a contrast to the fellah, who, true to his national characteristics, is an admirable automaton. The blacks are very excitable. On the other hand, their initiative, dash, and instincts of self-defence make them invaluable as fighting troops.

Before the British officers had been long at work, it was clear that they had created a small army superior in quality to anything which Egypt had heretofore possessed. That army was endowed with all those outward and visible signs of efficiency of which note can be taken in time of peace. Would it, however, fight? That was a question which for some while remained doubtful. all doubts have now been removed. The history of the Soudan, which has been narrated in this work, enables the question to be confidently answered in the affirmative.

But

The reasons why the endeavours to form an efficient military force in Egypt have been crowned with success are clear. The British officer has been allowed a free hand; he has had even greater liberty of action than the British engineer. Even a devotee of cosmopolitan principles would hesitate to subject the command of an armed force to the disintegrating process of internationalism. In spite, however, of the success which has so far attended the efforts of military reformers in Egypt, it should never be forgotten that an army composed of Moslems and officered to a considerable extent by Christians is a singularly delicate machine, which requires most careful handling.

CHAPTER LVI

THE INTERIOR

Uncertainty of British policy-Difficulties of administrative reformLord Dufferin's Police proposals-Mr. Clifford Lloyd-Changes made in the Police organisation-Nubar Pasha's conflict with Mr. Clifford Lloyd-The latter resigns-Friction in the Interior— Appointment of an Adviser-And of Inspectors-Difficulties of the present moment.

CASES have so far been discussed in which the reformer was, to a greater or less extent, crippled by internationalism, or hampered by the anomalous nature of an official position in which he was expected to fulfil many of the functions of a Minister without possessing ministerial rank or authority. It is now necessary to deal with a case in which the evils arising from the uncertainty, which for many years hung over the future of British policy in Egypt, come into special prominence. Whether the British occupation was to be temporary or permanent, there could be no doubt as to the desirability of relieving taxation, digging canals, and creating a welldisciplined army which would be able to repel Dervish invasion. The financier, the engineer, and the soldier might, indeed, think that the edifice which each had reared would either collapse at once, should British influence cease to be paramount, or gradually decay when exposed to the dry-rot of unchecked Pashadom. But however that might be, there could be no doubt as to the

kind of edifice which had to be constructed; its nature was, indeed, indicated by certain wellrecognised professional canons.

The case of internal administrative reform was different. It might have been thought that the work of organising the Department of the Interior would, relatively to other Departments, have presented but little difficulty to the Englishman, with his law-abiding tendencies, his practical common sense, and his freedom from bureaucratic formalism. The main thing was to organise a Police force, to appoint a few Police Magistrates, and to lay down a few simple rules for the relations which were to exist between the judicial and executive authorities. Work of this sort could not surely present any insuperable difficulties to a nation whose dominion was world-wide, and who had shown a special genius for the government of subject races.

Conclusions drawn from general arguments of this nature are often liable to error from forgetfulness of the fact that certain combinations will not bring about certain anticipated results unless it be ascertained that no link is wanting in the chain of circumstances necessary to fulfil the conditions of the required combination. Even Euclid had to assume the truth of his postulates. There can be little doubt that if the conditions under which the work of Egyptian administrative reform was undertaken had been favourable, a success equal to that of which the British administrative reformer may boast in India and elsewhere would speedily have been achieved. But the conditions were not only less favourable than in other countries, they were unfavourable even when judged by the standard of Egyptian intricacy. It was not only that the British reformer was deprived of liberty of action to such an extent as to be unable to

execute his own plans. It was not only that he had to pose as a subordinate and, at the same time, to act in a great measure as a superior. Difficulties even more formidable than these had to be encountered. He was in the position of an architect who was told to design a house without any indication as to whether the building was to be a king's palace or the cottage of a peasant. No one could tell him precisely what was required of him. Was he to allow the abominable Police system which he found in existence to remain in force with merely some slight modifications? Certainly not. He was expected to reform, and he was well aware that he could not make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Was he to take the matter vigorously in hand, employ agents on whom he could thoroughly rely, and introduce a rational system based partly on the experience gained in other countries, and partly on the special requirements of Egypt? From many points of view this would unquestionably have been the best course to pursue, but he had to remember-and here the most important link in the chain of circumstances necessary to ensure success snapped in twain-that the British occupation was only temporary, that the authority of the native rulers must not be impaired, and that it was useless to begin the construction of a system which could not be completed in the limited time at his disposal, and which would of a surety fall to pieces directly the Englishman turned his back. For, indeed, a severe relapse could, in this instance, be predicted with absolute certainty. There might be some faint hope that, if the occupation ceased, self-interest would lead the rulers of Egypt to employ British engineers to supervise the supply and distribution of water. It was conceivable, though improbable, that the first outcome

of the withdrawal of effective British control would not be the reproduction of financial chaos. But it was altogether inconceivable that the cause of internal administrative reform should prosper in the hands of the Egyptian governing classes, if they were left entirely to their own devices. For, in fact, the centre of gravity of Egyptian misgovernment lay in the Department of the Interior. That Department was the very citadel of corruption, the headquarters of nepotism, the cynosure of all that numerous class who hoped to gain an easy, if illicit, livelihood by robbing either the Treasury or the taxpayers, or, if both these courses were impossible, by obtaining some well-paid sinecure. Every vested interest in the country was sure to be against the reformer, who at each step would find that his views clashed with long-standing abuses, perverted morals, and habits of thought with which he was unfamiliar. Neither could he hope to gain that degree of support from local public opinion which was, however grudgingly, accorded to the engineer. He would be unable to produce material proofs, which could be visible to the eye or palpable to the touch, of the good work he was doing. In order to succeed, he would have to be a moral, even more than an administrative reformer. He would have to be engaged in a succession of conflicts on matters of detail, the mass of which, taken collectively, were indeed of great importance, but which, taken separately, were little calculated to arouse enthusiasm or sympathy on his behalf.

Moreover, besides these general causes, other special hindrances stood in the way of the internal reformer. It was no easy matter to sweep away the abuses of the ancient village system of government, without wrecking the system itself. Still less easy was it to establish a modus vivendi between

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