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tions, viz., from the subjective-intensive to the objective-extensive. This will at least be admitted by those who realize the complexities in which this, the central question of all recent psychology, is involved.
Pure vacuous space—is it something or nothing? We may even say that this is at the same time a real and a logical question. Substituting the word "space,” first, for being,” then, again, for “nothing,” in the large logic, we have, without a single change in the phraseology or illustration, a discussion of the above question. Like being, space is undetermined; like only to itself, cannot be known by means of any determination or content which can be distinguished in it, or out of it. It is, in short, nothing which sense or understanding can apprehend. It is perfect emptiness, or self-determination, and thus neither more nor less than nothing; though we cannot add of space, as Hegel does of being=nothing, that it is empty perception or thought itself. This, especially if we were to accept Werder's interpretation that nothing is, as it were, the memory of the vanished being, and, therefore, something additional to it, simply shows how sublimated and impossible is the thought here postulated. Will it be said that space is merely an illustration of pure being? If so, as the above are all the attributes of being and nothing, and as they belong to space, have we not a perfect identity? Where are the differentia?
The grounds upon which space is identified with being are far more logical than those by which thought and being are identified. Hegel's reasoning may be put as follows: Pure being is indeterminate, simple, immediate. Pure thought is indeterminate, simple, immediate. Therefore, thought is being. This violates two principles of logic. Two negative premises are made to yield a conclusion; and, secondly, that conclusion is positive when it should be negative, because the syllogism is in the second figure. In other words, Hegel starts with two tabulæ rasce, and, because they are alike in being rasce, he infers that the two tabulæ are identical. While we insist that there is but one conceivable tabula which is absolutely rasa in the universe, and that that is simply space, which thought tries to apprehend—now positively, as a condition and prius of all things; now negatively, as the absence of all content or determination.
When we remember how the Eleatics denied the existence of notbeing, or, as we should say, failing to see the dialectic nature of the notion of space, made it more real than its content; or how the Vedic consciousness, abstracting all sensuous content, hypostatized emotional factors as its content of unlimited potentiality, the great merit of Hegel's characterization must be admitted. We prefer to stand, however with C. H. Weise, who, in his metaphysics, breaks with Hegelism by arguing that everything that is real and necessary must submit to the categories of space.
If Hegel's being were the mere infinitive of the copula is, as Erdmann thought, not only would whatever copulative force it might retain still presuppose two terms to be connected, but it is impossible to empty the word of all notion of existence. Of course, the phrase nothing is must be purely negative here. The is has no shadow of substantive quality about it. It has manifestly even less meaning than in such a phrase as abracadabra, which has no sort of existence, is. The predicate of the phrase being is, on the other hand, has, in spite of us, a positive substantive meaning In characterizing or thinking being, we cannot escape the subtle connotations of the predicative verb; while, in thinking nothing, all reference to even its copulative function is, by hypothesis, excluded. We cannot escape the conviction that, though no doubt Hegel understood this distinction well enough, he has unconsciously punned upon two words which really have nothing in common except form and grammatical function.
Again, we may substitute for being and nothing, in the Hegelian equation, space with any homogeneous content, and it “ solves and proves” quite as well; for instance, ether-Lucretian atoms uniformly and infinitely diffused, undifferentiated nebula-anything which will serve as a background for the cogitable universe, even if it be so only in terms of sight and touch, it does quite as well. Are, then, intension and extension convertible terms instead of dialectic opposites, or have we here only an artificial abstraction from sensation? Hegel is fond of showing us that no more could be seen in pure unbroken light than in darkness, but how shall we explain his denunciation of Newton as a barbarian, who might as well have said water was made of seven kinds of dirt, as light of seven colors ? Surely it was not because Newton had marred a mere metaphor of the Hegelian logic.
Leibnitz was the first to say that all science that could be proven must be referred to spacial intuitions. Schopenhauer has shown that many qualitative relations of thought may be best expressed diagrammatically. J. H. Fichte argues that space depends on a peculiar feeling of extension “inseparable from self-consciousness and grounded in the objective nature of the soul.” The mechanical logic of Boole, and even that of Ueberweg, are founded upon the idea that as inference becomes certain it is best formulated by quantitative symbols. F. A. Lange, however, has attempted to show at some length that, after excluding modality, a spacial formularization in thought is always necessary when we would assign a general validity to any particular logical form. Thus, all the true may be best distinguished from all the fallacious forms of the possible syllogism by means of the spacial inclusion or exclusion of circles. Although syntactical forms furnish the most striking and suggestive illustrations of the innateness of these spacial determinations, was it not upon such geometrical references, far more than upon grammatical relations, that even Aristotle was led to infer the apodictic nature of syllogistic reasoning?
One interpretation of pure being makes it the same as the simplest psychic process. This is precisely what Hegel attempts to describe at the beginning of the Phenomenology. “Mere being,” we are there told, “is an immediate delivery of sensuous certainty, but as the first object of consciousness it is identical with the abstract now and here." This is precisely the view of recent psychology, and accords with the verdict of perhaps most post-Hegelian speculation. “ Thought,” says Ueberweg, “ must be free from the compulsions of experience, but not void of experience.” “ Thought without presupposition,” argues Ulrici, “ reverses the possibility of things.” “Pure abstraction," says Schelling, “must always presuppose that from which abstraction is made.” “Reason,” says Schopenhauer, “is of feminine nature. She can give only what she has received. Her conceptions are never immaculate.” “No concept-form” (Begriff), Hodgson urges, “ can ever grasp the infinite, but can only reach the conviction that there is something beyond its power to grasp, and this something we call ontological, because, and so far as, we feel that thought does not correspond to things.” In other words, intension, as divorced from extension, is inconceivable. Schleiermacher's argument is that dialectic reason must always rest upon the double basis of inner and of outer perception, and Kuno Fischer, in his Hegelian period, understood Hegel to mean that the shadows of earlier perceptions might enter and determine the dialectic process.
Our conclusion, then, is, not that pure thought is demonstrably unknowable or unreal, but only that it was as unknown to Hegel as it is to the rest of us thus far; that what he has characterized is neither single, immediate, nor extraneously undetermined. The fact that the Idomedian eye—which Reid supposed to exist by itself, and to perceive the world as it would look if sight were absolutely uninstructed by experience or by the sense of touch-was unreal, does not forever disprove the possibility of something that we may poetize about as pure vision. If we close the eye, we have a dim sense of spacial
extension, over which the retinal darkness is spread—something, as Hegel assumes, the mind, emptied of all the products of sensation, has a consciousness of being and nothing; but the one feeling as well as the other is a mere residuum of experience, and not the undifferentiated substance out of which experience is made. If color had no objective ground, but were, as Schopenhauer argues, only a physiological phenomenon, dependent for hue on greater or less quantitative activity of the retina, and for intensity on the amount of its undivided residual energy, then we should have something in the world at least analogous to Hegel's pure logic of quality. But even this is far more demonstrable.
Pure thought, then, in the sense required by Hegelism, we regard as a postulate, or rather an hypothesis, of logic, and not as an established verity, and still less as demonstrably identical with being.
But even this is not the greatest difficulty with the first triad. Thus far all is static, motionless. Pure being is as seductive to the restseeking reason as Nirvana to a world-sick soul. But where comes the vital, moving, evolving principle? Such random categories as matter, space, substance, being, are members of a very different order from such as cause, force, becoming, and the like. Whether because these last are based upon time, as the first upon space, we will not here pause to ask. However this may be, it is certain that esse and fieri, stasis and dynamis, are, as it were, the two poles of all thinking. Whence, then, comes the last? Logic, at length, has come to adequately recognize Leibnitz's dynamic negative as a universal determinant. But we have still to urge that an absolute nihil privitivum is not the presence, but the denial, of all possible determination or predication. If universal being is in pure thought, or otherwise, then nonbeing is not, else being is relative and finite. However, whatever or so far as being is, non-being is not. This is purely logical negation, or the mere denial of what the first or affirmative notion arrested, without in any way implying anything else in its place. Opposition is here equivalent to diametrical contradiction, and the application of the method of the excluded middle is undoubted. Hegel cannot, then, have meant that being and nothing are logically opposed, or else becoming, as their synthesis, would be forever impossible. But if we define real opposition, with Trendelenburg, as the denial of an affirmative notion, by another affirmative notion, so far as they must be mutually related, what have we, then, but the obverse side of Mill's 6 associative impulse," or a new and somewhat quaint illustration of the doctrine of relativity. Nothing, like being, is positive only; it is in a new relation, and the dialectic process, instead of being in any sense genetic, is as capricious and arbitrary as the psychological factors of attention. In fact there is no contradiction whatever, save in the Herbartian sense of mere difference.
Trendelenburg's question is still more searching. How does thought get from its first affirmative term to its second denying affirmation? It can only be by reflection from sense or understanding. "The nothing is attained by comparing the pure being of thought with the full being of sense-perception."
But we must not forget that being and nothing are not affirmed to be absolutely identical. We are not required to say both yes and no to the same question understood in precisely the same sense, else there were no possibility of becoming. If A equals A, it cannot become A in any real sense. Everything flows, said Heraclitus, because it is and is not at the same time. Only movement is and is not at the same point and moment, said Trendelenburg, and so movement, understood in the most generic sense, as common to thoughts and things, and not becoming, is what is motivated here. But motion is an original factor, of a new species. It is, even Trendelenburg admitted, the existing contradiction which formal reasoning easily proves impossible. Thus, contradictions are overcome, though all static logic is powerless to tell how.
If the problem of creation were absolutely indeterminate, if the atoms of the Lucretian rain had been infinitely diffused, or had not swerved from the straight equidistant lines of their course, “there could have been no law, even of gravity, for its existence depends on the distribution and collocation of matter.” These would have eternally remained an infinite equation of possibilities, every element perfectly poised and balanced, an infinite here, an eternal now. In language less mathematical and more familiar, the homogeneous is unstable, and must differentiate itself. But why, if purely homogeneous, can it be unstable, and whence comes the must ? Formal logic, which deals with ready-made ideas, can always prove development impossible, for every sort of creation must be regarded as the irruption of an extraneous power into the realm of its Saturnian repose.
Thus it is that the necessity of an empirical principle is demonstrated, which must be at the same time simple and universal. Now, psychological analysis and physiological investigation concur in designating motion as such a principle. Vierordt, and Exner, and others have shown some reason for believing that the perception of motion is the only immediate sensation, and, unlike other rudimentary psychic processes, not founded on unconscious inferences of any sort. The sense of motion, it is claimed, is the quickest, the most minute,