own states;— but essential liberty consists in this, that the mind can turn itself from one love to another, that is, can resist and reject a love which is evil, or apparently good, and devote itself to a love which is truly good, or which it judges to be so. Wherefore liberty does not consist in this,—that the mind be without any love, desire, or [actuating] end; for in this case it would cease to be a mind; but liberty consists in the ability of adopting one principle of love, and of rejecting another; and indeed genuine liberty, namely, that which accompanies a more perfectly developed intellect, consists in adopting the best love [as the principle of its life]. For if an evil love or principle is adopted, it is a sign of a perverse intellect, namely, of an intellect governed by perverse loves, and thus it is a sign of no liberty, but of licentiousness; of which, however, by imperfect intellects, liberty is predicated; or it is considered that to will and act freely according to any kind of prompting love, whether good or evil, is liberty. Whereas, according to the judgment we form of the liberty from which we act, such is the intellect; thus there may be the highest liberty where slavery itself appears to exist. The reason is, because, to be subject to the love of the highest Good, as to a master, is a subordination which is eminently according to the nature of things; for in the order of things, one thing must govern and another must obey. Wherefore that which is superior, prior, and more perfect, must give laws and commands to that which is inferior, posterior, and imperfect. Hence, if the mind subject itself to this universal law of subordination, it is most free. For it cannot alone hold the helm,* since it cannot depend on itself; wherefore to choose and adopt the highest Good is to adopt it that the mind may serve that which is more perfect, and suffer itself to be governed by it. For if a servant rise up against his master, or a subject against his sovereign, or a soldier against his commander, this rebellion is not liberty, but licentiousness, which destroys universal society, or an entire army.

* That is, it cannot of itself, independently of a higher power, which flows in from God, govern itself, but it can govern as of itself: see note above, page 362.

(To be concluded next number.)

371

THE DEPENDENCE OF LANGUAGE UPON CORRES

PONDENCES.

[Continued from page 344.]

71. Another, and a most elegant testimony to the intimateness of the relations which subsist between the human mind and the external world, is yielded in the philosophy of that deep love which all men feel for what is called Nature. Were it not for these relations, men would have no affection either for the sublimities of the sea, or of the swelling mountains; none for the solemn and silent woods, filled with solitude as with a presence; none for the beguiling beauty of the shaded pathway by the river; none even for such simple things as pure air and the green fields. But the love of these things is universal. With different individuals it may fill the soul as a yearning passion, or may exist as but one among many feelings: still it is inseparably and beautifully bound up with man's whole being, and is continually productive of new and refreshing enjoyments. And while it thus varies in degree with different individuals, it varies also in the direction which it takes. One mind is most charmed by flowers, another by birds; one delights most in the view of a well-ordered farm, another in rocks and waterfalls; one most loves sweet sounds, another the stars, another trees, another the human form, and so on, infinitely.

72. Why should this be? Whence arises so endless a variety of taste, always resembling in essence, never identical in kind? Is it not that every one of the countless elements of our inner being has its own specific and independent relationship with one or other of the shapes and embellishments of the world outside; and that we love those things best whose spiritual counterparts in our souls are developed in the highest activity and perfection? There can be no other reason :—

'How can the beauty of material things

So win the heart, and work upon the mind,

Unless like-natured with them ?'*

If the love of nature were excited merely by the allurements of beauty in nature, it would follow that beauty lies in objects as an abstract property. But we know that this cannot be, because if it were so, the same things would not seem beautiful to one mind and unattractive to another,

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