concurrence of suspicious circumstances, the other by the matchless, though villanous, skill of Iago; each has avenged his supposed wrong; but where Othello dies, Gutierre-marries again. And such different ends are possible; because, while Othello loved Desdemona with the deepest and truest love of man for woman, and was by her beloved again with a love answering to his own, Gutierre loved himself better than he loved Mencia, and dimly felt all along that he had won her hand without her heart. And Mencia herself is less to be pitied than Desdemona, seeing that in her case death blighted a less perfect wedded happiness; nay, more, stepped timely into the lists to throw down the truncheon ere, in the conflict between love and duty in her breast, the weaker though worthier champion might sink down exhausted by the protracted combat.

It is time now to draw the curtain before our "Chamber of Horrors."

That Shakespeare is much greater than Calderon is a point too universally acknowledged to stand in need of proof. The one takes man as he essentially is, the other the Spaniard of a particular period, for his theme; the one deals with the deepest things of the human heart, the other mostly with conventionalities; the one occupies us with realities, the other mainly with appearances. Othello teaches us that, "Love born of Hate is blind as he :" Calderon's jealous husbands that, even where Love might pardon, Honour must slay. But though the tragedies at which we have been looking do not deserve the minute study which Othello so well repays, we may yet

hope that the short time which we have given to them has not been ill bestowed. The delicate touch laid in them on a most hazardous subject, their lofty and pure strain of feeling, and the view which they give us of the Spaniards of a day when Spain imposed its sentiments on Europe, make them well worth at least one reading. If their heroines cannot win such a place in our memories as that which belongs to "the gentle lady wedded to the Moor,' they still claim tears by their sad histories which few would refuse them. Their heroes are noble and courteous gentlemen, though so grievously misled by their false notions of honour. They are indeed far the inferiors of Calderon's own Portuguese Regulus, that saintly knight, his "constant prince." But although they do not attain his high standard, we feel, after all, inclined to take our leave of them with a word of pity rather than of blame. It is perhaps their misfortune more than their fault that they survive their slain wives; for from each of them is withheld that revelation of his victim's innocence which is the portion of Othello, and which makes him count it "happiness to die." Fatal regard for seeming rather than being seals their lips where his spoke out so plainly; and therefore to them never comes that knowledge, at once so satisfactory and so deadly, which exempts Othello from their hard necessity of putting forth to brave fresh storms in their rent and shattered vessels; and enables him to say, as he stands beside his dead, "Here is my journey's end, here is my butt,

And very sea-mark of my utmost sail."

A MONTH ago it was quite clear that, although no progress had been made and no alteration effected in the relations of the Turkish Government to the insurgent provinces, yet a new phase of what is called the Eastern Question had been reached, and one uncertain chapter of diplomacy had been closed. Nearly twelve months had passed since the Turkish troubles had begun, and the principal subject of attention had been the attitude of the Great Powers to one another. The failure of the Andrassy Note, and the hopelessness of internal reform in Turkey, were small matters compared with the possible designs of Russia and Austria, and the undisclosed policy of Great Britain. The assent of the Powers to the Berlin Memorandum, the refusal of England to join in it, and the events which followed, threw light, at all events, upon that portion of this intricate problem which concerns the external rivalry of those Powers which are compelled to interest themselves in the internal difficulties of the Turkish empire. The result was, as we observed a month ago (and events have subsequently confirmed that impression), that the policy of the Great Powers was not of a character to precipitate European war; and that the adverse criticism passed by the English Government upon the policy disclosed by the Berlin Memorandum had indirectly dissolved the triple alliance, and had opportunely evoked the censure of Europe upon a precipitate and ill-judged interference. The result was due partly to the firmness of the English diplomacy, partly to the course of events at Constantinople. The one brought to light the divergent interests of

the three Powers and the dissatisfaction of Europe; the other rendered the proposed measures inapplicable, and facilitated their withdrawal. Some excitement ensued, and hard words were written and spoken; but it soon became apparent that warlike counsels were not in the ascendant. Both sides in the controversy had ostensibly paid exclusive regard to "the alarming news from Turkey," "the dangers of the situation," the surexcitation menaçante, and the Salonica massacre. The Berlin Memorandum did so in express terms; and some weeks later, Lord Derby, as we had anticipated, attributed the movements of the British fleet to precisely the same cause the strong and general excitement which prevailed. A policy of aggression is fortunately at the present time forbidden, by the circumstances in which every great European Power, and especially Russia, now finds itself placed. And we are not surprised that, after the silent trial of strength which ensued on the first intimation of the Berlin Memorandum and its designs, a calm descended upon the politics of Europe, that the principle of nonintervention assumed an unwonted sanctity, and that the political atmosphere was cleared of its more threatening elements. Whatever may have been the real political motives for ordering the British fleet to Besika Bay in such considerable strength, and in retaining it there, the official explanation of the matter forbids the supposition that it was intended as a hint to Russia or as an encouragement to Turkey. However mistaken the world may have been in the construction which it put upon that important move

ment, it was not intended to impair the harmony which prevailed, nor has it produced the slightest misunderstanding amongst the Great

Powers.

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The important deputation which expressed to Lord Derby its " found conviction that our country would not be justified under any pretext in upholding, even by its moral influence, far less by force of arms, the Turkish authority in conflict with its revolted subjects," did essential public service by eliciting Lord Derby's truly valuable speech in reply. It contained a fuller exposition of Ministerial policy than we had previously received; it tended, by timely explanation, to check a growing division of feeling as to our policy in these disputes. Its memorial deprecated using "our power in helping to fasten on the necks of the oppressed subjects of the Porte a yoke which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear." It denounced as execrable an "alliance with a cruel and criminal despotism;" and earnestly hoped that our policy would be that of strict neutrality, "except when it may be able to interpose its friendly offices to mitigate the horrors and to has ten the close of the conflict that is now raging." Lord Derby did not accept every statement contained in the memorial; but with regard to the policy recommended-" I say, as regards that expression of opinion, your feeling is absolutely and entirely mine." It is to be noted that Lord Derby declares that he was never very sanguine as to preventing the war which is still proceeding. And according to the papers recently published, it would seem that that war was in contemplation as far back as last February.

We need not refer to the Foreign Secretary's vindication either of refusing to concur in the Berlin Memorandum or of sending the fleet to Besika Bay. We have most of us

formed our own opinions on those subjects; and the expressions in regard to the future are of far more importance. "I think it is the most improbable thing in the world, that in consequence of anything that is now passing within the limits of the Turkish empire a general European war should ensue." He briefly reviewed the circumstances in which each one of the Great Powers was placed, with a similar conclusion. And as regards the policy of England, non-intervening and pacific as it is declared to be, "we must push no doctrine to an extreme; and an absolute declaration of non-intervention under all circumstances is a declaration of international anarchy, and I need not tell you that international anarchy does not mean either international peace or progress." We cannot tell all the world that "we have nothing to do with the East, that we mean to give no advice, to exercise no influence, to cancel all treaties, and to profess entire indifference to what is going on." Lord Derby was much more explicit with regard to the political position external to Turkey than with regard to the view taken by the Government of the internal commotions of that unhappy country. Except that he expected the rising of the Slavs, the speech contained no definite reference to purely Turkish questions.

In answer to a second deputation, however, the Foreign Minister declined to admit that the application of the same régime to the two creeds of Christianity and Mohammedanism is utterly impracticable. He explained that the integrity of the Ottoman empire meant "Here is an extensive territory which we agree to respect; because, if not respected, it would lie open to a general scramble in the theatre of war." Within the limits of the Turkish empire the scramble is between

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liarly savage manner." cities were not all on one side, exaggerations were abundant, and no case had been made out for our interference.

The policy of maintaining the political status quo seems therefore to have been completely successful, as far as any intrigues or attempts at interference by any of the Great Powers are concerned. Count Andrassy and General Ignatieff, who seem to be credited with the risings in Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively, have increased the anxieties of their Governments without any corresponding advantage, or prospect of advantage. But the pacific intentions of the European Cabinets, however satisfactory, are not the only factors in this great controversy. It is, of course, of infinite satisfaction to find that those powerful committees, who have an immense though not an absolute control over the destinies of European races, are all of them ranged on the side of peace. Turkish difficulties which are, as no one knows better than the Turk himself, European difficulties are no longer complicated and aggravated by the competing ambitions of external Powers, and involved with the larger issues of international peace or war. The controversy is now, to all appearances, confined within the limits of the Turkish empire, except so far as it is influenced by the excited state of surrounding populations, and by the mode in which these populations may ultimately influence, perhaps determine, the future policy of the powerful Governments to which they are subject. For the present, however, the dispute is localised; the matter is cleared of all political passion of the kind which centred in the Crimean war: we shall hear no more, as we trust, of Russia as the exclusive friend and protector of the Christian; or of the

English as concerned, with BashiBazooks, Kurds, and Circassians, in a ruthless support of .Turkish domination. All the Governments of Europe are shown to be of one mind, at least with regard to the greater question of European peace: their concurrence in the Andrassy Note, and their general spirit of enlightenment and humanity, as well as considerations of policy to which they cannot be indifferent, lead us to hope that their union in non-intervention does not imply a further union in indifference to the scandal and the danger of an oppressed and misgoverned empire.

Public attention, therefore, has for the last month been diverted from the action and diplomacy of the Great Powers, and concentrated upon what is passing within the limits of the Turkish empire and its immediate neighbourhood. And within those limits we find abundant testimony to the fact, that however powerful may be the influence of imperial Cabinets, they are not omnipotent. The sudden quiescence of Russia in presence of the events of last June, was followed by the equally sudden quiescence of Prince Milan and the Servian Government, no doubt in obedience to the word of the Russian Minister. There arose a general hope that an indefinite adjournment of all the more serious portions of this controversy was at hand, and that the matter was reduced to the dimensions of a local and insignificant disturbance, of no great European importance — one which might be removed by an im proved administration of the disaffected districts, in the matters of taxation, judicature, and police. But it is easier to fan than to allay the excitement of whole populations, full of religious and race animosities, burning with the sense of oppression, perhaps inspired by the memories of former greatness and the consciousness of growing num

bers. It is clear that the Servian Government was powerless to restrain the Servian population; and that the various communities which congregate near the banks of the Danube are, when the greater political excitements which obscure them to the public eye have subsided, found to have wills and ambitions of their own, which cannot be left entirely out of account. The revolutionary committees are as potent as Cabinets in stirring up mischief, and are more difficult to restrain. The declaration of war by Servia, in spite of the remonstrances of all the Powers, took most people by surprise. It is a small principality with a small army, consisting ten years ago of about 4000 men; but it has a considerable militia service. Its revenue is less than a million; and by the treaty of 1856 the protectorate of Russia was abandoned, and Servia was placed, under the collective guarantee of the contracting Powers, as a semi-independent State under the suzerainty of the Porte, but with an "independent and national administration, as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation." It was in full possession, therefore, of all the advantages to be derived from autonomy; its favourable position was assigned to it as one of the results of the Crimean war, and maintained by precisely the same authority as the integrity and independence of the suzerain empire-viz., the guarantee of all Europe. Large concessions had been made to it in 1862 and 1867 by the Porte, with a view to secure its friendly relations. One can hardly conceive a position in which the duty of deferring to the collective wish of the Great Powers was more obvious: if sense of duty to the suzerain was weakened by the growing incapacity and misrule of the Sultan, the obligations of this little State to

its guarantors at least remained in full force, and ought to have prevented a step so fatal to the peaceful settlement of a perilous controversy. Montenegro, of course, is in a different position; and being more independent, violated less public duty by assuming the character of a belligerent. Neither country, in the documents published to vindicate their proceedings, appears to assert any special grievances of its own as a justification for war. Moral and economical sufferings from neighbouring insurrections, explosions of Mussulman fanaticism throughout European Turkey, the progress of the Turkish army to their frontiers, and the desire to represent civilisation and liberty in the East, are assigned as the reasons for these aggressions. It is difficult to find any ground upon which such proceedings can be vindicated which would not sap the foundation of public order within, and public tranquillity without, the boundaries of any State. The palliation and excuse for what would otherwise be wanton aggression must be found in the barbarous nature of the scenes which are enacted in their neighbourhood, in the ungovernable excitement produced by the sufferings and oppression of their kindred.

M. Magazinovich, on behalf of the Servian Government, formally presented Prince Milan's ultimatum to the Porte. He declared himself warmly interested in the integrity of the Ottoman empire, but insisted on the calamities produced by the Bosnian insurrection, which it traced to the misrule and misconduct of the Sultan's officials. Its requirements were, that Prince Milan should be invested with the administration of Bosnia, whose people are one with the Servians, and who might easily be united with them as a tributary province of the Porte. A similar communication came from