LXV. APPLICATION OF PROBABILISM

Romualdus, a not very conscientious priest, yet inclined to scrupulosity and suffering from it all the more as up to the present he has been unable to determine upon following one certain moral system, turns now to probabilism in order to rid himself of his scruples. He intends to carry it through in such way that he will invariably, in regard to himself and in the guidance of others, follow the less severe, if still probable, opinion. Especially does he believe: 1. That whenever opinions differ whether an obligation is present or not, the opinion favoring freedom from obligation may be accepted; 2. The lenient opinion is to be accepted if doubt prevails whether an obligation (sin) be grievous or slight; 3. If, finally, with regard to the necessary subjective conditions (appreciation and sufficient action of the will) for a grievous offense, there prevails an uncertainty in the penitent, according to the same principles of probabilism he may always decide on a merely slight offense.

What is to be said, I. Of Romualdus' view in general; II. Of his particular tenets? Of course it is presumed here that probabilism and its application is lawful.

I. According to the lucid explanation of LEHMKUHL (I, n. 82 sq.) probabilism applies only to the intrinsic lawfulness of an action, or its appropriateness for a (certain) end to be attained. In regard to the matter and form of the Sacraments, in so far as their validity is concerned, the system can not be applied. Eternal salvation is the goal of every man, the means necessary for the attainment of this goal must naturally also be available. No mere probability can be of assistance in this respect; there must be, as is self-evident, as far as possible, a moral certainty attempted. Furthermore a great

deal that is lawful in itself, may, either in consequence of the general frailty of human nature, or in regard to special circumstances, conceal dangers and therefore be more or less unlawful; lastly, man not only must avoid the evil, but also do the good, and, in proportion to his state and the graces granted him by God, he must strive after perfection; it is the confessor's duty not merely to prevent, as far as possible, a penitent from sinning, but also to lead him on to the path of virtue. Much as it is to be desired that the penitent should be enlightened to such extent that he would not sin as result of a false conscience, yet it would be wrong to advise, or even command him, under all circumstances to choose the easier way.

From the above it is obvious under what suppositions alone Romualdus' proceeding might be considered justified, and that for him, who on one hand inclines to scruples, and is not very conscientious on the other hand, as is not infrequently a fact with scrupulous people, there is the danger of entering upon a course which is opposed alike to the nature of probabilism and to the rules for its application.

II. With respect to the particular tenets of Romualdus, the following must be said:

Ad. 1. The tenets here presented-supposing of course the premises suggested under I. prevail-lie in the nature of probabilism; hence the adherer of this system may and will follow it.

2. From the maxim: Lex dubia non obligat there appears at the first glance to follow not only: Non est imponenda obligatio, ubi de ea non certo constat; but also: Non est imponenda gravis obligatio ubi, etc.

Upon this point also-again of course suppositis supponendiswe may agree with Romualdus. Upon closer observation, however, the matter would not seem quite so simple. Of the cases namely

in which there is doubt between strict and lesser obligation (grievous. and slight sin) two distinct kinds are distinguishable. Firstly, such doubt may arise from the uncertainty, whether in addition to a slight obligation there is not also, different from the first, another more serious obligation. Here, according to the principles of probabilism, one will as a matter of fact decide only on the absence of a serious obligation (in practise). Thus he who recites his breviary voluntarily without interior attention, certainly is at fault on account of lack of reverence toward God, although on this ground as a rule only at a slight fault; whether he also offends on account of transgressing an ecclesiastical precept, that is, whether the latter prescribes the inner attention and this strictly, and sub poena nullitatis recitationis, upon this point there prevail two contradictory probable opinions. Practically, an obligation on account of the ecclesiastical precept will therefore not be acknowledged. For another similar example see LEHMKUHL, I, n. 900.

Secondly, there are cases, which do not deal with two obligations (sins) of which one-the greater-is questionable, in which there is doubt, rather, whether the one present obligation (transgression) is serious or slight. For instance there are various probable opinions as to whether a promise under oath to do something venially sinful is a slight or grave offense. Again, theologians are not unanimous as to what materia of a theft is to be considered gravis, so that also here there are several probable views. If we compare these two sorts of cases, we find without difficulty that they are not quite identical, but a discussion of their difference may here be omitted as it will appear from the following argument. But how does there result from the theoretical probability of a milder opinion at once its practical certainty?

Worthy of note, and an argument against an affirmative answer,

is the fact that even probabilists, like BALLERINI and LEHMKUHL, of whom the former for the first time made a thorough application of probabilism, and the latter, after a precise statement of the theoretical aspect of the case, invariably draws practical conclusions according to the system which he represents, do not, for cases of the kind now contemplated, always advance as certain the practical conclusions (Compare GURY-BALLERINI, I, n. 311; n. 313; II, nn. 208 seqq.; LEHMKUHL, I, n. 413*; II, nn. 232 seqq.).

Furthermore, the principle upon which probabilism is based can hardly be here the furtherance of justice or fairness. For though it may be assumed that the lawgiver does not intend to bind by a precept the existence of which is doubtful, it is not so easy to prove that he must in every case specify the degree of obligation. Furthermore, probabilism, like every other moral system, is only of value as a rule of conduct if brought to the consciousness of the mind; the conscience, however, may be easily trained to distinguish, in the heat of struggle, distinctly enough between the lawful and the unlawful; however, it is much more uncertain that in temptation the magnitude of an offense is judged, when the will has already decided for the evil. If, moreover, in a moral discussion the supernatural may be referred to, it must be remarked that in our cases grace alsoalready partly rejected—would hardly exert a specially effective force. Therefore the probability of the milder opinion, of which there is mention, will be frequently of no interest in practise, because consciousness of it did not prevail in the act, whence with some certainty a conclusion may be drawn as to whether from the theoretical probability the practical certainty follows. Let me quote an

*It is said there very significantly: "Maxime autem tunc id (peccatum leve esse) in praxi dici debet, si iurans ad actionis, quam promittit, pec caminositatem non attendit.

analogism. In order to incur a penalty imposed by a certain law it is usually necessary (at least in the case of ecclesiastical penalties) that the offender know something of the penal law, yet a precise knowledge of the nature and measure of the penalty is not in the least requisite.

From all this follows, that, in this second class of cases, from the theoretical probability of the milder view can not always be concluded with certainty its validity in practise; Romualdus did not judge rightly, as the supposition of a merely slight obligation (sin) is not justified without special reason.

The following may be adduced in elucidation and support: Supposing a grave obligation (offense) is not considered certain, then, 1. The offense can not oblige to anything incurred by a positively grave fault, for example to the reception of the Sacrament of Penance before Holy Communion. 2. There would, however, be the obligation of awakening perfect contrition before the reception of all Sacraments for which the state of grace is necessary, as here it is a question not of a positive precept, but of something in a certain respect required necessitate medii (above 1). 3. The same may well be held in respect to the state of the soul required for the worthy administration of the Sacraments. 4. Whether this latter result follows in every degree of (still actual) probability of the more severe view, we do not venture to decide for the present. Theoretically considered it appears really to be the case, as there where something in the nature of a means must necessarily be present, any just doubt should be removed. In practise there would be frequent cause for an uneasy conscience, especially in the instance last mentioned.

III. The question of the offense of a penitent with consideration of the perception and action of the will, is a pure question of fact, and must be decided according to fixed rules for ascertaining a fact, and