greater part of the corvée, and the regulation of whatever remains of the system of forced labour, the necessity for paying the village Sheikhs in order to be exempted from the obligation to labour disappeared.

In the sixth place, the organisation of a proper recruiting service swept away a whole nest of corrupt practices.

Lastly, the employment of a number of honourable and capable British officials has probably done more than anything else to check corruption. Their mere example has counted for much. The Egyptians pay an unconscious compliment to English integrity by very rarely offering bribes to

British officials.1

It cannot be doubted that these measures have been effective in checking corruption. Broadly speaking, it may be said that most branches of the central administration of the Egyptian Government and the law-courts are now little, if at all, tainted with venality. It is not, however, on this account to be supposed that the "bakhshish" system is defunct. It is, of course, impossible to state with any degree of confidence to what extent it still exists, for the people, in spite of every encouragement given to them by the superior officials of the Government, are generally reluctant to complain of illegal exactions, whilst, on the other hand, the corrupt Egyptian official displays such a singular degree of perverted ingenuity in the perpetration of fraud as to baffle the efforts of those whose wish it is to track him down. On the whole, it may be said that although corruption is no longer practised on any large scale, it cannot be doubted that in the provincial administrations, as also, I fear, in some branches of the

1 As a general rule, the integrity of the British officials in Egypt has been absolutely unimpeachable. There have, however, I regret to say, been a very few cases of corruption and dishonesty amongst the subordinates.

Public Works Department, there is still a good deal of bribery. It will be long before all this disappears, more especially in view of the extreme difficulty of obtaining evidence against corrupt officials. In the meanwhile, it can be stated with confidence that at no previous period in Egyptian history has so little "bakhshish" been paid or received as at present.

These, therefore, were the first-fruits of British interference in the country. Torture and the use of the courbash ceased. The corvée system was practically abolished. Administrative corruption was greatly diminished.

How was it that, in these three cases, the efforts of the British officials in the service of the Egyptian Government were crowned with such signal success? It was because they were either free to act, or because, as in the matter of the corvée, they were able, after a sharp struggle, to throw off the international shackles by which they were bound. The more the history of Egyptian reform is examined, the more will it be seen that in most cases success was in direct proportion to the freedom of action of the Egyptian Government, acting under British control and advice. Where no such freedom exists, the result has usually been either failure, or, at best, a modified success.

1 It cannot be too clearly understood that fear of each other has, in the minds of the mass of the Egyptian population, largely taken the place of the fear of the Government, which formerly existed. This is a very important feature in the administration of the country. The latter of these two sentiments tended, at all events, towards the maintenance of public tranquillity. On the other hand, the fear that vengeance will, in some form or another, be wreaked by any one of whose conduct a complaint is made, or against whom evidence is tendered in a law-court, manifestly operates in an exactly opposite direction. Mr. Machell, the present Adviser of the Interior, has, in his Annua! Reports, given frequent and very striking illustrations in support of this view. As regards the jealousy often entertained amongst the fellaheen for each other, see Egypt, No. 1, 1905, p. 45.

CHAPTER LII

EUROPEAN PRIVILEGE

Origin of the Capitulations-Difference between Turkey and Egypt— Abuse of the Capitulations-Raison d'être of European privilegeAnomaly of the British position-Impossibility of arriving at any general solution-Minor changes-The right to enact by-laws The House Tax-The Professional Tax-Proposal to create a local legislature-Internationalism.

It is unnecessary to enter into any technical discussion on the rights conferred by virtue of the Capitulations upon Europeans resident in Egypt. The subject is complicated, more especially as some of those rights rest on the text of international instruments, whilst the precise nature of others, which have been acquired by custom, is still a constant source of dispute. Historically speaking, it is, indeed, incorrect in this connection to employ the term "rights." The Capitulations were originally "letters of privilege, or, according to the Oriental expression, imperial diplomas containing sworn promises," which were delivered by the Sultans of Turkey, as also by their Byzantine predecessors, to Europeans who wished to reside and to acquire real property in their dominions. A legal fiction had to be created in order to afford a justification to strict Moslems, who were guided solely by Koranic principles, for dealing with Christians on a basis of equality. Christians were theoretically deemed perpetual enemies and, as such, unworthy of peace unless they either embraced Islam or paid 1 Van Dyck, Ottoman Capitulations, p. 12.

66

With un

tribute to their Moslem conquerors. believers, "treaties were impossible, and indeed impious, but it was conceivable that the Commander of the Faithful might, of his grace, condescend to grant them "privileges." The Moslem, unaware that his inelastic faith contained within itself the seeds of his own political decadence, may well have thought that the bestowal of these 'privileges" would not undermine his system of government. In this, he was mistaken. As the power of the Crescent waned before that of the Cross, the Frank was gradually transformed from being a humble receiver of "privileges" into an imperious possessor of "rights." These rights were to form a potent instrument for good and also for evil, both to their possessors and to those by whom they were originally conferred. They were notably to contribute, as they are still contributing, to shatter the political and social systems of those who hold to the faith of Islam.

The rights which have been conferred by, or which have grown out of the Capitulations are not the same in Egypt and in other parts of the Ottoman dominions. The Turkish Government have been watchful of European encroachment, and have, relatively speaking, been powerful to resist it. The Khedives of Egypt, on the other hand, being wanting in vigilance, allowed a plentiful crop of European privileges, which are not sanctioned by treaty, to be drifted on the wave of custom into the position of acquired rights, and if, as at times occurred, they tardily awoke to the consequences of their own heedlessness, they were either too weak to offer resistance, or the impecuniosity, which was the result of reckless extravagance, rendered them willing to barter a portion of their political birthright for the sake of some temporary concession. Thus it came about that the European,

who is privileged in Turkey, is ultra-privileged in Egypt. Abuse of privilege follows in the train of privilege itself. It happened, therefore, that in that part of the Ottoman dominions which, more than any other, has of late years been subject to the direct control of a European Power, and in which, consequently, the concession of privilege has been least of all necessary and its abuse most of all baneful to the cause of progress, the degree of privilege granted has been greater, and its abuse more pronounced, than in any other portion of the territories of the Sultan.

Although, however, nothing can be said in favour of the abuse, many valid arguments may be advanced in defence of the use of the Capitulations. At first sight, it appears monstrous that the smuggler should carry on his illicit trade under the eyes of the Custom-house authorities because treaty engagements forbid any prompt and effective action being taken against him. Those engagements have also been turned to such base uses that they have protected the keeper of the gambling hell, the vendor of adulterated drinks, the receiver of stolen goods, and the careless apothecary who supplies his customer with poison in the place of some healing drug. But when all this, and a great deal more of the same description of argument has been stated, there still remains the unquestionable fact that the smuggler, the keeper of a gamblinghell, the receiver of stolen goods, and the retailer of adulterated spirits, represent certain principles. They, and their contemptible brethren, notably represent these principles, that so long as they have not been proved to commit an offence at law' they have a right to continue without hin

1 It is to be borne in mind that, before any European can be adequately punished, he must be proved to have committed an offence not against Egyptian law, but against the law of his country of origin.