ADDENDA.

Additional Illustrations referring to the respective Pages above.

Page 406. IDEAS of intellect, &c. The distinction between ideas of intellect and ideas of imagination is much insisted on by Des Cartes in his Metaphysics, and is explained more clearly and to better advantage in a late judicious treatise written by Mr. Crousaz in French, and now rendered into English b.

P. 441. The same with denying his eternal existence. I should have omitted the word denying, or else have said, the same with denying the necessity of believing his eternal existence. All I meant to say was, that Episcopius (which is true also of Limborch) did not distinguish in that instance between the eternal generation of the Logos and the eternal existence; as some of the ancients didc.

P. 460. Such effects might last beyond the apostolic age. I might have expressed myself with greater assurance, and said, that they actually did last as far down as to the Cyprianic aged: nay, and if we may believe Paulinuse, who reports it as an eyewitness, they continued down to the latter end of the fourth century. From whence may fairly be accounted for the long continuance of the phrase of delivering over to Satan in excommunications f.

a Cartesii Meditat. vi. p. 36. Object. v. p. 45. Respons. v. p. 78.

Crousaz, New Treatise of the Art of Thinking, vol. i. p. 16, &c.

See my Defence, vol. i. Qu. viii. p. 368, 369. Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. viii. p. 618.

d See Dodwell, Dissertat. in Iren. ii. 54. p. 191-194.

e Quem cum interrogasset [Ambrosius] et deprehendisset autorem

tanti flagitii, ait: Oportet illum tradi Satana in interitum carnis, ne talia in posterum audeat admittere: quem eodem momento, cum adhuc sermo esset in ore sacerdotis, spiritus immundus arreptum discerpere cœpit. Quo viso, non minimo timore repleti sumus et admiratione. Paulin. in Vit. Ambros. p. 9.

f See Bishop Hare, Scripture Vindicated, p. 69, 70.

Indeed, the use of the form remained afterwards, when such miraculous effects had entirely ceased: because the form had been customary from the beginning; and because it might still be understood in a sense not altogether foreign to its first intention, such as I have expressed above.

P. 468. He may be in some measure hurt in his reputation by it, and that is all. I would be understood here of the general case only 5, abstracting from particular cases and circumstances; as of ministers, suppose, whose maintenance also may be accidentally affected by it. An inconvenience common to ecclesiastical offices or civil, as often as men disable themselves from serving, either by refusing to give the legal securities, or by opposing the public

measures.

P. 469. Or to pay them so much as common civilities. That is to say, when such civilities were likely to be interpreted as an approbation of the men and of their principles. But see this rule of the Apostle considered more at large, under its proper restrictions and limitations, by an able hand.

P. 485. A wicked life the worst heresy, which is scarce sense, &c. At the best, it is a strong figure, or a turn of wit, and the thought not just upon the whole. But something of it may be traced up as high as to St. Bernard of the twelfth century, who argued that vicious persons were seducers by their bad example, and therefore were a kind of heretics in practice, corrupting more by their ill lives than heretics, properly so called, could do by their bad doctrinesi: and he applies it particularly to vicious clergymen; not to extenuate the guilt of heresy, but to enhance the guilt of such bad example. The thought was not much amiss, if he had not carried it too far. He should not have suggested that bad example is worse than heresy, properly so called. It is true, that bad example commonly will do more harm than sound preaching will do good; because such example runs in with cor

Denique bono aut æquo non contraria est excommunicationis pœna, qua nulla mansuetior. Non admovet flagra corporibus, non aptat vincula, non denuntiat mortem, non eripit bona, non abdicat dignitates; indignis abnuit sacramenta quibus in perniciem suam abuterentur. Itaque tota et ad Dei gloriam et ad peccantis salutem est comparata. Sam. Basnag. Annal. tom. ii. p. 481.

h Dr. Berriman's Sermon, in the

Appendix to his Boyle's Lectures, vol. ii. p. 339.

i Multi sunt Catholici prædicando, qui hæretici sunt operando. Quod hæretici faciunt per prava dogmata, hoc faciunt plures hodie per mala exempla: seducunt scilicet populum et inducunt in errorem; et tanto graviores sunt hæreticis quanto prævalent opera verbis. Bernard. Serm. ad Pastores, p. 1732.

rupt nature, and the other is contrary: but if the doctrine be on the same side, it will do infinitely more mischief; and one loose casuist will debauch more than a hundred others shall do who are only loose in their lives. Bad example, under the check and discountenance of sound doctrine taught by the same person, carries its antidote along with it. But bad doctrine is a very dangerous snare: it is not merely breaking a law, but loosening the authority of allk. Therefore Bernard strained the thought too far and so did Dean Colet after him; who is the first man I have met with that ventured formally to say (for Bernard had not expressed the figure so boldly) that a bad life was a heresy, and the worst heresy. However, neither of them intended to extenuate the guilt of heresy at all, but to magnify another kind of guilt, as still greater according to their way of reasoning, or rather rhetoricating.

Archbishop Tillotson glances upon the same thoughtm, but gives a very different turn to it; and cannot, I think, be reasonably understood of heresy strictly and properly such, but of what some have wrongfully called so. Bishop Taylor, a very moderate

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k "Who will maintain that a prince "would do better in changing the laws "according to his present passions, "than to let them subsist, and break “them every hour? Nobody. For if "he observes not the laws as he should, he leaves them their autho"rity however, with respect to his subjects and such other princes as are willing to observe them; which "is absolutely necessary to society."If it be asked then, which carriage "is most dangerous and blamable, "that of such as violate the laws of "the Gospel which they believe to be "divine, or that of the incredulous "who reject the Divinity of those "laws, because they have no mind to

obey them; it is plain that the latter "is much worse than the former, supposing the laws of the Gospel to be "beneficial to society, which cannot "be doubted." Le Clerc, Causes of Incredulity, p. 88, 89.

The case which Le Clerc here puts is not precisely the same with the other, but the reason is the same for both.

"He sheweth plainly, that there "be two kinds of heresies, one arising "from perverse teaching, and the

"other from a naughty life: of which two this latter is far worse and more perilous, reigning now in priests." Colet's Sermon before the Convocation, A. D. 1511. Reprinted in the Phœnix, vol. i. p. 7.

m Tillotson's Sermons, vol. i. p. 402. fol. edit. His reflection upon those who were too censorious in charging heresy upon others, and at the same time too indulgent to their own vices, runs thus:

"Deluded people! that do not con"sider, that the greatest heresy in the "world is a wicked life, because it is "so directly opposite to the whole

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design of the Christian faith and religion; and that do not consider, "that God will sooner forgive a man a hundred defects of his understanding, than one fault of his will.” N. B. Heresy, justly so called, is not a mere defect of understanding, but a fault of the will: and it is more directly opposite to religion than common offences; as overturning the authority of a law is worse than transgressing it, or as mutiny, sedition, and rebellion are worse than common felonies.

man, in a treatise written on the side of liberty, may be a very proper arbitrator to clear and determine the whole dispute.

"Men think they have more reason to be zealous against "heresy than against a vice in manners, because it is infectious " and dangerous, and the principle of much evil. Indeed, if by heresy we mean that which is against an article of the Creed, "and breaks part of the covenant between God and man by the "mediation of Jesus Christ, I grant it to be a grievous crime, a

calling God's veracity in question, and a destruction also of a "good life; because upon the articles of the Creed obedience is "built, and it lives or dies as the effect does by its proper cause : "for faith is the moral cause of obedience. But then heresy, that is, such as this, is also a vice, and the person criminal, and so "the sin is to be esteemed in its degrees of malignity. And let "men be as zealous against it as they can, and employ the whole "arsenal of the spiritual armour against it. Such as this is worse than adultery or murder; inasmuch as the soul is more "noble than the body, and a false doctrine is of greater dissemi"nation and extent than a single act of violence or impurity.

Adultery or murder is a duel, but heresy (truly and indeed "such) is an unlawful war, it slays thousands. The losing of "faith is digging down a foundation: all the superstructure of "hope and patience and charity fall with it.-But then concern"ing those things which men nowadays call heresy, they cannot "be so formidable as they are represented. And if we consider "that drunkenness is certainly a damnable sin, and that there "are more drunkards than heretics, and that drunkenness is the "parent of a thousand vices, it may be better said of this vice than "of most of those opinions which we call heresies, it is infectious "and dangerous, and the principle of much evil, and therefore as "fit an object of our pious zeal to contest against "," &c. Thus far Bishop Taylor.

In the sum of the matter I entirely agree with him. The result, I think, is, that nominal heresy, or an error in slight matters, not affecting the foundation, not hurting the vitals of Christianity, is not so bad as real immorality: and it is equally true, on the other hand, that nominal immorality is not so bad as real error in religion, though in the slighter doctrines. But supposing the error and the maintaining of it to amount to real heresy,

n Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying, Dedicat. p. 42, 43.

it is then a vice, and the greatest of vices: so the whole will turn upon the nature, quality, and tendency of what is charged as an heresy. Invincible ignorance will equally excuse any other vice; and so is wide of the purpose.

P. 508. All parties are for creeds under one shape or other. It may be asked perhaps, what creed the Sceptics are for, who profess to doubt of every thing? I answer, that their pretended scepticism is mostly affectation, and they generally are as credulous as other men; frequently more so. If they believe less of religion, as some of them perhaps may, yet they are easy of belief as to any thing else. They have their systems, their maxims, their probabilities, (as they are pleased to call them,) which make up as long and large creeds as our certainties do only there is this difference, that they commonly prefer a creed of paradoxes, and sometimes glaring absurdities, before a rational faith. And while we believe as much as we can prove, and no more, (which is believing like wise men,) they believe what they have a mind to, proving nothing, by their own confession; which is resolving all into fond persuasion and credulity.

The most considerable writer I know of that ever appeared in behalf of general scepticism (matters of faith only excepted) is the celebrated Huetius, in a posthumous treatise, written, I suppose, for an exercise of wit, to divert himself and friends; unless he had some further latent view to serve the Romish cause. I may remark, that one article of his sceptical creed is, that the certainty of faith is superior to that of sense: a second is, that it is superior even to that of the first principles and axioms of Geometry P. One cannot desire any two plainer instances of the credulity of a sceptic. I mention not how often he forgets the part he was to act, talking in the style of a dogmatist: Sure it is, or It is certaina. Sometimes, he is fully persuaded, or fully convinceds, or certainly knows: at other times he speaks of evident proof", and irrefragable argument, and demonstration, just an any dogmatist would do. So hard a thing is it for the finest wit even to personate a sceptic with any tolerable grace, or without perpetual inconsistency: for which reason