thus given a final blow to the hateful system of forced labour which had existed in the country over which he ruled since the days of his Pharaonic predecessors.

So far allusion has only been made to the forced labour which used to be employed in the work of clearing out the canals during the period of low Nile. The corvée has, however, from time immemorial been employed in Egypt to attain another object, namely, to guard the banks of the river during the period of high Nile and thus obviate any risk of inundation. It is essential to the well-being and safety of the country that this work should be performed. It has not as yet been found possible to abolish completely this description of corvée, but the number of men employed every year is small, and is steadily diminishing.

CHAPTER LI

CORRUPTION

Universality of corruption-Steps taken to arrest it-Example of British officials-Diminution of corrupt practices.

IN no country probably has corruption-the canker which eats away the heart of most Eastern governments-been more universal than it was in Egypt during the reign of Ismail Pasha. Ismail had inherited from his predecessors an administrative system steeped in corruption. By his own action, he made this system doubly corrupt. He believed in bribery, if not as the only, at all events as the most effective system of government. Every man, he thought, had his price. He put into practice the principles of which Byron, in one of his cynical moods, has given us a description :—

"Tis pleasant purchasing our fellow-creatures,
And all are to be sold, if you consider

Their passions, and are dext'rous; some by features
Are bought up, others by a warlike leader;
Some by a place, as tend their years or natures;
The most by ready cash-but all have prices,
From crowns to kicks, according to their vices.

Ismail Pasha's subjects followed humbly in the footsteps of their master. They took and they paid bribes. From the half-naked donkey-boy,

who in shrill tones demanded "bakhshish " to the extent of a piastre or two from the winter tourist,

to the highly-placed Pasha, whose assistance could only be obtained by the payment of more substantial sums, all, or nearly all, were venal. The contractor bribed the Minister to obtain a contract on terms unduly advantageous to himself, and would then bribe the Clerk of the Works in order that he should not inquire too carefully as to whether the terms of the contract had or had not been strictly executed. The subordinate official bribed his superior in order to get promotion. The landowner bribed the engineer in order that he should obtain more water for his fields than was his due. The Kadis were paid by both the plaintiff and the defendant to any suit, the decision being usually given in favour of the highest bidder. The Government surveyors were bribed to make false measurements of land. The village Sheikhs were bribed to accord exemption from the corvée and from military service. The Police were bribed by everybody who had the misfortune to be brought in contact with them. The passenger by railway found it cheaper to give "bakhshish" to the guard or to the ticket-collector than to pay for a ticket. As a preliminary to bribing a Moudir to inquire into any alleged grievance, it was necessary for the petitioner to bribe the hungry satellites, who hang about the office of the Moudirieh, before the great man could be personally informed that any petition had been presented. The ramifications of the system were, in fact, endless. Egyptian official and social life was saturated with the idea that in

Egypt personal claims and interests, however just on their own merits, could never be advanced without the payment of "bakhshish.”

It was from the first manifest that the adoption of more healthy ideas by an administrative service and by a society so thoroughly diseased as that described above, would be a work of time. One of

the main safeguards against corruption in civilised countries is that society condemns venality. The act of offering or of taking a bribe is considered dishonourable. The offender, if discovered, is visited by a social punishment often more severe than any which the law can inflict on him. In Egypt, no restraining public opinion existed, even if it now exists, on this subject. Bribery was considered a venial offence. Habits of thought of this kind cannot be changed of a sudden. They are but little affected by the passing of laws and regulations. Nevertheless, it was possible to adopt certain administrative measures calculated to diminish the temptation to accept bribes, and thus both render it less probable that bribery would obtain the objects for which money had heretofore been paid, and also facilitate the discovery of the guilty parties. Measures of this sort were initiated in Egypt during the period of the Dual Control, and were subsequently perfected during that of the British occupation.

In the first place, the inauguration of a proper system of accounts and of audit did a good deal towards putting a check on the malversation of funds belonging to the State. Vouchers were required for all expenditure. Officials were called upon to render strict account of all monies which had passed through their hands. It was no longer possible for public money to disappear as if by enchantment.

This reform was excellent in its way. It is, however, a mistake to suppose that the accountant or the auditor can alone put a stop to the corrupt dealings of dishonest officials. A hundred ways exist for eluding their vigilance. To quote a single instance, a high Egyptian official was, on one occasion, charged with the sale of certain lands belonging to the Government. Adjoining these lands, were others, which were his private property.

He sold the two lots together to the same purchaser. They were of precisely the same quality, but the price obtained for the Government was very low, whilst that obtained by the official acting in his private capacity was very high. Thus, a considerable part of the money, which should have been paid into the Treasury, found its way into the pockets of the official who was specially charged to look after the interests of the Government. No system of audit would have succeeded in preventing a fraud of this description. It could only have been discovered by some one who happened to know that the market value of the land sold by the Government was in excess of the sum which the Government received.

In the second place, the regular payment of the salaries due to Government officials has done much to free them from the temptation to take bribes. Also, in many cases the salaries of the lowest classes have been raised. So long as the Government allowed inadequate salaries to their servants, or, as in the days of Ismail Pasha, often left them for months without paying them at all, it is obvious that the temptation of the latter to increase their incomes by illicit means must have been strong."

In the third place, the system of inviting tenders for most public works and for the supply of Government stores, struck a blow in that quarter where corruption on a large scale was heretofore most prevalent.

In the fourth place, the creation of an improved judicature, the careful choice of judges, and the more vigilant control which has been exercised over their conduct, have purified the law-courts.

In the fifth place, with the abolition of the

1 It was by raising the salaries of officials that Lord Cornwallis put a stop to the corruption which existed in India towards the close of the eighteenth century.