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Natural love ne'er takes erroneous course;

Through ill-directed aim the other may,
Or from excess, or from a want of force.

While o'er its bent the Primal Good hath sway,
It cannot be the source of wrong delight.

But when it swerves to ill, or if it should
Seek good with more or less zeal than is right,

Against the maker doth his work rebel.
Whence may'st thou? comprehend how love in you

Must of all virtue be the seed, as well
As of each action to which pain is due.

Now, since love must look ever towards its own
Subjects' well-being, things are from self-hate

Saved; and since naught can be supposed alone
To exist, from the First Being separate,

Hated of Him is also spared to man.”3

created beings as derived from Him. Love in man is natural or rational — that is, of the mind. Natural love, towards all things necessary to one's preservation, cannot err. Rational love can err in three ways: first, when directed to a bad aim — that is, to evil; secondly, when directed excessively to earthly pleasures; thirdly, when directed feebly to those things truly worthy of love — the celestial. As long as love turns to the Primal Good — the celestial — or seeks, with due check, the inferior or terrestrial, it cannot be the source of wrong or sin. “But when it swerves to ill,” etc.

? Love is the source of good works, as of bad ones; thus, according to St. Augustine, Boni aut mali mores sunt boni aut mali amores.

3 Love cannot turn against its subjects (viz., men cannot hate themselves); and as these subjects cannot exist separate from their First Being, they cannot, therefore, hate God. (Men may deny or blaspheme, but not hate, God.) It follows, therefore, as no bad love can be directed against one's self, or against God, that it can only be against one's neighbor, and this can be in three forms, viz. : by Pride, or the love of good to ourselves, and of evil to others; by Envy, or the love of evil to others, without cause of good or evil to us; by Anger, or the love of evil to others on account of real or imaginary evil to us.



of Philosophy – Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical – hy William Fleming, D. D., Protessor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, from the second edition, 1860; and the third, 1876, edited by Henry Calderwood, LL. D.) By Charles P. Krauth, S. T. D., LL. D., Vice-provost of the University of Pennsylvania. New York: Sheldon & Company. 1378.

In 1860 Dr. Krauth had edited an American reprint of Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy, and, by his own additions, had made a useful book much more useful and valuable. In 1873 he contributed a very important work to Lippincott's Library of Philosophical Classics, by editing “Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.” The treatise itself occupied less than one-fourth of the 420 pages of the book, the rest being an industrious and scholarly collation of matter in regard to Berkeley and his doctrines, constituting, as it were, a sort of general treatise on Idealism.

Philosophical students who had felt the want of a more complete book than Fleming's hoped for a new work from Dr. Krauth, which would supplement its deficiencies in the manner of the “Prolegomena” of Berkeley. The present work, in a measure, supplies the want. The additions to the Fleming's Vocabulary consist in “A Vocabulary of Philosophical Sciences,” containing nearly as much matter as the former, and more systematically arranged. Definitions are given, and the citations are more pertinent, and from authorities of far greater weight. Fleming seems to have little acquaintance with German philosophy, and it is the technical terms of German thinkers that furnish most occasion for a " Vocabulary” to explain them. Dr. Krauth has collected illustrations, not only of German Philosophy, but also of Scholastic Philosophy and Greek and Latin Philosophy. He has added historical material everywhere. The “Chronological Table of the History and Literature of the Philosophical Sciences, from 1860 to 1867,” is excellent. He has prefixed to it Tennemann's Chronological Table, commencing with the birth of Thales, 640 B. C. A Biographical Index of Authors and of proper names follows. It gives dates and chief works of each author, also the subjects upon which he wrote, thus: ABELARD, PETER (1079-1142).

1. Opera (Paris, 1616)., Cousin (1849).
2. Recently Discorered Works. (Sic et Non.) (1831, Rheinwald; 1836,

Cousin ; 1851, Hanke and Lindenkohl.)
Belief. Scholastic Philosophy.
This index occupies over seventy pages in fine print.

A Synthetical Table of the Philosophical Sciences completes the book. Its “Part First” treats of Theory and Definitions," showing the technical terms used in treating each subject. Its “Part Second” is historical and critical, giving the names of the several systems of Philosophy that have prevailed in the world, and then classifying them historically under each country.

The useful “Index of Terms,” which is found in the original Fleming's Vocabulary, and also in Dr. Krauth's editions of 1860 and 1873, is omitted from this edition, because, we presume, the “Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences” renders it unnecessary by reason of its full cross-references to Fleming.

This is a work that every student of philosophy should possess.



Hutchison Stirling. Edinburgh: Edmonston & Co. 1878.

This small volume, from the distinguished author of "The Secret of Hegel,”. will prove of unusual interest to those who have read his philosophical writings. His intense, fiery style, his profound absorption in his theme, his amazing gifts at description of subtle psychological processes, rendered his book on Hegel what the Germans call an "epoch-making” one. He seizes the reader's attention from the start, and holds it by his power to throw the interest of personal adventure into his portrayal of the struggles and disappointments incident to discovering the thought of a great philosopher. We cannot but find healthful stimulus in the book, which shows us indomitable energy in the pursuit of an understanding or comprehension of a system of philosophy, however often baffled and defeated in hope by the prodigious difficulties which technique and vast syntheses create for

The novitiate is always a thinker from the stand-point of sense or of reflection, and, consequently, his ability to make combinations — to think syntheses is quite limited. He finds that his mincing steps are utterly inadequate to span the Olympian strides of the world-historical thinkers. The biography of the thinker during his process of education into true insight is part tragedy, part comedy; but its portrayal is of genuine interest to all rationally disposed men and women. Dr. Stirling is certainly the most successful of philosophers in his literary presentation of the steps of philosophic experience. This has been realized by a multitude of old and of young who have read his books. These persons will welcome the “Saved Leaves" as a desired completion to the biography of a true man, who has labored, with no mean success, to become MAN the generic type; to realize his

We are all, potentially, MAN. We are what Aristotle calls “first entelechies;” by education, by study of the great thinkers, seers, sayers, and doers, we realize in each of us the type of MAN, and become “second entelechies.” Human life has this great object before it: to make the individual who is at first only a particular, special existence, also a universal, generic existence.

It is all-important, for the sake of stimulating the courage of the novitiate philosopher, that the biography of the giant shall commence with the dwarf-period. This man, who can comprehend Hegel and unravel the tangled web of mystery which enshrouds the “Logic" — was he ever of childish stature? The greatest of obstacles to the progress of thought is the self-distrust which says, at the very first page of genuine philosophy: "Ah! I can never understand this. I never was born with the head to grasp it. Plato and Aristotle and Hegel had special gifts for such thinking.” Such is the fatalism which utterly misreads human nature and its own destiny. For, surely, we are all born with limits, and no one of us but has the power to grow out of such limits as he may have at a particular time, by earnest effort. The capacity to grow is worth more than all “gifts,” “natural talents," "genius," or " innate faculties.” The highest human achievement in character is below the ideal possibility of the humblest man.

Stirling's character and capacity when a young man is clearly defined in the “Saved Leaves,” prose and verse, wherein he gives his views of “The Novelist


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,” “The Novel Blowers, or Hot-pressed Heroes,” of “The Foreign Country at Home," "A Peep into a Welsh Iron Valley,” “Social Condition of South Wales,” or utters his deepest sentiments and insights in more or less poetic verses: “The Ballad of Merla," “ Belshazzar's Feast,” “Venetian Madeline," “The Blacksmith's Hame,” “The Enchanted Isles," and so on through the eighteen “saved leaves" of poetry and the ten similar of prose. We may readily enough discern the “stuff” of the man, but it is a "first entelechy." And it is a generous thought of the author to show us these firstlings. He says of them: “The "Saved Leaves’ are as they name themselves — saved leaves. There is a literary flush in most impressionable young students, from sixteen to twenty-three or so; of such flush these leaves are saved specimens. The judicious reader will probably perceive that some part of the “saving' element was consideration of the variety of tastes.” “It is different with • Burns in Drama,' which, nevertheless, was itself planned, begun, and in large part written, in 1855. It is scarcely necessary to remark that, by this piece, no drama of plot or incident is intended, but only a study of character. With this object in view, the matter of concluding (partial) monologues was found unfit for the form of dialogue.”

“Burns in Drama” is divided into five acts, and subdivided into scenes, after the manner of a drama. Most of the scenes of the first three acts would make a lively impression on the stage. The fourth and fifth acts follow the life of Burns into richer, nobler developments, but which cannot be presented with adequate stage effects because of their internality. The unity of the piece is solely that of subject; its time extends from the advanced youth of Burns to his death, a period of some twenty years; the place changes from Mauchline, and thereabouts, to Edinburgh, and then to Dumfries.

The contents of the several acts are given thus: “Act I. The Natural JetAwaking Youth. Act II. Opening Manhood - Young Blood, Young Feelings, Young Bitterness. Act III. Life, Love, and Horror of Eclipse. Act IV. Edinburgh, and After — The Blaze and Ashes. Act V. Dumfries, and the End." A note is appended, relating to the character of Burns. The characters are portrayed in a few masterly strokes, showing the very essence of their humanity. The father and mother, the cruel factor, the Laird of Coilsfield, the corrupt Rankine and his evil companions, the charming Jean Armour, the brethren of the masonic lodge, pass before us in the first three acts. The tragic scene at night, in which Jean communicates to Robert the grief and wrath of her father when their liaison became known, ends with oaths of fidelity and — separation.

Burns.—No, indeed, puir lassie! it wasna your faut-- I've been a bad fellow, Jean

- can you forgie me? Jean.—I'm no' blamin' ye — there's naething to forgie - I liked you owre weel; that was a'.

Burns.-And dinna I like you, Jean?
Jean.-But you're gaun awa— you're ginny lea' me — you're ginny lea' me.
Burns. - I hae na siller.

Then the lonely night upon the moor, when Burns, hunted by outraged respectability, is on the eve of taking passage to the West Indies, to become overseer of the slaves of a plantation, shows us his deepest despair, so well depicted in the poem written on this occasion:

“The gloomy night is gath’ring fast,

Loud roars the wild, inconstant blast;
Yon murky cloud is foul with rain,
I see it driving o'er the plain;

The hunter now has left the moor,
The scatter'd coveys meet secure,
While here I wander, prest with care,
Along the lonely banks of Ayr.”

But hearing that the volume of poems which he had printed on the occasion of his departure was received with enthusiasm at Edinburgh, he changes his mind and goes to that metropolis. Here we tind him, at the opening of the fourth act, in a blaze of glory. Dr. Blair and Professor Dugald Stewart are introduced to us as the representatives of his society there. But he returns to Mauchline (with the £500 received from the new edition of his poems) in the second scene of this act, vents his splenetic reflections upon the shortness of the season in which a literary lion is permitted to engross the attention of society. He stocks a farm at Ellisland, marries Jean, receives a visit from his old tried friend, Ainslee, and flings away ambition. In Act V, on his death-bed, he passes verdict upon his own life, speaking to Jean: “ The hope of fame, of fame for ages, is to almost all — to altogether all, in the end - an unsubstantial dream.” “It is of no use — there is nothing in it. Nature is beautiful, and God's world is divine — but man is a lâche, his world a hell. Draw the curtain, Jean — I'll sleep.” The “professor and minister" pass judgment upon his character in the closing scene. No essay on Burns, or biography of him, gives us such vivid pictures of the man as does this “ drama.”


Otto Pfleiderer, in Berlin. Verlag von G. Reimer, in Berlin.

The first part of this work treats the history of the philosophy of religion from the time of Lessing and Kant to the present. In the first three sections the author traces the development of the philosophy of religion through the steps of Kant's Criticism, of the mystical, intuitive faith-philosophy of Hamann, Herder, and Jacobi, and of the speculative school of Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, etc. In the representation of each system the general connection of ideas is properly set forth, and the truth, as well as the limits of the various stand-points, are pointed out. The last section sketches the labors of the present day on the field of the philosophy of religion, and discusses, in that connection, among other matters, those writings that have attained celebrity by means of the religious-philosophical controversies to which they have given rise - as, for instance, the “Philosophy of Materialism,” by A. Lange; the “Philosophy of the Unconscious," and the “Self-dissolution of Christianity,” by Edward von Hartmann; and “The Old and the New Faith," by Strauss. In every instance the standard of an objective, scientific criticism is applied, and the relative right even of opponents fairly acknowledged; but the ground of their one-sided results is also unsparingly exposed.

The second part of the book contains a "genetic speculative philosophy of religion,” the method of which proceeds in the main from historical deduction in opposition to the a-priori association of ideas of Hegel's dialectic. But, on the other hand, in opposition to empiricism, it gathers together the results of the genetic development of that historical induction into speculative comprehension, and traces them back to their final grounds.

The first section treats of the religious subject, and describes the nature of religious consciousness according to its psychological factors, especially with regard to its relation to morality and cognition. The second section, which forms the

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