debts, he could not lawfully give away, particularly not if he wished in this way to defraud Frank, or his heirs, of their due. So are unlawful, according to all moralists, donations made by a merchant after declaring bankruptcy. The profane law expresses itself in the same sense, and tolerates no donation where the money is needed to pay debts. The donation therefore in that part was invalid, consequently Anthony is obliged to lay the matter before his son-in-law, and demand the return of the one thousand dollars. In regard to this obligation of Anthony, it is Caius' duty that he believe his fatherin-law, for he has no reason to doubt; and furthermore that he pay over the demanded amount, for that which Anthony could not lawfully give, Caius can not lawfully retain.

If it be too difficult for Caius to pay the sum all at once, he is to be allowed to pay the debt in partial payments. We must concede, even, that if Caius or rather his wife, for the time required by law, should have regarded the entire donation bona fide as her property, nothing seems to stand in the way of declaring lawfully that the claim is outlawed and that Caius may retain the one thousand dollars.

Answer.-2. Caius has never heard from a credible source, i. e., from his father-in-law, anything concerning the entire affair. He was not bound to credit the statement of the heirs and could rightly let suit be brought. Caius in conscience is therefore not answerable for the costs of the legal proceedings. Let us, however, suppose that Caius in the course of the suit, before taking oath, had been positively enlightened concerning the point at issue. He could then not have taken the oath, and was bound to pay over the one thousand dollars. If he did not do this, then he would also have to pay the costs for the continuation of the suit.

FRANZ HILGERS.

PERSONAL PROPERTY

The following case is presented for solution: Cornelius, now a secular priest, but formerly belonging to an order, sic confitetur: While still in the order I was called one day to the deathbed of a woman whose regular confessor I had been. Upon having confessed she presented to me, as a token of gratitude for my long years of endeavor with her, a bank book for six thousand dollars. Even then I had the intention of leaving eventually the order and so I asked her whether I might keep the money for my own use for the event of my leaving the order. She answered: I do not give this money to the order, but to you personally; do with it as you will, keep it for the time when you will have left the order. Accordingly I kept the bank book, without the knowledge of my superiors. Three years after that I left the order, and drew the six thousand dollars, together with interest. Since, however, I belonged to a rigid order with solemn profession, and had taken the vow of poverty, I feel worried and beg you, as my confessor, to advise me whether I may keep the money. To decide this case we must answer the following

questions:

1. May a religious, in anticipation of the fact that he will positively obtain permission to leave the order, put away some means (as in our case) for his future use?

2. If this were not lawful in general, would our case perhaps form an exception, the benefactress having expressly declared that she presented the bank book to Cornelius, and not to the order?

3. If his (Cornelius') action was sinful, was it an offense against poverty, or also against justice?

4. Has the sin against justice ceased through the dispensation

from the vows, and may Cornelius now keep the money in good conscience?

5. What is to be done in case of death of this ex-religious? Must the money revert to the relatives, or heirs, of the benefactress, or to the order, or may Cornelius dispose of it as he pleases?

I reply to the questions as follows:

Ad. 1. No; a religious, before his dismissal, must certainly not possess himself of anything to make use of it after his dismissal; for he is hic et nunc still fully bound by the vows of holy poverty.

Ad. 2. As the benefactress expressly agreed that the presentation take place only pro tunc, not at once, it appears to me that the religious may have meanwhile considered himself as depositarius; this of itself is not against poverty, but may certainly be against the rules of the order; whether venialiter or graviter, depends upon rules and circumstances.

Ad. 3. As the order had obtained no right to the amount, and the benefactress having renounced her title to it, Cornelius does not violate justice, nor poverty per se (except perhaps secundum desiderium et actum internum, if he per fas et nefas, without a reason valid before God, seeks release from his vows); he may have violated the rules of the order, or also the obedience, perhaps grievously. In this answer, denying the violation of poverty, I am presuming that Cornelius really had reason and prospect to be released from the vow of poverty. Compare, however, my answer Ad. 5.

Ad. 4. This answer is given in the preceding argument.

Ad. 5. The money is not to be given to the heirs of the benefactress, as she has invalidated her and their right to it by voluntary cession. Nor is it to be given to the order, as, according to the will of the benefactress, it has no claim to it. Still it does not follow that Cornelius can freely dispose of it. In secularizing a professed

of solemn vows there remains generally intact the substance of the vows; the secularized is and remains disqualified from possessing property, he may have, and acquire, property ad usum suum, quantum eis ad sustentationem indiget; whatever is over and above that he must in his lifetime, or mortis causa, give up to the purposes mentioned in the Indult of Secularization. If a certain work is mentioned to which the legacy of the secularized religious should revert, then all his property must be so disposed of; if, however, the Indult of Secularization gives the right of free disposal, ad pias causas, then the secularized religious in regard to this money may freely choose among the piae causae.

AUG. LEHMKUHL, S.J.

LXXIII. REPETITION OF EXTREME UNCTION

DURING THE SAME ILLNESS

A Catholic, for a long time estranged from his religion, who has hated the priests and used blasphemous language, suffered a stroke of apoplexy. He remained unconscious for an entire day. In this extremity it was thought best to give him absolution and Extreme Unction. Later the patient returned to consciousness, without being able to speak. He violently protested against the exhortations of the priest and of the good sister in attendance, once or twice he even attempted to spit upon the crucifix held before him. Meantime many prayers were being offered for him in the hospital where he had been taken. Suddenly he gave unmistakable signs of conversion; he kissed the crucifix with devotion, and listened willingly to the priest's words; he repeatedly tried to make the sign of the Cross, and endeavored to utter the Holy Name, as well as other invocations. The chaplain rejoiced at this sudden change of mind and administered Extreme Unction once more. For this, however, he was later severely censured by a confrater, who pointed out that Extreme Unction must not be repeated in the same illness. Who was right?

The chaplain referred, in proof of his correctness, to the lack, on the part of the recipient, of the intention requisite for the validity of a Sacrament. As this intention on part of the subject was, in fact, not present at the first administration, the repetition of Extreme Unction after the patient's conversion was perfectly justified. The action of this unfortunate man before his conversion proved his aversion for any religious act, and consequently the absence of the intention requisite for the validity of the Sacrament.