property is injured by a dog, knowledge of the dog's vicious habit must be proven against its owner, before he can be held liable. The liability of the owner or keeper of any animal for an injury committed by it is founded upon negligence. Any person is justified by the law in killing another's dog, where the dog is dangerous or ugly, and his owner knew it, and the dog is found running at large or has been bitten by a mad dog; when it attacks one's domestic animals on his land, or when it attacks persons or in any way becomes a nuisance; when in the act of chasing, worrying or wounding sheep, unless such chasing, etc., be done by the direction or permission of the owner of the sheep, or by his servant. But no one has a right to shoot a dog because he has been trespassing on his land, although he may have put up a sign or notice on his land that he would do so.

The confessor, therefore, if we may be allowed to repeat, distinguishes between a culpa theologica and a culpa juridica. Culpa theologica is a real sin, either mortal or venial; culpa juridica is the omission of the care which the law requires of persons in the use of their property so as not to injure others, whether the omission be sinful or not. Very often such omission will be sinful: then it becomes theologica; but it will also often happen where it is not sinful: then the theologians call it culpa mere juridica. The principle insisted on in moral theology is this: "Ut actio damnificans inducat obligationem restitutionis, requiritur ut sit theologice culpabilis; nemo enim obligatur in conscientia ad reparandum damnum, nisi illatum fuerit in conscientia." No one can be held liable for the results of involuntary actions. Now only voluntary actions can be sinful. If an action is not sinful, although injurious, then it is not voluntary qua injurious, and one can not be held answerable for the injury. The injury done may be voluntaria in se or else voluntaria

in causa, or altogether involuntary. A person may intend the injury resulting from his action of omission or he may not intend it, but still foresee it as necessarily resulting from his action or omission, which action or omission is done for some other purpose and not to cause injury. In this latter case, if the injury is foreseen and no sufficient cause is present to justify its being allowed to happen, it is imputable as sin.

Now let us apply all this to the present case. It may be said, then, that it is lawful to kill another's dog if he is injuring one's property, but only on certain conditions. These conditions are: (1) Killing the dog must be the only way open to us to stop the injury. If the injury may be prevented by notifying the owner of the dog, etc., then in conscience it is not lawful to kill it; (2) the injury done by the dog must be a grave damnum; (3) the primary purpose of the killing must be the protection of one's property, and not the injury done to another. These conditions are required in foro interno; for the forum externum all that is required is proof that the care required by the law was or was not taken in using one's property.

The confessor must determine whether A. was guilty of sinful negligence in the keeping and using of his dog. According to the statute law he is liable for carelessness and may be compelled to repair the injury resulting from such carelessness. The dog in killing B.'s chickens becomes a nuisance, and may be killed and damages recovered from A.

But before the matter is brought into court, what is A.'s duty? It will depend on the nature of A.'s carelessness in keeping his dog. If A. was guilty of sin in being careless, then he is responsible in conscience for the injury done by his dog. A. had been notified of his dog's vicious habits and should have so guarded that he could not injure another's property. In neglect

ing to do so, he evidently failed in his duty and committed a sin, and must now make reparation.

As B. complained to A. about his animal to no purpose, and if an appeal to the officers of the law would have done no good, then if the injury that was being done by the dog was a grave damnum, B. was justified in conscience in killing the dog to protect his property. Vim vi repellere licet is an axiom of the law. Of course, if there had been any other less injurious way or means of preventing the injury to A.'s property, B. would have been obliged in conscience to adopt it. But under the circumstances there does not seen to have been any other way of stopping the damage. B. has a right to insist that A. shall so use his property as not to injure him, and he has a right to recover damages for the injury done.

He has a right also to resist the suit brought by A. to recover the value of his dog. At the same time, if the court should fine him for killing the dog, he will be obliged in conscience to pay, because the court is a competent authority to determine the question of the justifiability of the killing of A.'s dog.

In regard to A., he is bound in conscience to make restitution for the injury done by his animal, because he was evidently guilty of criminal negligence in the way he kept his dog. But if as a matter of fact there was no sin in his carelessness, then, ante sententiam judicis, he is not bound to make restitution.

XVI. SECRET COMPENSATION

A man working for a railroad company compensated himself secretly to the amount of about one hundred dollars. He did so at the suggestion of fellow-workmen, who convinced him that he was doing more work than his weekly salary paid for. Prior to being advanced to his present position, this man knew the nature of the work that would be required of him, and the long hours necessary to do the work. This happened several years ago. Now, for some months back, this man has been trying to get an increase of wages from the company. The matter has been taken under advisement by his superiors before whom such matters come for consideration, and they seem to have practically admitted that he is entitled to an increase of ten dollars per month. However, they have been procrastinating now for five months, and are not likely to give the increase until spring, because, this man says, they know that the winter is a bad time for a man to quit work, that a man can not well better himself at this time, and therefore he will not give up his present employment. Now, suppose that the time runs on long enough before they increase his wages, and the total amount to which he thinks himself entitled amounts to one hundred dollars, would this man be justified in not restoring the hundred dollars already taken?

Answer. According to the moralists very definite conditions must be verified before occult compensation or secretly recovering what one believes to be one's own, can be considered lawful in conscience.

1. Ut debitum sit verum. Our claim must be founded in strict justice, and not merely in gratitude for work well done, or in promises to remember us in one's will, etc.

2. Ut debitum sit certum. If there be any reasonable doubt whatever that we have no strict claim in justice, then possession is ninetenths of the law, i. e., the party from whom we endeavor to recover is in possession, and law and equity favor him, and he has a right to keep what he has in his possession until it shall be proven beyond reasonable doubt that it belongs to another. If this were not so, hallucinations would prove a prolific mother of thefts.

3. Ut debitum aliter obtineri non possit. The public peace and the welfare of the social structure require that debts be collected through the channels created by custom and law, and only when these are inadequate can recourse be had to secret recovery.

4. Ut damnum debitoris vel tertü caveatur. We may injure the debtor in secretly recovering from him if we expose him to the danger of paying the debt twice, or leave his conscience charged with the debt, when in fact the debt is discharged. A third person may be injured by being suspected of dishonesty, etc., and thereby suffer loss of position or legal prosecution.

In regard to employees the moralists say: Ultra salarium, de quo pactum sit, modo saltem infimum sit, non licet se compensare; nam ultra pactum, in quod ipse consensit, nil ei debetur.

Where no fraud or deception or force has been employed, and the nature of the work was sufficiently understood, and the employee was not driven by stern necessity to agree to work for a wage that is manifestly unjust, there can be no room for secret compensation. If, in the course of his employment, the work required of him should suddenly become more dangerous than could have been foreseen, or much more arduous, as, for instance, night work instead of day work, and the man could not very well get another position immediately, then he might recover secretly. 'Applying these conditions to the case before us, we are forced to