The reasons which the confrater cited against this view are not valid, as their closer examination will show.

1. Extreme Unction may only be administered once in the same illness. In this connection it may be said that in our case it was really only given once, as the first administration proved to be invalid.

2. But this unfortunate patient was already sacro oleo unctus, and all prayers prescribed by the Church had been said over him. The invalidity of this objection is obvious. Some one may be aqua ablutus, or chrismate unctus, and yet the particular Baptism, or Confirmation, may be invalid, and he is neither baptized nor confirmed, if in administering the Sacrament an essential defect occurred. Lack of intention, on part of the administrator or recipient, is such a defect in the essence of the Sacrament.

3. But Extreme Unction is often administered to an unconscious person who has led an unchristian life, has not received the Sacraments for a long time, nor manifested a desire now, and yet no solicitude is had for the validity of the Sacrament in such cases. From this it may be inferred only that in many cases the administration of this Sacrament is invalid. Following the principle in extremis extrema sunt tentanda the Church goes as far as possible in granting Extreme Unction, which for so many poor souls may be their only salvation. For the recipient of the Sacrament the intentio habitualis is requisite, in the case of unconscious persons the Church contents herself with the intentio interpretativa; i. e., the Church explains: if this patient hic et nunc could express his intention, he would desire the Sacrament, or: if he were conscious he would request Extreme Unction. If it is proved that this presumption was an erroneous one, the administration must be regarded

as invalid. In our case we have in the patient's behavior sufficient proof that the presumption this unconscious patient would, if in his senses, wish to receive the Sacraments, was erroneous. His demeanor denoted sufficiently that he was averse to receiving the Sacraments. On the part of this subject, therefore, all intention was lacking; it was administered to him against his will, against his intention.

4. But let us suppose the case-which often enough happens in deathbed conversions-that a person estranged from religion has received Extreme Unction in the state of unconsciousness; subsequently he comes to and gives evidence of a religious disposition, then in continued danger of death Extreme Unction is not again administered; and why not? Because in such a case the intentio interpretativa, upon the presumption of which the Sacrament was given him, was lawful and the contrary not in evidence. If, however, the contrary is proved, as in our case, if it is ascertained that the good will presumed and the intentio interpretativa was not present, then the matter is quite different, and another administration of Extreme Unction, even in the same illness, is certainly in order if the refractory patient afterward shows his willingness.

5. But does not theology teach of a sacramentum informe, that it may become sacramentum formatum and that the sacramental grace may be imparted later to a hic et nunc ill-disposed recipient, as soon as the indispositio is lifted and the obex gratiae removed? A sacramentum informe can, it is true, become in such manner a sacramentum formatum, the validity of the same supposed. Sacraments invalidly administered can not be made valid. To administer a Sacrament to a subject who has no intention, does not mean merely to give it to an unworthy person, but it is giving it to a person incapable of receiving it.

'As the case stands we can not perceive how the chaplain was liable to censure; the reasons advanced by his confrater against the second administration of Extreme Unction are not valid.

JOHN ACKERL, D.D.

LXXIV. THE IMPEDIMENT OF CLANDESTINITY

The following somewhat complicated marriage case was laid by an episcopal curia before the Sacred Officium for decision.

The answer given by the Congregatio S. Officii, Seu Inquisitionis, differs somewhat from the opinions of the consulted theologians, and is, one might say, astonishingly simple. We give the case according to the Analecta ecclesiastica.

Caius, a Catholic of the diocese of N., contracted, thirteen years ago and in the town of A., where the Tridentinum has been promulgated, a marriage with Titia before a non-Catholic minister, and had with her several children. Tortured by remorse, he wished to re-validate this marriage, but a great obstacle stands in the way. Titia had, twenty-five years ago, been married to a Lutheran, Sempronius, which marriage, however, had been dissolved in court fourteen years ago.

but

Titia and Sempronius, both non-Catholics, lived at that time in the town B., where the Concilium Tridentinum had been published at a time when a separate Protestant community already existed, and they arranged in this town everything necessary for marriage; the ceremony, however, did not take place in B., in the town of C., before the, for this act, delegated non-Catholic minister; immediately after the wedding they returned to B. and there lived peacefully, becoming the parents of two children. Their happiness was destroyed by the husband's faithlessness, and the court granted divorce on this ground. It is to be noted that in the town B., where the consensus was given, the Tridentinum had been published at a time when no Protestant community existed there. Caius now asks that the marriage between Titia and Sempronius be

declared invalid on the impediment of clandestinity, thus making it possible for him to contract marriage with Titia.

As we see it is a matter here of two marriages. The marriage between Caius and Titia is without doubt invalid, because of clandestinity, and for this reason Caius wishes re-validation. To this re-validation is opposed the first marriage between Titia and Sempronius, which, presuming that it was valid, could not be dissolved by the court. The question, therefore, is: Was the marriage between Titia and Sempronius valid or not?

In the episcopal curia opinions were divided. The majority of counselors held the marriage to be invalid on account of the obstacle of clandestinity; it had been contracted in a place where the Decretum Tametsi was in force, but before a non-Catholic minister. Furthermore, they claimed that: in this case the decree of the Sacred Officium, of June 5, 1889, finds application, according to which a marriage contracted clandestinely in a locality where the Tridentinum exists in force, can, setting aside other prescribed formalities, be pronounced invalid by the ordinary, without a second decision being necessary.

Other diocesan counselors held for various reasons that the marriage in question was valid.

The Theologus capitularis gave his votum as follows: 1. The first question is, was the marriage between Sempronius and Titia valid, or not? 2. If undoubtedly invalid, then of course the decretum S. Officii, of June 5, 1889, finds application and episcopal curia can definitely pronounce the invalidity. 3. I hold, in opposition to others, that for a certainty the marriage in the town C. was contracted invalidly, because in that place the Decretum Tametsi was published, and one must maintain the principle: Locus regit actum. 4. Because, however, non servata forma Tridentina they could in