must serve as a commentary upon the other, and how both must thus be discredited in the judgment of the future historian.

Had our author confined his complaint to the real cause of offence; had he stripped of its mask the base and treacherous Jacobinism, which sought by depreciating the military power of England, and maguifying that of France, to lower the heart and the hopes of the country in the impending contest; had he shewn how this must, of necessity, have cooled the ardour and crippled the resources of any government depending upon popular support, while it afforded a corresponding encouragement to the common enemy; had he held up to merited reprobation the palliators of French atrocities, the men who scrupled not "to call evil, good, and good, evil;" and who hesitated not to rejoice in the invasion of Spain, as the bright era of its moral and political renovation, he would have done well. The wickedness of evil-doers might tbus be rebuked, and the ignorance of foolish men put to shame. Had he taken to task that able organ of the revolutionary party, the Edinburgh Review, then in the plenitude of its reputation; had he detected the unsoundness of its views, and exposed the fallacy of its predictions, and employed the power of scornful sarcasm which he possesses, in branding its base and canting sophistry with merited indignation, we could well believe that Major-General Napier was really solicitous for the removal of those impediments which prevented the British government from bestowing all its energies upon the ardent and effectual prosecution of the war in Spain. But, seeing that he leaves untouched those sources of national difficulty, which hung, as it were, upon the flanks and rear of the government at home, even as the Guerillas and the Partidas upon the French in the Peninsula, no candid reader can help regarding his complaints as partaking more of the rancour of the partizan, than the honest reprehension of the dispassionate his. torian.

With General Napier's views respecting questions of domestic policy, we do not meddle; they are wholly beside our purpose, even if they were not below contempt. He appears to us to be an uneducated bigot of the vulgarest democracy, intoxicated with self-conceit, and thinking it a fine thing to strut upon his literary stilts, and

swag his saucy plume in the face of men who are immeasurably his superiors. But we tell him this, that, until democratic England has evinced the wisdom and the prowess, the righteous determination, and the noble perseverance, that distinguished aristocratic England under the ancient constitution, that has been overthrown, it were wiser to restrain his boasting. We trust in God the occasion may not soon arise, when efforts, like those of Wellington may be necessary for our preservation ;-but, if they did, we have little doubt that events would soon occur which would rebuke the folly of the military historian, and convince him, that if, in the transactions which he now records, there was a feebleness, a vacillation, and a want of promptitude in the conduct of our rulers, which rendered it difficult for Lord Wellington to carry on the war-all those evils would be only aggravated one hundred fold, by the caprice and the violence, the ignorance and the profligacy, which would be sure to characterise a more unmitigated democracy.

It will be seen from the above remarks, that we do not regard Major General Napier's history as perfect. But it cannot be denied that he has done good service in recording, as he has done, the great events in which he' bore no inglorious part, and illustrating, as he has done, transactions which it required knowledge and experience such as he possessed to make plain to the comprehension of the general reader. He has thus furnished materials of which some future writer may take advantage, in giving a really enlightened account of the contest in Spain; and we look to Mr. Alison, if his history of the French revolution should extend so far, as one who will yet avail himself abundantly of our author's researches and of his skill, while he eschews the errors of the intemperate politician, and rebukes, with an unsparing severity, the shallow impertinences of the factious pamphleteer. We will, by those who know us, be believed, when we say, that we regret to be obliged to speak thus of one who belongs to a profession which we love, and who frequently evinces a spirit and an ability which we would delight to honor; but truth and justice required from us this exposure, and having made it, we proceed to the much more agreeable task of making known the merits of Major-General Napier's work to our readers.

His last volume brought down his history to the siege of Badajos, which he described with a force and a fidelity which we never remember to have seen exceeded. By that memorable exploit, the Duke of Wellington laid a basis for more extended operations in Spain, which it is the object of the General's present volume to describe; and it is but right to say, that he does not suffer his political prejudices to interfere much with his estimate of the transcendant merits of our great commander. Indeed,the services of this extraordinary man are such as surpass all praise; and it is impossible for us not to regard as providential the circumstances which placed him at the head of our army, when it is our conscientious persuasion that the complicated difficulties with which he had to contend could have been mastered by no other man in the British empire.

Buonaparte was now intent upon his Russian campaign. The intruder, Joseph, was in Madrid, and at variance with almost all the generals by whom the French troops in the various parts of Spain were commanded. They despised him for his want of generalship, and he, with a feeling worthy of a better cause, felt displeased with them for their arbitrary severities, and their tyranuous exactions.

Wellington was now no longer to be couped up within the territory of Portugal. By the successes of the last campaign, it was free to him to operate either upon the north or the south of Spain; and he chose the former, as well because success in that direction would bring him nearer to cutting off the communication of the enemy with France, as that the lateness of the harvests in Leon and Castile promised a more continued supply of provisions for

his army.

Nearly three hundred thousand French troops were still in arms in the Peninsula. Seventy-six thousand, under Suchet, composed the armies of Catalonia and Arragon. Forty-nine thousand composed the army of the North, under Caffarelli, and were distributed on the grand line of communication from St. Sebastian to Burgos of these, two divisions were destined to reinforce Marmont. Nineteen thousand composed the army of the centre, "occupying a variety of posts in a circle round the capital, and having a division in La Mancha." Sixty-three thousand composed the army of the South, under Soult, occu

pying Andalusia and a part of Estremadura. "The army of Purtugal, under Marmont, consisted of seventy thousand men ;" these occupied Leon, part of Old Castile, and the Asturias; their front was upon the Tormes; and a division watched the movements in Gallicia.

Joseph saw that it was now optional with Wellington to direct his force against any of the divisions of the French army; and, accordingly, arrangements were made by which, wherever the attack was made, there should be a concentration of force by which it might be resisted. His chief anxiety, however, seemed to be about the security of Madrid, which, considering the position of affairs at that time, he valued at more than its importance. Both Marmont and Soult respectively apprehended that they would be the object of the British commander; and, accordingly, their advice respected, chiefly, the exigencies in which they imagined that they would, separately, be placed; and they either thwarted or disobeyed the commands of their king in a manner that was well calculated to provoke his indignation. Of the strife which prevailed between Joseph and Soult, the following may serve to convey some idea to the reader. The latter was directed by the king

"To keep Drouet, with one third of the army of the south, so far advanced in Estremadura, as to have direct communication with General Trielhard in the valley of the Tagus; and he especially ordered that Drouet should pass that river, if Hill passed it."

"The duke of Dalmatia would not suffer Drouet to stir, and Joseph, whose jealousy had been excited by the marshal's power in Andalusia, threatened to deprive him of his command. The inflexible duke replied that the king had already virtually done so by sending orders direct to Drouet, that he was ready to resign, but he would not commit a gross military

error.

time to help Marmont, and would be too Drouet could scarcely arrive in his absence would ruin Andalusia, because weak for the protection of Madrid, but the allies, whose force in Estremadura was very considerable, could in five marches reach Seville, and take it on the sixth; then communicating with the fleets at Cadiz they would change their line of operations without loss, and unite with thirty thousand other troops, British and Spanish, who were at Gibraltar, in the Isla, in the Niebla, on the side of Murcia,

E and under Ballesteros in the Ronda. A Lew army might also come from the ocean, and Drouet, once beyond the Tagus, could not return to Andalusia in less than twelve days; Marmont could scarcely come there in a month; the force under his own immediate command was spread all over Andalusia, if collected it would not furnish thirty thousand sabres and bayonets, exclusive of Drouet, and the evacuation of the province would be unavoidable.

"For these reasons Soult would not permit Drouet to quit Estremadura, yet

sup

he promised to reinforce him, and so to press Hill, that Graham, whom he posed still at Portalegre, should be obliged to bring up the first and sixth divisions. In fine, he promised that a powerful body of the allies should be forced to remain in Estremadura, or Hill would be defeated and Badajos invested. This dispute raged during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile the English general, well acquainted from the intercepted letters with these dissensions, made arrangements, so as to confirm each general in his own peculiar views." Andalusia was now supposed to be the object of the British general; and all his address was employed in confirming them in that erroneous persuasion. In truth, such a design had been seriously entertained, and was but recently relinquished; and the secret despatches to the Portuguese government, in which this first intention had been fully declared, was, by their culpable negligence, suffered to appear in a Gibraltar newspaper, and served, in no small degree, to satisfy Soult that immediate hostilities were to be expected. Hill's position at Almarez, which he had so gloriously captured, menaced, alike, the north and the south; but he took care to disseminate a rumour that the invasion of Andalusia was at hand. Graham, indeed, returned to Beira, with the first and sixth divisions of Cotton's cavalry; but as Hill was at the same time reinforced, and Graham's march sudden and secret, the enemy were again deceived in all quarters. For Marmont and the king, reckoning the number of divisions, thought the bulk of the allies was in the north, and did not discover that Hill's corps had been nearly doubled in numbers, though his division seemed the same, while Šoult, not immediately aware of Graham's departure, found Hill more than a match for Drouet, and still expected the allies in Andalusia."

66

The reader will at once, perceive that Wellington had to fight for more than victory. He must take care not to purchase success over one division of the French army, at an expense that might leave him unequal to the others.

and isolating, in some measure, the Having succeeded in deceiving Soult, proceeded vigorously in that course of army of Portugal, the British general action on which he had resolved, and took every human precaution that his great design should now experience and the Spanish forces, were directed no serious interruption. The Partidas, to operate on the flanks and the rear of the enemy. An expedition, under Sir Home Popham, was to commence operation on the coast of Biscay, for the purpose of engaging the attention of Caffarelli's division, and withholding them from the succour of Marmont. A Sicilian expedition was to menace Catalonia and Valencia, for the purpose of preventing Suchet from reinforcing the king. And the garrison at Gibraltar, together with the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish troops in the Isla de Leon; insurrections in the kingdom of Cordoba, and the Spanish army under Ballesteros, were so to occupy Soult, as to prevent him overwhelming Hill, before the latter had effected his junction with the main body of the British army.

But Marmont now clearly understood the drift of these extended arrangements, and he was, our author tells us,

"A man to be feared. He possessed quickness of apprehension, and courage, moral and physical, scientific acquirements, experience of war, and great facility in the moving of troops; he was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for glory, and although neither a great nor a fortunate commander, such a one as might bear the test of fire. His army was weak in cavalry, but admirably organized; for he had laboured, with successful diligence, to restore that discipline, which had been so much shaken by the misfortunes of Massena's campaign, and by the unceasing operations from the battle of Fuentes Onoro to the last retreat from

Beira."

Wellington was soon before Salamanca, the forts of which he straitly invested. The French, at first, retired at his approach. But the strength of the forts had been underrated; and intercepted returns showed the Duke, that the armies of the south and of Portugal were far stronger than he had

supposed. Marmont quietly remained in observation at Fuente el Sauco, until his expectation of reinforcements justified him in retracing his steps for the purpose of relieving the forts.

"Meanwhile Marmont, who had remained in person at Fuente el Sauco, united there, on the 20th, four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, furnishing about twenty-five thousand men of all arms, with which he marched to the succour of the forts. His approach

over an open country was descried at a considerable distance, and a brigade of the fifth division was immediately called off from the siege, the battering train was sent across the Tormes, and the army, which was in bivouac on the Salamanca side of St. Christoval, formed in order of battle on the top. This position of Christoval was about four miles long,

and rather concave, the ascent in front steep, and tangled with hollow roads and stone enclosures, belonging to the villages, but the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe corn; the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, and the left dipped into the country bordering the Lower Tormes, for in passing Salamanca, that river makes a sweep round the back of the position. The infantry, the heavy cavalry, and the guns crowned the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry fell back from the front to the low country on the left, where there was a small stream and a marshy flat. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the left of the position; the village of Cabrerizos marked the extreme right, though the hill still trended up the river. The villages of Christoval, Castillanos, and Moresco, were nearly in a line, along the foot of the heights in front, the last was somewhat within the allies' ground, and nothing could be stronger than the position, which completely commanded all the country for many miles; but the heat was excessive, and there was neither shade, nor fuel to cook with, nor water nearer than the Tormes.

"About five o'clock in the evening the enemy's horsemen approached, pointing towards the left of the position, as if to turn it by the Lower Tormes, whereupon the British light cavalry made a short forward movement and a partial charge took place; but the French opened six guns, and the British retired to their own ground near Monte Rubio and Villares. The light division which was held in reserve, immediately closed towards the left of the position until the French cavalry halted and then returned to the centre. Meanwhile the main body of the enemy bore, in one dark volume, against the right, and halting at the very foot of the position, sent a flight of shells on the

lofty summit; nor did this fire cease until after dark, when the French general, after driving back all the outposts, obtained possession of Moresco, and established himself behind that village and Castellanos within gun-shot of the allies.

"The English general slept that night on the ground, amongst the troops, and at the first streak of light the armies were again under arms; nevertheless, though some signals were interchanged between Marmont and the forts, both sides were quiet until towards evensixty-eighth regiment from the line, to ing, when Wellington detached the drive the French from Moresco. This attack, made with vigour, succeeded, but the troops being recalled just as day-light failed, a body of French, coming unperceived through the standing corn, broke into the village as the British were collecting their posts from the different avenues, and did considerable execution. In the skirmish an officer of the sixtyeighth, named Mackay, being suddenly surounded, refused to surrender, and singly fighting against a multitude, re

ceived more wounds than the human frame was thought capable of sustaining, yet he still lives to shew his honourable

scars.

How

"On the 22d three divisions, and a having now nearly forty thousand men in brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, who hand, extended his left and seized a part of the height in advance of the allies' right wing, from whence he could discern the whole of their order of battle, and attack their right on even terms. ever, General Graham, advancing with the seventh division, dislodged this French detachment with a sharp skirmish before it could be formidably reinforced, and that night Marmont withdrew from his danmiles in his rear." gerous position to some heights about six

We cannot afford space to follow the marchings and the counter marchings of these adverse leaders, in which so much consummate generalship was displayed, and which, indeed, could not be clearly understood, without an inspection of the very neatly executed plans which accompany our author's volume. But the following is so strikingly graphical that we cannot withhold it from the reader :

"The 23d the two armies again remained tranquil, but at break of day, on the 24th, some dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, came faintly from the mist which covered the lower ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of artillery succeeded, and the hissing of the bullets as they cut through the thickened atmosphere, plainly told that the French

were over the Tormes.

After a time the fog cleared up, and the German horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order, retiring before twelve thousand French infantry, who in battle array, were marching steadily onwards. At intervals, twenty guns, ranged in front, would start forwards and send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattering parties of light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession, and peering abroad, gave signals to the main body. Wellington immediately sent Graham across the river by the fords of Santa Marta with the first and seventh divisions and Le Marchant's brigade of English cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army between Cabrerizos and Moresco, he awaited the progress of Marmont's operation.

"Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and equable order, regardless alike of the canonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the enemy's scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, they, for the first time, perceived Graham's twelve thousand men, and eighteen guns, ranged in an order of battle, perpendicular to the Tormes. From the same point also, Wellington's heavy columns were to be seen, clustering on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance against the French troops left on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to pass the river to the aid of Graham. This apparition made the French general aware of his error, whereupon hastily facing about, and repassing the Tormes he resumed his former ground. "Wellington's defensive dispositions on this occasion were very skilful, but it would appear that unwilling to stir before the forts fell, he had again refused the advantage of the moment; for it is not to be supposed that he misjudged the oc

casion, since the whole theatre of operation was distinctly seen from St. Chris toval, and he had passed many hours in earnest observation; his faculties were indeed so fresh and vigorous, that after the day's work he wrote a detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing a bank in Portugal, treating that and other financial schemes in all their bearings, with a master hand. Against the weight of his authority, therefore, any

criticism must be advanced."

If the forts continued to hold out much longer, Marmont was resolved to give battle; but they having fallen much sooner than he expected, he withdrew his garrison from the Castle

of Alba de Tormes, and retreated towards the Duero, by the roads of Tordesillas and Tero. He was followed briskly by the British commander, but no opportunity presented itself for bringing matters to any decisive issue, and each general continued to act with a degree of caution, which could pay to the abilities of the other. was the best compliment which he Meanwhile, Wellington felt exceedingly straitened for want of money. The promised remittance from Eng. land had not arrived; and as the insufficiency of land carriages rendered it extremely difficult to feed the army

even on the Duero, to venture further into Spain, without pecuniary resources upon which he could certainly rely, would be the height of madness. But his difficulties at this period are best described in his own words.

distress as at present, and some serious "I have never,' said he, been in such misfortune must happen, if the government do not attend seriously to the subject, and supply us regularly with money.

The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese government are a joke to ours, theirs, we should certainly starve. is, if we don't find means to pay our bills for butcher's meat there will be an end

and if our credit was not better than As it

to the war at once.'"

Marmont, in his turn, now became the assailant, and he effected the passage of the Duero with great stratagetic skill. Then commenced a series of movements, in which much generalship was displayed on both sides, and which terminated in bringing the allies and the French within very nearly the same positions which they occupied a month before, when the first advance of Marmont caused the attack upon the forts of Salamanca to be suspended. Upon the whole, the French general seemed to have the advantage. He had succeeded in turning the flanks of the allies, had gained possession of the principal passage over the Tormes, and seemed, from his position and his force, able to menace the communication of the allies with Salamanca, and Ciudad Rodrigo.