len and Locke, and we know not how many other leading writers, seem to have regarded it as the great seat of mental disorder.

§ 14. Remarks on the Imagination.

V. Another leading power which, when we accurately consider its nature, seems properly to be arranged under the general head of the Intellect, is the Imagination. We shall have occasion hereafter to recur again to the nature and intellectual process of imaginative action, when it comes in place to consider the disorders to which this important faculty is subject. All we propose to do here is briefly to point out the relation existing between the imagination and the reasoning power. D'Alembert somewhere intimates very distinctly, that this relation is a very close one; and suggests farther, in illustration of his views, that Archimedes, the geometrician, of all the great men of antiquity, is best entitled to be placed by the side of Homer. If such a relation exists, it furnishes one reason at least in support of the classification, which arranges the imagination, in connexion with the reasoning power, under the general head of the Intellect.

Some of the particulars, in which the imaginative and deductive powers are closely related, are these. They both imply the antecedent exercise of the power of abstraction; they are both employed in framing new combinations of thought from the elements already in possession; they both put in requisition, and in precisely the same way, the powers of association and relative suggestion. Nevertheless, they

are separated from each other, and characterized by the two circumstances, that they operate in part on different materials, and that their objects are different. Reasoning, as it aims to give us a knowledge of the truth, deals exclusively with facts more or less probable. Imagination, as it aims, chiefly to give pleasure, is at liberty to transcend the limits of the world of reality, and, consequently, often deals with the mere conceptions of the mind, whether they correspond to reality or not. Accordingly, the one ascertains what is true, the other what is possible; the office of the one is to inquire, of the other to create.

§ 15. Of other important Intellectual Principles.

In addition to the intellectual susceptibilities which have been mentioned, there are others which, in a full account of the mental powers, would be entitled to an important place; such as Association, Memory, and Abstraction. The power of Abstraction, in consequence of the applicability of its exercise either to external or internal objects, might be arranged under either of the two great divisions of the intellect. Association and memory, as they have a very intimate relation to the reasoning and imaginative powers, would, with a high degree of propriety, present themselves for consideration in immediate connexion with those powers; and, accordingly, be arranged under the head of the Internal Intellect rather than of the External. These important powers of the mind our limits will not permit us particularly to notice.

It is not to be inferred, however, from the cir

cumstance of their not being considered here, that they will not hereafter receive their appropriate place and their full share of notice. Whatever may be true in respect to the power of abstraction, certain it is that no view of insanity would be adequate which should fail to point out the phenomena presented by a disordered condition of association and memory.

§ 16. Of the Sensibilities in Distinction from the Intellect.

The second great division of the mind is that of the Sensibilities. The action of the sensibilities is subsequent in time to that of the intellective nature. As a general thing, there is and can be no movement of the sensibilities; no such thing as an emotion, desire, or feeling of moral obligation, without an antecedent action of the intellect. If we are pleased or displeased, there is necessarily before the mind some object of pleasure or displeasure; if we exercise the feeling of desire, there must necessarily be some object desired, which is made known to us by an action of the intellect. So that if there were no intellect, or if the intellectual powers were entirely dormant and inactive, there would be no action of the emotive part of our nature and of the pas sions.

The department of the sensibilities is itself susceptible of being resolved into some subordinate yet important divisions; particularly the natural and moral sensibilities. The department of the natural sensibilities considers objects chiefly as they have a

relation to ourselves. The department of the moral sensibilities, taking a wider range, contemplates objects as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness, the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks what is GOOD,

the other what is RIGHT.

It will, perhaps, throw light upon the distinction which we suppose to exist in the sensibilities, if we call to mind that the natural (or pathematic sensibilities, as they are sometimes called) exist in brute animals the same as in man. Brute animals are susceptible of various emotions; they have their instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections, the same as human beings have, and perhaps even in a higher degree. They are pleased and displeased; they have their prepossessions and aversions; they love and hate, with as much vehemence at least as commonly characterizes human passion.

But if we look in the lower animals for the other and more elevated portion of the sensibilities, it is not there. And here, we apprehend, is the great ground of distinction between men and brutes. The latter, as well as human beings, appear to understand what is good, considered as addressed simply to the natural affections; but man has the higher knowledge of moral as well as of natural good.

§ 17. Other and more Subordinate Divisions of the Sensibilities.

The natural or pathematic sensibilities resolve

themselves again into the yet more subordinate division of the Emotions and Desires. These two classes of mental states follow each other in the order in which they have been named; the emotions first, which are exceedingly numerous and various ; and then the desires. The DESIRES are, in their own nature, essentially fixed and uniform, and are chiefly modified in their combination with emotions. The various modifications which the desires assume, appear in the distinct shape of Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections. And it is here that we find a very interesting and important department of the mind, especially in connexion with insanity.

The moral sensibilities divide themselves in a manner analogous to the classification which exists in the natural. The first class of mental states which presents itself to notice under this general head, is that of Moral Emotions; corresponding in the place which they occupy in relation to the intellect, as well as in some other respects, to the natural emotions. The moral emotions are followed by another class of moral feelings, which may be designated as obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation; which hold the same relation to the moral emotions, which the desires do to the natural emotions. If we had not moral emotions (that is to say, feelings of moral approval and disapproval), it would not be possible for us to feel under moral obligation in any case whatever, the latter state of the mind being obviously dependent on the former.

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