all its truth, how few distinct and determinate rules has the genius of its author been able to offer for the actual practice of nations! How true are its generalities, but how restricted in application and uncertain in event its particular instructions! With what energy and effect are the great ends of legislation designated, with what comparative hesitancy and vagueness the means to attain them! That he knows and acknowledges a defect which belongs in truth not to himself but to the invincible difficulties of his subject, is as much an indication of the general moderation and wisdom of the writer, as the really admirable attempts which he has made to overcome it are of his philosophical sagacity and depth. And, after all, in rightly estimating such works as these it is not the "special rules" (in logical phrase) of policy, applicable to particular cases, that we are to demand the schemes and secrets of political practice; but the "general rules" and objects of social union-not Laws, but the Spirit of Laws.

Considered then as a sketch of the proper aims of legislation, and the general principles which should govern every attempt to realize them, this volume is valuable beyond almost any similar work which it has been our fortune to see for many years. These are no untested theories; the weakly children of enthusiasm and inexperience; they are the sound and vigorous offspring of more than forty years study of the history of associated man. A profound research of past ages, a watchful experience of the present, have given to M. de Sismondi qualifications for political speculation unequalled, it is probable, in Europe. The storyist of the Italian Republics and of France, can scarcely fail to have learned that great art of historical generalization, which, in the similarities of recurring events, detects the great principles that everlastingly pervade society-substantially identical, though reappearing under a thousand different manifestations: and the keen observer of the events of the last halfcentury has had the advantage of witnessing a series of human affairs more rich with instruction, more pregnant with valuable experience, than any equal portion of the modern history of the world. The work which M. de Sismondi now presents to the statists of Europe was undertaken, as we have stated, forty years since. It was then intended to be carried to a great exVOL. IX.

tent; "to comprise an exposition and criticism of each of the free constitutions of which we preserve monuments." The first two volumes were presented to the Institute, but never printed. The result of the more elaborate researches in history which the author has since prosecuted, and of the enlarged experience which he has derived from the eventful changes of Europe, has been to throw the light of a stronger evidence upon his original views, while altering considerably his manner of delivering and enforcing them.

The spirit of this book, as of all M. de Sismondi's writings, is strongly tinctured with the republicanism proper to a patriotic citizen of Geneva; but it is the republicanism of a philosopher as well as of a Swiss. Such a man knows well that all modes of government are but means to a high and noble end; and that where that end is fully attained, the means become absolutely indifferent. A political speculator who addresses the reason of mankind and not the prepossessions of a party, will not, it is true, admit with the poet that "whate'er is best administered is best :" he knows that this is but the licensed exaggeration which the necessary universality of poetry requires for its metrical epigrams; that there are forms of government whose evils no perfection of mere administration could remove; and forms of government which, while human nature remains the same, we can never hope to see well administered. But while such a thinker advocates the adoption of particular schemes of polity, and sees in them incommunicable advantages, he only advocates their adoption on the supposition that the public mind either is sufficiently familiarized to these systems to embrace them with cordiality, or presents a tabula rasa upon which all systems may come into equal competition. We cannot forcibly and suddenly induct new codes, unless we can with equal suddenness abolish old recollections. We may despise men's prejudices, but we must legislate for them. And, therefore, while M. de Sismondi speaks and writes as a genuine son of Switzerland, and to new states unaffected by the remembrances of ancestry and unbound by the fetters of custom, recommends some modification of the form which national predilections have consecrated to his own reason, he is fully alive to the merits of others, can admire the energetic unity

N

of the royal as well as the ardent public spirit of the republican executive, and recognizes innumerable cases in which apparent and theoretical amelioration is to be purchased by such a disruption of ancient ties and such a violation of hallowed customs as would weaken or destroy those principles to which all government is indebted for its existence or its continuance.

Love and Fear, says M. de Sismondi, are the two great social motives of man, the means by which all states of association are maintained in existence; and these terms, understood in their most general sense, may serve to designate the first great classification of human governments. The former principle, under whatever form it manifest itself-whether this attachment of the citizen to his country's institutions, be a sentiment of enlightened selfinterest, or a sentiment of gratitude towards a protecting constitution, or a sentiment of justifiable pride in influencing its laws and decisions, or whatever other modification of patriotic feeling constitute his affectionate regard for his native land-is the source and support of liberal constitutions. The principle of Fear, on the contrary, is that which consolidates all those unhappy combinations of men in which the object of combination is the happiness not of all but of a few which would instantly dissolve if their members were free-and which under the name of unmixed despotic or servile governments have long been the curse and disgrace of human reason. These miserable combinations are wholly rejected by political science; she regards them but as anomalies and abortions; and the only modes of association whose perfectionment she recognizes as the object of her doctrines, are those which, founded on the better principles of human nature, serve in their turn to exalt the principles on which they rest.

That the progress of reason, and the study of the aims and means of government, is really tending to the advancement of this great cause of genuine liberty, we would, with M. de Sismondi, gladly believe, even in spite of the disheartening aspect presented by existing European politics, and the still more discouraging exhibition which our own country offers of the prostitu

tion of the language of freedom to the vilest purposes of temporary excitement. It may, we do believe, be affirmed, with probability, that the light of political truth is spreading, notwithstanding the efforts of its enemies to cloud or quench it, and the still more injurious folly of its friends, who would prefer to see in it not its own sober beam, but the wild unsteady glare of conflagration. In the very centre of disturbance the common sense of politics is slowly maturing; the contention of parties is originating a better lesson than party itself could ever teach; and though there are still many (and will perhaps be in every age many) who are willing to believe that agitation and excitement are necessary ingredients in patriotism, there are many, too, who have learned to acknowledge that every government may be fairly acquiesced in, which offers peace, security, and sufficient opportunities of intellectual and moral development. Our readers may wish for the melancholy gratification of hearing M. de Sismondi's own account of the present chaotic state of the nations which have aspired to be the modern champions of freedom in Europe. After alluding to the hard fate of the Italian Republics, over whose tomb he still hangs with the fondness of a patriot deepened by the peculiar interest which an historian must ever find in the long subject of his labours -to the perished republics of Germany-to the "royal republic" of Poland-to the United Provinces degraded, as he seems to think, into a monarchy-and to the revolutionized cantons of Switzerland-he proceeds to comment on the state of the constitutional monarchies of Europe.

"Dans les monarchies constitutionnelles, le progrès est également révoqué en doute. L'Angleterre, de beaucoup la plus sage comme la plus heureuse d'entre elles, a introduit un changement essentiel dans la partie populaire de sa constitution; mais au lieu de la raffermir ainsi, elle s'est trouvée dès lors ébranlée dans toutes ses parties; des haines plus vio lentes s'y sont manifestées, les partis s'y sont combattus avec plus d'acharnement, toutes les institutions antiques ont été menacées, et les amis de leur pays ont pu craindre qu'il ne restât bientôt plus rien de cette constitution qui avait fait long

unfortunate results, the science of the politician may aid him in demonstrating their causes. In many cases these results are themselves exaggerated by the fervour of journalists who would sacrifice the reputation of their country to the gratification of animosity or avarice; while in arbitrary states evils far more oppressive may be at work, though buried in impenetrable secrecy by the censorship of the press. But the best encouragement is to be found in the actual progress which the dissemination of just political thinking has effected in the arbitrary governments themselves. A principle is now admitted which contains in it the germ of endless improvement; a principle established beyond the power of royal despotism or of mob despotism to shake; the great principle, that the object of all government is the good of all. Simple as this truth now appears, the discipline of centuries was required to teach it. Who hears now of the "glory of the monarch" as the sole or great end of government? yet who heard any thing else in the days of Louis XIV.? The Tory of old was often the misguided defender of preposterous theories of the sacredness of all authority, however acquired or maintained, madly arguing that power was consecrated by its very existence: the Conservative of modern times is the rational defender of tried and established institutions that have vindicated their propriety by their permanence, against the idle and mischievous spirit of change-a spirit even more irrational in many of its votaries than the passive obedience of elder times a kind of pessimism which adopts but one principle in its political philosophy, Whatever is is not right. Again, compare (as another instance of the improvement for which we contend) the morality of modern and of former courts; the decency of conduct that governs their precincts, with the wild profligacy of by-gone royalty; and where vice still reigns, the sober secrecy which now shades it from the public gaze, with the shameless exposure of its pollutions, in the days when a crown could sanctify every immorality, and the maxim seemed to be accepted in its fullest literality, that "Kings could do no wrong." Another article of which M. de Sismondi reminds us as signalizing the triumphs of intellectual advancement, is the Reform of Criminal Justice, the substitution of a system of punishments not

the less effective because they are humane, for the judicial barbarities which sullied even the reign of the just and liberal Henry IV. The victories of rational politics are not least certain where they are least ap parent. Prussia-M. de Sismondi scarcely does justice to that happy country-and Austria, both of which to the cursory observer seem so resolutely stationary, and all whose novelties appear to be those of speculation, not of action-the novelties of the lectureroom and the closet, not those of the cabinet or popular assembly—have, nevertheless, felt the universal impulsion, and their course resembles those vast astronomical cycles, where the interval of a few years can discover little or no progression in the mass, but where the comparison of a large period detects palpable and perceptible advancement. In fact, it is now evident-nor has it ever been the maxim of this journal to deny itthat elements before unthought of have entered into political calculation; that doctrines have produced events, and events have still more powerfully produced doctrines; that the thinking faculty has forced its way into the conduct of governments, boldly summoning men to be swayed not by habits but by reasons:-and the heart of the patriot, and the intellect of the philosopher will now feel it their true duty not to urge but to restrain, or to urge only to guide. Above all, we would say that it is their wisdom to remember, as a great practical maxim, that while human nature remains the same, no government can ever realize the bright ideal of speculation; that it is therefore weak or wicked to exhibit this delusive phantom for any but a purely philosophical purpose; and that in the political, as in the individual constitution, nemo caret vitüs, optimus est qui minimis urgetur. The best existing government is that, wherever it be, which makes the greatest provision for social happiness and moral progression. To expect that this object is perfectly attained, or will be perfectly attained by any scheme which human prudence can devise, is to pronounce a direct contradiction—it is to suppose in framing a government that our nature has attained to the very perfection for whose distant production it legislates, and that it is to be governed by rules, the very contemplation of whose possibility presupposes all

vernment needless.

go