most primitive sensation of animal life; out of it all the higher faculties of the soul are developed, and in many common delusions of muscular and other feeling we may still detect its original forms, uninterpreted-indeed, almost forgotten-by adult consciousness. The facts upon which these inferences rest are, it need hardly be said, far too few to warrant any positive conclusion of this sort.

But shall we then urge, with Trendelenburg, that movement, in a broader sense, is the only aspect common to both thought and beingis the prius and the medium of all experience? Because, he argues, the original activity of mind is best described as the counterpart of material motion, knowledge of the external world is possible and valid, though it is imperfect so far as this analogy fails.

Because of this common term ideal, a priori categories are possible and valid in experience. Time is the internal result, space the external condition, of movement. If we are asked to explain light, heat, electricity, chemical change, the laws of physics or astronomy, the mode in which mind acts on matter, or the essence of either, or even the way in which the idea of a line, a surface, or a sphere, or a logical conception, arises in the mind, we can only reply in terms of movement in time. Molar is explained by molecular, known by hypothetical motion. Yet movement, which explains all things, is itself unexplained and undefined. By it all things are known. It must be selfknown. If we try to derive movement, or construe it into non-motive terms, we are like a blind optician, who does not realize that sight can be understood only by seeing.

Here we shall at once be met by the objection that movement in thought and physical motion have nothing in common but the name. We grant at once that succession in consciousness and objective sequence are two very different, and perhaps quite incommensurate, series, but as soon as one psychic term follows another in the same order, as the corresponding objective term follows its antecedent, we have, if not as Chauncy Wright argued, the very beginning of consciousness at any rate, pro hac vice, the truest form of knowledge; for what is causation but the postulation of something in the bond that joins two things, that is common with the bond that joins two thoughts, or vice versa?

We quite agree with Hegel that we may be said to know a thing, even the mind itself, most truly when our thought has followed all its changes in time, or has traced all its processes above, but we insist that the dialectic method is in no real sense genetic.

It is easy to conceive the external world as real, or as ideal, but impossible to conceive the order of the terms which common con

sciousness ascribes to it as real, as the reverse of that ascribed to it as ideal. Philosophy may still find pleasant pastime in resolving the universe into all-object or all-subject, but has she not a higher destiny than to amuse herself with this see-saw of reality and ideality, in despair of ever getting out of the labyrinth in which the theory of knowledge has entombed her, remote from the common life of men and dead to the issues and impulses of science? May not pure idealism read a wholesome warning in the fate of the obsolescent materialisms of the past, infinitely superior as it is in every way to them? Are mind and matter mutually exclusive or contradictory? Must the world be all one or all the other, or is there much that is common to, yet more than, both, as yet known? These are the questions which psychology has made pertinent, though it is as yet by no means certain that it can ever answer them. Its suggestions thus far may be briefly epitomized.

The simplest elements of sensation that common consciousness recognizes, and which seem immediate and instantaneous, are yet resolvable into a series of yet more ultimate states. The simplest act of vision, for example, is a whole cosmos of such psychic elements. Each of these changes has at some point of the nervous system, as a counterpart or background, some demonstrable form of molecular or electrical change. Now, if pure sensations may be described as an immediate knowledge of physical states; if æsthetic feelings, or pleasure and pain, are conditioned at all by the nutritive state of nerve fibres; if the muscular sense is an a priori knowledge of relative position or motion of parts of the body; if organic sensation, or the feeling of general depression or elation; and, above all, if Wundt's hypothesis of the direct consciousness of innervation registering accurately every increase or expenditure of nerve force be allowed, then, surely, those elements are not unconscious, but are the most innate forms of self-consciousness-the mother-tongues of sensation from which all the functions of sense-perception are developed, along with the form of sentient organism, by intricate processes of extradition and intradition, if the word be allowable. A primitive immediacy, or absolute identity of subject and object at some point back of all of individual experience, perhaps, is thus postulated. That mind and matter may even be proven identical to the understanding, will, of course, seem a forlorn hope. It is so; but is not the alternative for philosophy still more forlorn? Of course, to all who do not thoroughly prefer the pursuit to the possession of truth, the assurance of Hegel that the problem of things is essentially solved, or even the confessed nescience of Spencer or the new Kan

tean school will seem far more philosophical than such a mere programme of long investigations yet to be made-a programme that must itself, no doubt, be re-cast again and again with every new dis-covery. But does not psychology, as well as the history of philosophy, teach us that the outstanding questions of thought have always seemed settled in proportion as men's minds were shut, or as they confounded the limits of their own individual development or culture with the limits of possible knowledge? If the truth-loving reason is not to be satisfied with ever deeper insights, in a ratio corresponding to its own increasing power-if, as Tyndall intimates, its essential principles of science are all found out-nothing remains but to pigeon-hole all the details of knowledge.

The world in which thought lives and moves is but little better than a dead moon, and pessimism, the true devil-worship of philosophy, is inevitable. The apparent achievements of individuals were never less, but the real work done in philosophy was never greater or more promising, than now. It is for her to ask questions, and rarely, indeed, is it permitted her to answer them, save by other questions, broader, more earnest and searching. Philosophy is no longer a guild, or even a profession, so much as a spirit of research inspiring many specialties. It is because physiological psychology, with true Socratic irony, dares to take the attitude of ignorance toward both a positive philosophy and a yet more positive science, while it puts the same old question of philosophy in such new, tangible terms, and with such a divine soul of curiosity, that we love its spirit, and hope much from its methods. Nothing, since the phenomenology, which seems to us to contain the immortal soul of Hegelism, is so fully inspired with the true philosophic motive.

In creating and using a technical language, Hegel is unsurpassed throughout the logic. He is a master of illustration and of clearness in detail. If the maxim, bonus grammaticus, bonus theologus, were true of the philosopher, there would be little left to desire. But the trouble lies far deeper than style. Numerous as his school has been, no two Hegelians understand their master alike. Gabler says Trendelenburg's misunderstanding of him is inconceivable; while Michelet says Trendelenburg understands him better than most of his followers, but that Zeller's misconceptions are "monstrous." Stirling describes Haym's ignorance of Hegel's meaning as strange and inconceivable. Michelet considers that the greatest error of Krause, Herbart, and Schopenhauer is in fancying that they are not true Hegelians, while in a recent pamphlet he says-in emulation, perhaps, of Hegel's assertion that only animals are not metaphysicians

-that all who think must be Hegelians. Gans thinks the dialectic method is an instance of pure deduction. Gabler says the idea created being out of itself; while the young, or left, Hegelians assert that the idea is God immanent, not so much in the world-process, or the race-consciousness, as in the individual soul.

But it is not concerning the logic so much as the philosophy of rights, æsthetics, and especially of religion and nature, that Hegelians disagree. Yet the impulse he gave to thought in these fields was unprecedented. The philosophy of nature, for instance, of which Trendelenburg, more wittily than truly, said that it might claim to be a product of pure abstract thinking more justly than the logic, and which, when the first editions of his works were sold, was most in demand, gave an impulse to natural sciences none the less philosophical, because, in the ferment which followed, Hegel's views were soon outgrown, and his method forgotten. As a mental discipline, then, as a wholesome stimulant of every motive of philosophical culture, and as the best embodiment of the legitimate aspiration of the philosophical sentiment, we have gradually come to regard Hegel's system as unrivaled and unapproached; yet, at the same time, as fatal as a finality, almost valueless as a method.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., January, 1878.

G. STANLEY HALL.

SENTENCES IN PROSE AND VERSE.

FROM THE SANSCRIT.

Until he finds a wife, a man is only a half; the house not occupied by children is like a cemetery.

The housewife is declared to be the house. A house destitute of a housewife is regarded as a desert.

These women are by nature instructed, while the learning of men is taught them by books.

How can the conceit in one's mind be eradicated? The tittibha (a bird) sleeps with its feet thrown upwards, fearing that the sky may fall.

The place where the self-subduing man dwells is a hermitage.

Even when being cut down, the sandal-tree imparts fragrance to the edge of the ax.

Constantly, rising up, a man should reflect: "What real thing have

I done to-day? The setting sun will carry away with it a portion of my life."

The kinsmen of the poor die away, even when the poor themselves continue to live. A stranger turns himself into a relation of the rich. He whose time has arrived, if touched only with the point of a straw, cannot escape.

Hari was regarded by cowherds as a cowherd, and by gods as the lord of the universe.

A jar is gradually filled by the falling of water-drops.

The soul itself is its own witness; the soul itself is its own refuge. Poor King Rantideva bestowed water with a pure mind, and went to heaven; King Uriga gave away thousands of cows, but, because he gave away one of another's, he went to hell.

Say, say, who are the deafest? advice.

They who will not listen to good

Who is dumb? He who does not know how to say kind things at the proper time.

I know not if the essence of this world be ambrosia or poison. O lord of the Yadus, and husband of Lakshmi, I ever spend my time in doing homage to thy lotus-feet.

That jewel, knowledge, which is not plundered by relatives, nor carried off by friends, which does not decrease by giving, is great store of riches.

There are many books-Vedas and the like; there are myriad obstacles in the way of success. Let a man strive to discover the essence, as the swan finds milk in water.

A son born of one's body, if faithless, is like an eating disease, and to be wrongfully deserted by one's children is the torment of hell on earth.

Men wish the fruits of virtue, not virtue. They desire not the fruits of sin, but practice sin laboriously.

As a lump of salt is without exterior or interior, but is all a mass of flavor, so this soul.

The seeker of knowledge can find no ease.

Not self-directing, a man yields to some current of evil impulse, as a tree which has fallen from a river-bank and has reached the middle of the stream.

FROM THE ARABIC.

It is easy to mount a little donkey.

If you can add anything to what you possess, it is of value-even a rusty nail.