It most of those higher problems which are now being discussed on all sides under the heads of psychology, descent and development. will be recognized by all instructors of Catholic youth, and by students themselves, that it is no common advantage to have a firstclass textbook of physiology, written by a Catholic writer who has already won from the public the privilege of being listened to even on questions of far higher import. The chapter entitled, the Psychology of the Cat, contains, under a title which may astonish some and amuse a few, a most valuable and orginal lesson on the distinction between the mental powers of even the highest animals and the intellectual gifts of man. The author had already treated the subject at length in his "Lessons from Nature," from the fourth chapter to the seventh; and to those who have read that thoughtful work there is not so much in this chapter which is new. The list of the different kinds of language is repeated; but, on the other hand, we have a much more extended list of the various "powers" which exist in man and in the brutes. Professor Mivart sums up the cat's active powers under eighteen heads, among which he includes what he terms "organic inference" and "organic volition." "Organic inference," he defines as the power "of so reviving complex imaginations, upon the occurrence of sensations and images, as to draw practical consequences." It is obvious that it is the use of the words "inference " and “drawing of consequences" which has to be guarded and explained. The problem is, to admit that the animal sees a consequent without seeing the consequence. As there is, without doubt, an insuperable difficulty in forcing new terms into the language, we presume no attempt can be made to establish a double set of terms for "knowledge," the one expressing what is known by sense without intellect, the other by intellect making use of sense. Under these circumstances, perhaps, Professor Mivart's expression "organic inference," or "drawing practical inferences "-though the phrases somewhat startle a scholastic-need not be objected to. His explanation is extremely clear and well put. He says :-- All the actions performed by the cat are such as may be understood to take place without deliberation or self-consciousness. For such action it is necessary, indeed, that the animal should sensibly cognize external things, but it is not necessary that it should intellectually perceive their being; that it should feel itself existing, but not recognize that existence; that it should feel relations between objects, but not that it should apprehend them as relations; that it should remember, but not intentionally seek to recollect; that it should feel and express emotions, but not itself advert to them; that it should seek the pleasurable, but not that it should make the pleasurable its deliberate aim (p. 373). In fact, as he adds, all the mental phenomena displayed by the cat are capable of explanation without drawing at all upon that list of peculiarly "human" gifts which Professor Mivart gives on the preceding page. This, we consider, is the true way in which to meet the men who are always bringing up cases of miraculous dogs and reasoning cats. The question is, can these actions, which every one admits to have an outward resemblance to actions which man would do under similar circumstances, be explained without calling in reason proper, or the abstractive and universalizing power? If they can-and we maintain they can then they are of no weight whatever in proving that the mental powers of man and brute differ only in degree, and not in kind. Professor Mivart enforces his views by the consideration of the question of language. He enters at some length into the question of what the soul of an animal is. He considers that there is innate in every living organism below man, a distinct, substantial, immaterial entity, subsisting (of course) indivisibly. This he calls the Psyche-soul, or form. The animal soul has no actual existence apart from the matter which it vivifies. Yet it is the animal, par excellence; the matter of which the animal is composed being but "the subordinate part" of that compound but indissoluble unity—the living animal. And as the soul of the living creature has no separate existence from the matter in which it energizes, so when that material envelope, or rather, sphere of occupancy, is dissolved (by death) the "soul" ceases to exist at all. This is Thomistic teaching pure and simple. Professor Mivart even uses the word "form;" though it will be observed how skilfully he translates scholastic technicalities into modern English. He does not pursue the subject as far as some of his readers would have desired; he does not inquire whence comes the "psyche" of an animal, and whither it goes. The distinguished Dominican Professor, Dr. A. Lepidi, of Louvain, is of opinion that the souls of animals are produced immediately by divine interference in each case, either having been created all simultaneously, when the world was made, or being provided at conception, as soon as the body is sufficiently organized to receive them. His reason for this supposition appears to be the difficulty of every other hypothesis. "Matter," he says, quoting St. Thomas of Aquin, "cannot produce the immaterial." This idea of perpetual creation will, to many, appear unnatural. Does God interfere with his creative power whenever a fly is born, or an insect of an hour begins its brief existence ? But the truth is, that this "interference" is universal, and is not exceptional or miraculous, but law and Nature. Everything that exists presuming everything to be a composite-seems (to judge by effects) to have a "form" quite different from the resultant of its mechanical elements. Men of science deny this; but we are coming back to it again. These "forms" do not exist in Nature, apart or tangible. They seen to come in, to spring out, to be set up, at the moment matter is organized or prepared in a certain fashion. Similarly, at a certain step in the process of dissolution, they disappear and recede into non-existence. If it be thus with chemical forces, and with plants, much more truly is it so with beings whose operations, being immaterial, demand an immaterial "form or principle. So that animals, plants, and even the rocks and the water, begin to be by a sort of" creation "-the sudden bursting into being of a potent energy which was waiting undeveloped in those same recesses whence came the world itself. These energies die out as they come. In spite of the ingenious speculation of Balmez, that the souls of animals are not destroyed, but are used again and again for the "information" of fresh materials, it seems more true to the scheme of Nature to say they disappear. Their production is not creation proper, if we reserve the word creation either for the production of things without pre-existing conditions, or for the production of the image and likeness of the Maker; and neither is their dissolution annihilation. In his concluding chapter on the "Pedigree and Origin of the Cat," Professor Mivart repeats and enforces those views on Natural Selection and on Origin which he has so ably developed in his "Genesis of Species." His conclusion is well known. He admits that "environment," and "surrounding agencies," and "indefinite tendencies," have had much to do with development; but he insists that an internal force or "form," or soul, has played the chief part in the world's transformations. The idea of an internal force is a conception which we cannot escape if we would adhere to the teaching of Nature. If, in order to escape it, we were to consent to regard the instincts of animals as exclusively due to the conjoint action of their environment and their physical needs, to what should we attribute the origin of their physical needs-their desire for food and safety, and their sexual instincts? If, for argument's sake, we were to grant that these needs were the mere result of the active powers of the cells which compose their tissues, the question but returnsWhence had these cells their active powers, their aptitudes and needs? And, if by a still more absurd concession, we should grant that these needs and aptitudes are the mere outcome of the physical properties of their ultimate material constituents, the question still again returns, and with redoubled force. That the actual world we see about us should ever have been possible, its very first elements must have possessed those definite essential natures, and have had implanted in them those internal laws and innate powers which reason declares to be necessary to account for the subsequent outcome. We must then, after all, concede at the end as much as we need have conceded at the outset of the inquiry (p. 525). The book may be earnestly recommended, both as an admirable textbook and as a clear, sound, and courageous exposition of philosophical principle on matters regarding which every educated Catholic is bound to be fairly informed. Canon H. D. M. Spencer, Genesis and 1 Samuel, 1880. Pulpit Commentary The Pulpit Commentary. Edited by the Rev. M.A., and the Rev. JOSEPH S. EXELL. 2 vols. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co. E presume that by a " is meant a commentary intended especially for the use of preachers. Now preachers do not want long dissertations on roots and readings; they want the results rather than the processes of critical discussion. They look for a concise explanation of the Scripture text, with such comments as may best help them to adapt it to popular instruction. Suggestive thoughts, spiritual maxims, apt illustrations, pithy sayings of the Fathers, telling anecdotes-these form the concentrated food for which the preacher yearns; the milk and water can be easily obtained. Judging of the present work by the volumes which have yet appeared, it fails to fulfil the special requirements of a Preacher's Commentary. The exposition of the text is certainly the best part. A great deal of matter is there condensed into a very small compass. But the greater part of the work is made up of what are called homiletics and homilies, a distinction by no means clear, or uniformly understood by the various contributors. These consist mainly of sermon notes and plans of sermons; in other words, of homiletical matter in different stages of preparation, from the highly wrought period to the merest outline. Of solid dogmatic teaching there is scarcely a trace; but of vague Christianity, and virtue in general, there is more than enough. Platitude is heaped on platitude, and the whole mass endlessly divided and sub-divided. Let any one read but a few pages of these bulky volumes and he will understand what Sydney Smith meant by "being preached to death." There is more real suggestiveness in one chapter of "Cornelius à Lapide" than in a whole volume of the "Pulpit Commentary." Then, owing to its defective plan, the work when completed will be too large and too dear for any but the beneficed preachers of a well-endowed Church. There is not much of the old "No Popery" style, once so dear to Protestant preachers. Perhaps this may explain the intellectual poverty of the homiletical portion, for it used to be said of most Protestant preachers that unless they denounced the Pope they would have nothing to say. Still the old feeling must find expression, be it ever so feeble. Catholic commentators are called Popish writers. One homilist, d propos of Saul's kingship, exclaims What a calamity it has been to the Latin Church to have an alleged vicar of Christ on earth! The arrangement quite falls in with the craving for a spiritual ruler who may be seen, and the uneasiness of really unspiritual men under the control of One who is invisible. So there is a Popedom, which began indeed with good intentions and impulses, as did the monarchy of Saul, but has long ago fallen under God's displeasure through arrogance, and brought nothing but confusion and oppression on Christendom. We are a hundred times better without such a vicegerent. Enough in the spiritual sphere that the Lord is king (1 Samuel, p. 243). But perhaps the most offensive thing to Catholics is the constant iteration of the heresy of justification by faith only, in passages which look as if they had been borrowed from the Tract Society. For instance, The root of a Christian life is belief in a finished redemption; not belief that the doctrine is true, but trust in the fact as the one ground of hope. Hast thou entered on God's call; entered the ark; trusted Christ; none else, nothing else? Waitest thou for something in thyself? Noah did not think of fitness when told to enter. God calleth thee as unfit. Try to believe; make a real effort (Genesis, p. 147). The Book of Job: a Metrical Translation, with Introduction and Notes. By H. J. CLARKE, A.K.C. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1880. HIS is a devout and painstaking effort to make the full beauty of this divine poem more apparent to English readers. The translation is made directly from the Hebrew, and the rhythmical parts THIS are set in blank verse. Whether this is any real advantage is doubtful. In metrical translations, gain in rhythm is often compensated by loss in accuracy. Nor is Mr. Clarke's blank verse very poetical. He is too fond of long words and stilted phrases—e.g., "vociferate thy plaint," "adumbrates," &c. The prose of the authorized version is sometimes more poetical than Mr. Clarke's verse; as for instance, in the oft-quoted description of death,-"Where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest," (ch. iii. v. 17)-rendered by Mr. Clarke thus,-"The wicked there desist from raging, and the weary rest." On the other hand it must be admitted that through the help of modern scholarship a more intelligible rendering is given to some of the obscurer passages. The work of the miner in the twentyeighth chapter is thus described, Thus man has put An end to darkness, and extends his search That treads above them, there the miners swing: From out the earth then comes forth sustenance (pp. 67, 68). One great fault in Mr. Clarke's translation is that he spoils Job's prophecy of the Bodily Resurrection by rendering the twenty-sixth verse (ch.xix)" and, from my flesh released, shall I see God." In a note he defends himself, on the ground that the literal translation is "from my flesh." Yet the context shows that this phrase, though ambiguous in itself, must here mean "in my flesh," for it goes on to speak of the eyes of his flesh. And as Dr. Pusey says, "unless he had meant emphatically to assert that he should from his flesh behold God after his body had been dissolved, the addition of 'from my flesh' had been not merely superfluous but misleading. For the obvious meaning is from out of my flesh,' as the versions show."* Nor is it satisfactory to find that Mr. Clarke thinks that the author was Hesron, the Ezrahite, in the time of Solomon, thus ignoring all that Prof. Lee has done to prove the extreme antiquity of the book. A Handbook to Political Questions of the Day. Being the Arguments on Either Side. By SIDNEY C. BUXTON. London: J. Murray. 1880. HE author has ranged under such headings as "Disestablishment," "Compulsory Education," "Ballot," "Permissive Bill," the main arguments that have been advanced pro or con. By argument he understands what logicians call middle-term; his book is, in fact, a repertory of middle terms to which the statesman may refer when composing his speech, or by help of which the student may see at a glance the pith of the contention on either side, and thus more * "Lectures on Daniel," p. 509. |