But the argument has no foundation, no basis of fact, and I will show this House how. In 1854, by a strict and rigid observance of the principle of exclusion, the American fishermen were driven out of those waters. At that time the United States was free from debt and from taxation, and they had large capital invested in their fisheries. Our fisheries were then in their infancy. They were a "feeble " people, just beginning as fishermen with little capital and little skill and their operations were very restricted. I do not speak disparagingly, but in comparison with the fishermen of the United States there was an absence of capital and skill. The United States were free from taxation, they had this capital and skill, and all they wanted was our Canadian waters in which to invest that capital and exercise that skill, but how is it altered now?

Our fisheries are now no lever by which to obtain reciprocity in grain. What do the United States care for our fisheries? The American fishermen are opposed to the treaty. Those interested in the fisheries are sending petition after petition to the United States government and Congress praying that the treaty may be rejected. They say they do not want to come into our waters. The United States government has gone into this treaty with every desire to settle all possible sources of difficulty; their fishermen complain that they will suffer by it, but the United States government desires to meet us face to face, hand to hand, heart to heart, and to have an amicable settlement of all disputes. They know that they are not making political friends or gaining political strength because nearly the whole of the interest most affected by the fishery articles is against the treaty. But they desire that the ill feelings which arose during the Civil War and from the "Alabama" case should be forgotten. A feeling of friend

ship has grown up between the nations, and it can be no other desire than to foster and encourage that feeling which dictates the agreeing to these particular articles. The United States government will simply say, Well, if you do not like these arrangements, reject them, and the consequence will be on your own head if this friendship so auspiciously commenced is at any time broken by unhappy collisions in your

waters.

BISMARCK

OTTO

TTO EDWARD LEOPOLD VON BISMARCK was born April 1, 1815. He received the usual education of young men belonging to the class of the country gentry, graduating in due course at a Gymnasium and a university. When he first entered upon a diplomatic career, it was as a type of the Junkers, that is to say, as a representative of the most conservative, not to say reactionary, landed proprietors. He was opposed to the assumption of the imperial crown by the King of Prussia in 1848-49, because the offer of the dignity came from the Frankfort Parliament, and not from the German princes. When he subsequently represented Prussia at Frankfort in the Diet of the German Confederation, he steadily set himself to diminish the preponderant influence of Austria, and to organize a pro-Prussian party among the smaller German States. Having been made head of the Prussian Ministry in 1862, he governed for four years in defiance of the will of the Prussian Legislature, and literally risked his head in order to bring about the evolution of an army which should secure for Prussia the leadership of Germany. His designs were triumphantly carried out in 1866 and 1870-71, and he continued to govern the Fatherland as Chancellor of the German Empire and Prime Minister of Prussia until after the accession of the present Emperor, William II. He died in 1898, ten years after the delivery of his speech on the Army bill, which is here reproduced.

A PLEA FOR IMPERIAL ARMAMENT

F I rise to speak to-day it is not to urge on your acceptance the measure the President has mentioned (the army appropriation). I do not feel anxious about its adoption, and I do not believe that I can do anything to increase the majority by which it will be adopted-by which it is all-important at home and abroad that it should be adopted. Gentlemen of all parties have made up their minds how they will vote, and I have the fullest confidence

in the German Reichstag that it will restore our armament to the height from which we reduced it in the period between 1867 and 1882; and this not with respect to the conditions of the moment, not with regard to the apprehensions which may excite the stock exchanges and the mind of the public; but with a considerate regard for the general condition of Europe. In speaking, I will have more to say of this than of the immediate question.

I do not speak willingly, for under existing conditions a word unfortunately spoken may be ruinous, and the multiplication of words can do little to explain the situa tion, either to our own people or to foreigners. I speak unwillingly, but I fear that if I kept silent there would be an increase rather than a diminution of the expectations which have attached themselves to this debate, of unrest in the public mind, of the disposition to nervousness at home and abroad. The public might believe the question to be so difficult and critical that a minister for foreign affairs would not dare to touch upon it. I speak, therefore, but I can say truly that I speak with reluctance. I might limit myself to recalling expressions to which I gave utterance from this same place a year and a day ago. Little change has taken place in the situation since then. I chanced to-day on a clipping from the "Liberal Gazette," a paper which I believe stands nearer to my friend, Representative Richter, than it does to me. It pictures one difficult situation to elucidate another, but I can take only general notice of the main points there touched on, with the explanation that if the situation has since altered, it is for the better rather than for the worse.

We had then our chief apprehension which might come to us from France.

because of a war

Since then, one

peace-loving President has retired from administration in France, and another peace-loving President has succeeded him. It is certainly a favorable symptom that in choosing its new chief executive France has not put its hand into Pandora's box, but that we have assurance of a continuation under President Carnot of the peaceful policy represented by President Grévy. We have, moreover, other changes in the French administration whose peaceful sig. nificance is even stronger than that of the change in the presidency--an event which involved other causes. Such members of the ministry as were disposed to subordinate the peace of France and of Europe to their personal interests have been shoved out, and others, of whom we have not this to fear, have taken their places. I think I can state, also—and I do it with pleasure, because I do not wish to excite but to calm the public mind—that our relations with France are more peaceful, much less explosive than a year ago.

The fears which have been excited during the year have been occasioned more by Russia than by France, or I may say that the occasion was rather the exchange of mutual threats, excitement, reproaches, and provocations which have taken place during the summer between the Russian and the French press. But I do not believe that the situation in Russia is materially different now from what it was a year ago. The "Liberal Gazette" has printed in display type what I said then-"Our friendship with Russia sustained no interruption during our war, and it is elevated above all doubt to-day. We expect neither assault nor attack nor unfriendliness from Russia." Perhaps this was printed in large letters to make it easier to attack it. Perhaps also with the hope that I had reached a different