morali seu naturali obligatione legum sermonem non habent; unde ex scopo legis questio solvi debet; videlicet si bonum publicum postulat ut lex habeatur ut irritans etiam ante judicis sententiam, statim ut invalidus haberi debet in conscientia, etc."

In confirmation of this he refers to a decision of the Holy Office, given in 1873. The Italian government passed a law in 1866 requiring its creditors to accept paper money in payment, regardless of any previous contract to the contrary. The Holy Office was asked whether this law was binding in conscience; it answered, on January 21, 1873: "regulariter affirmative, nisi peculiares obstent circumstantiae" (Acta S. Sedis, t. VII, p. 211).

Aertnys, C. S. S. R., says: "Omnis lex humana, proprie dicta semper et necessario obligat in conscientia saltem ad aliquid. **** Neque refert civiles Legislatores infideles esse, qui non curant conscientiam; sufficit enim quod simpliciter obligare velint, eo ipso oritur obligatio in conscientia, quemadmodum docet Apost. ad Rom. xiii, 1, 2, 5, loquens de principibus ethnicis: "Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; non est enim potestas nisi a Deo; quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt. Itaque qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit; qui autem resistunt, sibi ipsi damnationem acquirunt. Ideo necessitate subditi estote, non solum propter iram sed etiam propter conscientiam" (de legibus, c. III n. 144).

Fr. Noldin, S. J., says: "De intentione autem hall nota: sicut necesse non est, ut legislator explicite intendat obligationem in conscientia imponere, ut lex in conscientia obliget, ita necesse non est, ut explicite intendat obliagtionem gravem imponere, ut lex sub gravi obliget; sicut enim intentio obligandi in ipso usu potestatis legiferae contineri censetur, pari modo legislator materiam gravem generatim etiam sub gravi injungere velle praesumitur.

Quare

omnino tenendum est, etiam legislatorem infidelem condere leges in conscientia obligantes" (de legib. n. 137).

These quotations might be continued indefinitely, but sufficient have been given to make it clear that, according to Catholic theologians, the laws of the state do, as a rule, bind in conscience, even though the legislators be unbelievers and infidels, and have no concern either about God or conscience. Indeed, from a perusal of these same theologians, it will appear that, instead of all modern civil laws being merely penal, the great body of the civil law is moral, i. e., binding in conscience, and that the purely penal laws are very few when compared to the whole body of the law.

Among the laws of the state that bind in conscience are to be included many laws concerning the ownership, purchase and sale, etc., of property; the laws concerning the prescription of property, treasure trove, valuables found, certain of the laws invalidating contracts, and certain of the laws invalidating last wills and testaments. For example, Fr. Noldin says: "Leges civiles jura statuentes seu dominia transferentes, ordinarie ante omnem judicis sententiam in conscientia obligant ex justitia commutativa. Nam lex ab auctoritate competenti in bonum commune condita, in conscientia obligat. Atqui jura, quae ad bona fortunae referuntur, constituunt objectum justitiae commutativae; quare leges praeceptivae, quae jura civium de bonis fortunae statuunt, ex justitia commutativa obligant" (de VII, praecept. n. 347).

In like manner, the civil laws concerning treasure trove, invalidating the contracts of minors, excluding certain persons from the benefits of a will, etc., are all binding in conscience.

As a rule the dispositions of the civil law regarding last wills and testaments only affect the same civilly, i. e., in foro externo, ante judicis sententiam. "Si ergo," says Noldin, "infirmus morti proxi

94

mus, viva voce donet alicui legatum, donatio, quippe carens forma legali, informis est: ideo haeres non tenetur solvere legatum et solutum juridice repetere potest, quia uti potest jure, quod a lege ei conceditur; sed neque legatarius tenetur illud reddere, donec haeres irritationem donationis per judicem impetraverit" (de vi legis civil. n. 3).

Fr. Aertnys, C. S. S. R., asks: "An lex indirecte irritans actum sive contractum temporalem, effectum sortiatur in foro conscientiae, ante judicis sententiam? Sententia probabilior affirmat, etc." "Ex dictis sequitur haeredem vel legatarium ex testamento non solemni posse tuta conscientia, antequam ullus possidet, accipere et retinere hereditatem vel legatum, quamdiu ab illo non abjudicatur; quia possidet certa voluntas defuncti. Similiter haeres ab intestato · potest tuta conscientia ejusmodi testamentum non exequi, vel impugnare, et eo expugnato per sententiam judicis, obtinere relicta a testatore; quia possidet jus succedendi ab intestato, et uti potest remedio juris" (de legibus, n. 148).

The Will Case to which "Sacerdos" objects was solved according to these principles. It was a "testamentum, nullum propter legem civilem irritantem, ad causas profanas, cum legato pio ei inserto." Is such a last will and testament valid?

The first thing to be settled is, was the charity to which the testator desired to give one thousand dollars, a vera causa pia?

The second question was, were there at least two witnesses present when the testator signified his will, or was his will in writing?

Thirdly, was the beneficiary in good or bad faith?

From the details of the Case as presented to us, we could not settle these questions, and even had we been able to settle them, it is disputed by theologians whether a last will and testament

ad causas profanas, containing a bequest for a pious purpose, is valid by reason of the pious bequest, when it is invalid for the lack of necessary legal formalities. (Cf. any of the older or

more recent theologians on this point.)

Since these things are so, we still believe that the solution of the Will Case here referred to was correct.

XIX. WASHING THE CHURCH LINENS

Father Paul, a young priest, is assigned to a parish where it is the practise for the sisters to wash the altar linens. Among these linens are the purificators and corporals. In the seminary it was taught that certain of the altar linens ought to be washed only by a man in sacred orders, and Father Paul remembers having taken his turn at this work after he had received subdeacon's orders. He desires to know whether it is only a pious practise for a man in sacred orders to wash the purificators and corporals, or whether there is any strict obligation for a priest or major-order man to wash them, or may they be turned over to the sisters together with the rest of the church linens to be washed and repaired by them.

Answer. I. The purificators, corporals and palls, when soiled, must be washed by a priest or deacon, or at least by a subdeacon. It is not lawful to give them to any one else, even to religious women, until they have been first washed, at least once, by a man in sacred orders. This is of strict obligation, and by no means a mere pious or becoming practise.

I. The third part of the decree of Gratian, in the Corpus Juris Canonici, treats "de consecratione." Distinctio I, canon 40, prescribes how the altar linens shall be washed. "Pallas vero, et vela sanctuarii, si sordidata fuerint ministerio, Diaconi cum humilibus ministris intra sanctuarium lavent, non ejicientes foras a sanctuario: et velamina Dominicae mensae abluant: ne forte pulvis Dominici corporis male decidat. Sindonem vero non foris abluant: et erit haec operanti peccatum. Idcirco intra sacrarium ministris praecipimus haec sancta cum diligentia custodire. Sane pelvis nova comparetur, et praeter hoc nil aliud