received the property of another—having, as it were, taken it in his keeping there devolved upon him, viewed objectively, the obligation to care for its rightful use. This he neglected to do, having left the matter to his wife and to her conscience. Nevertheless there is no proof that Andrew saw a grievous fault therein, or that he was conscious of his responsibility for the use of the money. If Andrew had not much judgment in matters of law he may have believed that he had thrown off all responsibility when he delivered the money to the one who in the first place bore both the guilt and the obligation to make restitution. Andrew's conscience should therefore be examined. If his bona fides is proved, then he is to be absolved from all obligation of restitution, unless it is proved that the money was applied for the family's use; in the case of mala fides, or, if it is shown that the money was used for the family, restitution would have to be made, but in the reduced degree as explained above.

AUG. LEHMKUHL, S.J.

XXXV. MARRIAGE BY COMPULSION

Illicit relations with Caius, a gentleman of high standing, have not remained without consequences for Amelia. For the sake of his own reputation Caius urges Amelia to marry Brutus, for whom she does not care; eventually, however, she does marry Brutus. Is this marriage valid? What grounds are there for and against its validity?

In this case the question arises whether the impediment of compulsion invalidates this marriage. To answer this is not an easy matter, owing to the lack of an exact account of the circumstances. First of all we must presume that Amelia gave actual consent. Should her aversion for Brutus have moved her to give only pretended consent at the marriage, no doubt could exist that the marriage is invalid. We presume then that she gave her consent; it was, however, induced by fear. Now Impedimentum Metus invalidates the marriage if the fear is great, unjust, and caused for the purpose of entering the marriage. By unjust it is understood that it must have been occasioned by another person. For the fear that arises only from one's inner self, ab intrinseco, does not make a contract invalid, so long as there exists sufficient deliberation. intrinseco is the fear that proceeds from the matter itself, and not from the person who threatens. D'Annibale, I, n. 138, well expresses it thus: "Diciter ab intrinseco, cum res ipsa metum facit; ab extrinseco: cum alius infert metum ad consensum extorquendum." Hence not only is the fear of an illness, the symptoms of which we observe in ourselves, ab intrinseco, but also the fear of infection, the fear of a thunderstorm, of a storm at sea, of hell-fire, etc. Fear such as this may move us to do things which we do not like to do, never

Ab

theless it leaves our power of determination quite intact, we do something, and will to do it, although with an effort. If, however, the fear is due to the threat of another person, then a certain exterior compulsion is present, which, though it leaves us freedom of will and deliberation, induces an action which is not so much dictated by our will as by the pressure upon us. Hence Alexander II says, in De Sponsalibus: "Cum locum non habet consensus, ubi metus vel coactio intercedit, necesse est, ut ubi consensus cujusdam requiritur, coactionis materia repellatur." When, however, there is metus ab intrinseco, then he decides for the validity of the act, for instance, De Regularibus, c. 17.

Hence it is evident that the impedimentum metus imposed by the Church applies only to the fear of a threat if it is unjust, 1. If no just claim exists for the marriage, and 2. If the evil threatened can not justly be inflicted. Therefore if a bride forces her tardy betrothed, by threats of legal action, to marry her, she is justified in so doing; also if a judge gives the seducer of a young girl the choice to marry her, or to go to prison, the resulting fear is just, and does not, therefore, render the induced consent invalid.

Let us now solve our present casus. A marriage between Amelia and Caius apparently is out of the question, either because of inequality of station or because Caius is already a married man (there is no mention of social injury resulting for Amelia from her relations with Caius). Therefore a love for Caius is not the reason for her aversion to Brutus. Caius urges or, as is understood here, compels, Amelia to a hasty marriage with Brutus, but by what means? If he only points out to her the disgrace that will befall him and her, and if Amelia is thus induced to marriage, there would be no impedimentum metus-such fear would be ab intrinseco. Should he, however, threaten to do her harm, or to disgrace her,

then there would be the impediment of fear; the fear being great, unjust, and compelling to marriage.

We may suppose the case to be practically as follows:

Caius has a large household in which Amelia is servant, and likewise Brutus. Brutus, though knowing of her condition, is willing to marry Amelia, out of regard for his master and for his own benefit, but Amelia does not want him. The master threatens dismissal and withdrawal of support. Amelia sees a hard future before her, and in order to escape this hardship, she gives her consent. Under these circumstances the impediment of fear would be present.

There is a considerable misfortune threatened unjustly, because Caius should justly provide for the expected infant, and the purpose of the threat is to induce marriage. Should the master, however, be willing to do in any case his duty in regard to Amelia, and only threaten to discontinue his special generosity, then there would be no injustice (in the particular threat) and therefore no impediment.

The confessor should, therefore, closely question Amelia without saying anything about an invalidity of the marriage. Should he find that the impedimentum is undoubtedly present, he should meanwhile not disturb the bona fides, but examine into the whole situation as to whether an agreement between Amelia and Brutus can not be induced. If Amelia can be moved to consent actually, Brutus being still agreeable, nothing further is required, because the causa metus is then certainly removed. But if Amelia of her own will insist upon a separation, the confessor must refer her to the bishop, because then the whole case belongs to the forum externum.

In this solution Brutus' previous knowledge of Amelia's condition is presupposed; otherwise we should have to discuss the wrong that Caius and Amelia inflicted upon him.

W. STENTRUP, S.J.

XXXVI. NULLITY OF A MARRIAGE OWING TO NON

FULFILMENT OF AN IMPOSED CONDITION

Silvia, when receiving the last Sacraments, confesses that in her younger days she had unlawful relations with her present husband Claudius, but also with one Ignotus, and that her relations with the latter had not been without consequences. A marriage with Claudius offering better prospects she led him to believe that he was responsible for her condition. Accordingly, on this condition, he married her, she declaring that he was the parent of the expected child. They have been married for many years, and more children have been born to them. The child conceived before the marriage is also living.

How about the validity of this marriage?

There can be no impedimentum erroris. According to Canon Law such error is essential only which excludes the necessary consent jure divino (the error conditionis servilis forms an exception)—this would apply in the case of an error of person. The error of person, an error of identity, however, annuls the consent, only under certain suppositions; the intention must be absent. The error in quality, though always accompanying the error of identity, differs essentially from it, and does not take away the validity of the contract, not even if the quality about which there is error is of decisive influence upon the resolution to consent; the consent is not excluded. The important so-called error qualitatis in personam redundans is not merely an error in quality, but a special kind of error in person. The error in our case is merely an error in quality-Claudius erred concerning the paternity of the child-though the error influenced his resolution.