whatever, would have rendered the Government ridiculous, and would have exposed them to further attacks in Parliament. The lives of the officers and men who subsequently fell at the battle of El Teb, were, in reality, sacrificed to public clamour and the necessities of the Parliamentary situation. On February 15, Lord Granville wrote privately to me telling me that the papers on the subject were about to be presented to Parliament. "I have," he said, "cut out your opinion unfavourable to the expedition. You might as well try to stop a mule with a snaffle bridle as check the feeling here on the subject. Our great object must now be to get them (i.e. the troops) back as soon as possible." When, eventually, the Soudanese were beaten, the Government, which had been violently attacked from one quarter for inaction, were attacked from another quarter for their activity. On March 14, Lord Granville wrote to me: "We are very nearly stalemated in the Soudan by the bloody victories." Sir Gerald Graham was consulted. On February 24, the following telegram was sent to him from the War Office: "Assuming Tokar to have fallen, what course would you recommend, remembering that no distant expedition will be sanctioned? Could the force march to Teb, protect fugitives, bury the English dead, and return by land to Suakin? If a movement on Suakin is threatened, you may take the offensive from Trinkitat or Suakin, as you think best. Report fully on the position." There could be no mistaking the spirit of this message. It meant that the Government wanted Sir Gerald Graham to suggest action of some sort, so that the policy of sending the expedition to Suakin might in some degree be justified. This, of course, tallied with the views of the soldiers. After receiving Sir Gerald Graham's report, Lord Hartington sent him the following instructions: "You should, if practicable, before attacking, summon the chiefs to disband their forces and attend Gordon at Khartoum for the settlement of the Soudan. Say that we are not at war with the Arabs, but must disperse force threatening Suakin." This telegram was first communicated to me by Sir Frederick Stephenson. I felt convinced that the proposed summons to the tribal leaders to go to Khartoum would not be productive of any result. I, therefore, telegraphed privately to Lord Granville (February 27): "Stephenson has shown me the War Secretary's telegram to Graham. I do not think that you can stop Graham advancing now. It is too late." On the morning of February 29, Sir Gerald Graham advanced with his entire available force. He found the Dervishes entrenched at El Teb; they were attacked and driven from their position with heavy loss. The British loss amounted to 189 of all ranks, killed and wounded. On March 3, Sir Gerald Graham advanced to Tokar, which was reached without any further fighting. On the 4th, the whole force returned to Trinkitat, and on the 5th embarked for Suakin. Admiral Hewett telegraphed to the Admiralty: "Tokar expedition most successful.” The success or failure of the expedition must be a matter of opinion. Its original object was to relieve the garrison of Tokar. This object had not been accomplished. It had been shown, not for the first time in history, that a small body of well-disciplined British troops could defeat a horde of courageous savages. But no other important object had been attained. Osman Digna had received a severe blow, but his power in the Soudan was by no means broken. Osman Digna's own view on the subject may be gathered from a letter written by him at the time and found some years afterwards at Tokar. "The English," he said, "did not stay long. God struck fear into their hearts, and they went back the next morning, staying only one night at the Mamurieh, and then they started back in their steamers." The question now arose of whether any further operations should be undertaken by Sir Gerald Graham's force. On March 2, Admiral Hewett telegraphed to the Admiralty recommending that the troops should be assembled at Suakin, and that Osman Digna, who was still in the neighbourhood, should be attacked. "That," he said, "will quiet the whole of this country." On March 7, Lord Granville telegraphed to me: "Her Majesty's Government have approved the recommendation of Admiral Hewett and General Graham to land a force at Suakin to give effect to their Proclamation calling upon the rebel chiefs to come in and denouncing Osman Digna as an impostor. They will march on Osman's camp to disperse force if the Proclamation is ineffectual." The Proclamation produced no effect, and, on March 13, General Graham's force advanced on Tamai, a few miles from Suakin, which was occupied by a Mahdist force estimated at 12,000 men. On the following morning, an engagement ensued. After an obstinate fight, 2000 Dervishes were killed; the remainder fled to the hills. In this action, the British loss was 13 officers and 208 men, killed and wounded. On the following day (March 15), Osman Digna's camp was burned, and the British force returned to Suakin. On the 17th, Sir Gerald Graham telegraphed to the War Office: "The present position of affairs is that two heavy blows have been dealt at the rebels and followers of the Mahdi, who are profoundly discouraged. They say, however, that the English troops can do no more, and must re-embark and leave the country to them." It will be as well to break off the narrative of events in the Eastern Soudan at this point. The subsequent operations depended upon the course of events in the valley of the Nile, to which it is now time to revert. It will be sufficient for the present to say that the whole of the episode narrated in this chapter is not one to which any Englishman can look back with either pride or pleasure. Many valuable lives were lost. A great slaughter of fanatical savages took place. But no political or military result was obtained at all commensurate with the amount of life and treasure which was expended. CHAPTER XXII THE GORDON MISSION DECEMBER 1883-JANUARY 1884 The situation in Egypt-Sir Frederick Stephenson-General EarleSir Edgar Vincent-Sir Evelyn Wood-Foreign Office supportFirst and second proposals to send General Gordon-They are rejected-Third proposal to send General Gordon-It is accepted -No British officer should have been sent to Khartoum-General Gordon should not in any case have been chosen-The responsibility of the British press-And of the British GovernmentGeneral Gordon's optimism-My regret at having assented to the Gordon Mission. DURING the course of an official career which extended over a period of nearly fifty years, I at times had some hard work. But I never had such hard work, neither was I ever in a position of such difficulty, or in one involving such a continuous strain on the mind, the nerves, and, I may add, the temper, as during the first three months of the year 1884. I was rarely able to leave my house. I had a very small staff to help me. I was generally hard at work from daybreak till late at night. Without doubt, mistakes were made during this period, but looking back to the difficulties of the situation and remembering the confusion which then reigned in Egyptian affairs, I cannot help. reflecting that it was quite as much by luck as by good management that the mistakes were not more numerous and more serious. I had, fortunately, one qualification for dealing with the situation, and VOL. I 417 2 E |