to repeat an adage of old Bracken, "A good horfe is never of a bad colour." Modern light and experience, have been happily employed in detecting and exploding the theoretic whimseys of antiquity, upon almost all subjects; among the rest, upon that of attributing this or that, good or evil quality, or temperament, to the colour of a horse. All that I am warranted in saying, from my own observation, is, that I have seen more bad Horses, of all kinds, among the light bays, with light-coloured legs and muzzle, than amongst any other colours; and the most good faddle and coach-horses, among the common bays, with black legs and manes, and the chocolate browns. This, in all probability, has been accidental. CHAP. III. ON THE RIGHTS OF BEASTS. E'en the poor beetle, that we tread upon, NOTWITHSTANDING the conftant and professed averfion of a confiderable part of mankind, to the discussion of abstract principles, it appears to me an axiom, that truth, be whatever the fubject, is to be discovered by no other mean; and that they who form a judgment upon a lefs laboured procefs, will obtain only a fuperficial knowledge, which may urge them to determinations, in oppofition to the laws of justice and humanity, and to the general interefts of fociety, with which their own must be neceffarily involved. This obfervation applies materially to the subject before us. The barbarous, unfeeling, and capricious conduct of man to the brute creation, has been the reproach of every age and nation. Whence does it originate? How happens it, that fo large a portion of cruelty remains to tarnish the glory of the present enlightened times, and even to fully the English character, fo univerfally renowned for the fofter feelings of humanity? We are to search for the cause of this odious vice, rather in custom, which flatters the indolence of man, by saving him the trouble of investigation, and in the defect of early tuition, than in a natural want of fenfibility in the human heart, or in the demands of human interest. It has ever been, and still is, the invariable custom of the bulk of mankind, not even excepting legislators, both religious and civil, to look upon brutes as mere machines; animated yet without fouls; endowed with feelings, but utterly devoid of rights; and placed without the pale of juftice. From thefe fuppofed de fects, fects, and from the idea, ill understood, of their being created merely for the use and purposes of man, have the feelings of beasts, their lawful, that is, natural interefts and welfare, been facrificed to his convenience, his cruelty, or his caprice. It is but too easy to demonstrate, by a series of melancholy facts, that brute creatures are not yet in the contemplation of any people, reckoned within the fcheme of general justice; that they reap only the benefit of a partial, and inefficacious kind of compaffion. Yet it is easy to prove, by analogies drawn from our own, that they also, have souls; and perfectly confiftent with reason, to infer a gradation of intellect, from the spark which animates the most minute mortal exiguity, up to the sum of infinite intelligence, or the general foul of the universe. By a recurrence to principles, it will appear, that life, intelligence, and feeling, neceffarily imply rights. Juftice, in which are included mercy, or compaffion, obviously refer to sense and feeling. Now is the effence of justice divifible? Can there be one kind of juftice for men, and another for brutes? Or is feeling in them a different thing to what it is in ourselves? Is not a beast produced by the same rule, and in the fame order of generation with ourselves? Is not his body nourished by the fame food, hurt by the fame injuries; his mind actuated by the fame paffions and affections which animate the human breaft; and does not he alfo, at laft, mingle his duft with ours, and in like manner furrender up the vital fpark to the aggregate, or fountain of intelligence? Is this spark, or foul, to perifh because it chanced to belong to a beaft? Is it to become annihilate? Tell me, learned philofophers, how that may poffibly happen. If you deny unto beafts their rights, and abandon them to the fimple difcretion of man, in all cafes, without remedy, you defraud them of those benefits and advantages, acceded to them by nature herfelf, and commit a heinous trefpafs against her pofitive ordinances, as founded on natural juftice. You deprive them, in a great measure, even of compaffion. But previous to an attempt to vindicate the rights of animals, it is no doubt neceffary to determine, fpecifically, in what they confift. They arise then, spontaneously, from the conscience, or fenfe of moral obligation in man, who is indifpenfibly bound to bestow upon animals, in return for the benefit he derives from their fervices, "good and fufficient nourishment, comfortable fhelter, and merciful treatment; to commit no wanton outrage upon their feelings, whilft alive, and to put them to the speediest and leaft painful death, when it fhall be necef fary to deprive them of life." It is a lamenta ble ble truth, that the breach of these obligations has ever been attended with impunity here; but if we fuppofe that fuch will be the cafe hereafter, the very foundation of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is at once fwept away. La morte eft fommeil eternel. We may as well, at once, adopt the imperfect principle of Diderot, who, in his Jean le Fataliste, inftructs us, that" could we take a view of the chain of caufes and effects which conftitutes the life of an individual, from the first instant of his birth to his laft breath, we fhould be convinced that he has done no one thing, but what he was neceffarily compelled to do." I am aware of a fmall fect of Bramins among us, who are difpofed to proceed a step beyond me, and to deny that nature has conferred any fuch right on man, as that of taking the lives of animals, or of eating their flesh. These, I fuppose, are the legitimate defcendants of the faints of Butler's days, who were for abolishing black-pudding, And eating nothing with the blood in. Certain philofophers there are also, in Paraguay (if travellers may be depended upon) who will not eat sheep, left they should get children covered with wool; a very rational apprehenfion, a priori, no doubt. Noxious and dangerous animals, I suppose, are included in this sys tem |