trine, or hypothesis, of the treatise is the perfectibility of the human race. "I adopt with all my faculties," she says, "this philosophic belief. It is the conservative, the redeeming, hope of the intellectual world; it imparts a grand elevation to the soulits highest consolation. The doctrine lifts the weight of life and gladdens all our moral being with the happiness and nobleness of virtue. It is not a vain theory: we are conducted to it by the observation of facts."-Vol. i, p. 231.

This doctrine met with great opposition in France, and immediately provoked much discussion, which finally brought out some of the best thinkers of Switzerland and Germany upon the subject. As the production of a woman, the book was the marvel of all Europe. For a long time it maintained a strong hold upon reflecting men; and whoever reads it now will find that many opinions, since thoroughly examined and adopted by the most vigorous leaders of thought, were first advanced and defended in its pages. Whether we accept or reject her theories, we are astonished by the variety of learning, the individuality of mind, and the acute reasoning of the work. In these respects it probably has no equal among the writings of women.

"Delphine," her first and, in the opinion of many, her best romance, was published in 1802. It was written amid troubles, anxieties, and threatening dangers, which would have been unbearable but for the diversion and comfort which literary activity afforded her. Her design in "Delphine" seems to be to express a profound pity for women with strong minds and hearts to whom the happiness of love in marriage has not been accorded, and to show that it is not only difficult for them to "inclose themselves within the narrow bounds of their fate," but more difficult for them to overstep those bounds, without experiencing the keenest suffering. It is possible, in a romance, to present such a thought in a variety of forms; so she pictures a woman (said by many to represent herself) brilliant but unhappy, "dominated by her affections, badly directed by her independent spirit, and suffering by her most amiable qualities." A desire for happiness in marriage, and a settled conviction that it is impossible to be otherwise happy, pervade the entire book. The great genius displayed in "Delphine" was acknowledged by all; but its morality was at once questioned. While, perhaps, the charge of immorality cannot be

fully maintained, still it plainly "is not a wholesome book, morally or intellectually," although in this regard it is the best book among similar productions in French literature of its time. Vinet criticises the work severely from his own high moral stand-point; but he also says: "Delphine, with all her errors, is one of the most touching creations of genius; her character is as true as it is charming. It is impossible not to love this generous soul, which lives only for love and selfsacrifice. No fiction has ever been more vitally real. No work of Madame de Staël has been written with more facile, more abundant, power. If she has not yet the maturity of her opinions, she has, I believe, all the plenitude of her talents." In the most thoroughly finished character of the book, Madame de Vernon, she doubtless intended to depict Talleyrand. The Machiavellian minister at once recognized the likeness, and said to his friends, alluding to the virile character of Madame de Staël's mind: "In her romance she has disguised us both as women-herself and me." "Delphine" excited great interest, both in literary and fashionable circles, and increased the already brilliant reputation of its author, since it revealed her power in an entirely new field of literary effort. From this point on she stands acknowledged by the best minds as the greatest female thinker and writer of her age.

"Corinne," by which she is probably best known to American readers, was published in 1807; and, according to Vinet, it was one of the greatest literary events of the day. The book was written after a long journey through Italy, and a most thorough study of its scenery, social life, manners, and customs, and especially its art and art treasures. It abounds in magnificent descriptions and keen criticisms. It is most rich in healthful sentiment, deep thought, and genuine morality. The true idea of the beautiful nowhere receives a clearer presentation, or a more enthusiastic and just defense, than in this work of her superabundant genius. Its success was "instantaneous and universal." It is a romance, and, at the same time, a faithful picture, and "a record of subtile and precious thoughts." It reveals the freedom and vigor of the author's matured powers. Throughout Europe it was received with enthusiastic praise. Even in cultured and critical Edinburgh it met with the approbation of all. Jeffrey, in the

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Edinburgh Review," pronounced Madame de Staël the greatest writer in France since the time of Voltaire and Rousseau, and the greatest female writer of any age or country.

The "Allemagne" was published in London in the autumn. of 1813, and so great was the interest it excited, that within three or four years it was translated into all the principal tongues of Europe. The work is divided into four sections. The first treats of Germany and the manners of the Germans; the second, of literature and art; the third, of philosophy and morals; the fourth, of religion and enthusiasm. The "Allemagne" does not appeal to popular readers, but universally commands the attention of scholars and the more enlightened classes. Mackintosh, in the "Edinburgh Review," said: "The voice of Europe applauds this as a work which, for variety of knowledge, flexibility of power, elevation of view, and comprehensiveness of mind, is unequaled among the works of women; and which, in the union of the graces of society and literature with the genius of philosophy, is not surpassed by many among those of men." The "Allemagne" first opened up to France and to Europe generally the vast products of the German intellect; and must be considered as "the initiative of foreign criticism on German literature." As an adequate survey of German life and literature it has, necessarily, by the lapse of time, become deficient; but, like all works of genius, it is immortal, and must forever stand as the most worthy exponent of the rare gifts of the greatest of Frenchwomen.

ART. VI.-PROFESSOR BOWNE'S METAPHYSICS.* In the year 1872 there appeared in the "New Englander" a series of articles on Herbert Spencer. Their boldness of statement, freshness of thought, and aptness of illustration, attracted wide attention. Excepting the article of Mr. Martineau, no abler criticism of Mr. Spencer has yet appeared. The author of these articles was Professor Bowne, then a student in the University of New York. Seven years later "Studies in Theism" appeared, a popular discussion, with the promise

"Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles." By Borden P. Bowne.

in the Preface of a more philosophical treatment of the subject in a later volume. In the work now before us this promise is fulfilled. Though rather expository than original, "Metaphysics" is by far the most elaborate work that Professor Bowne has yet written. As Professor Latimer remarked, it is essentially an exposition of the philosophy of Lotze. Were he alive the great thinker might well congratulate himself on having found so able an expositor. Rare is it, indeed, that so acute a thinker, so clear and forcible a writer, as Professor Bowne can sympathetically expound not only the broad general principles of a philosophy, but its minutest details.

I propose to give some account of the fundamental principles of this philosophy. My object is exposition, not criticism. I shall try to state and illustrate the broad general principles of this philosophy so that the main outlines of the whole can be seen in the order of logical dependence.

The book aims to show that the universe is only the manifestation of God-has its being solely in him. My confidence in the conclusions of science, in the facts of perception, in the existence of my fellows, is only justified by my faith in God. That the arguments upon which these conclusions are based may be thoroughly understood, it is necessary to get a clear apprehension of Professor Bowne's starting point Every philosopher consciously or unconsciously starts from common sense. But there are two radically different ways of appealing to common sense. M'Cosh, for instance, appeals to common sense to establish as absolute certainties all those facts and principles having the characteristics of self-evidence, necessity, and universality. Spencer, on the other hand, appeals to common sense merely for provisional truths, and claims that these are justified or condemned according as the results reached from a logical use of them are consistent or inconsistent. Professor Bowen's method of appealing to common sense is a kind of compound of the two I have described. In partial agreement with M'Cosh and his school, he would repose unlimited trust in the principles of common sense, but not in its facts. In partial agreement with Spencer, he would regard the facts of common sense as only provisionally true, but not its principles. In agreement with M'Cosh, he holds that "the mind is able to know some things on its own account, and thus the

warrant for such knowledge is simply rational insight;" that these truths, thus known "by their own self-evidence," verify themselves. In agreement with Spencer, he says:

In discussing our theory of things, we propose, therefore, to take every thing as it seems to be, and to make only such changes as are necessary to bring our views into harmony with themselves. The reasons for doubt and modification are to be sought entirely in the nature of the object, and not in the possibility of verbal doubt.... If we distinguish between appearance and reality, it is because reason can be harmonized with itself in no other way. We take, therefore, the theory of things which is formed by spontaneous thought, and make it the text for a critical exegesis in the hope of making it adequate and consistent. We take the notions of common sense as they exist, and the functions ascribed to them, and change them only as reason itself prescribes.-P. 18.

Professor Bowne's figure puts the matter clearly: the common-sense theory of things he makes the text for a critical exegesis. Self-evident truths, known by the mind's own insight, are the principles of interpretation. Obviously, the first question is, What is the text? and, second, What does he hold to be the proper principles of interpretation? Professor Bowne has nowhere given an explicit answer to these two questions, though it is easy to see what would have been his answer to the first. The conception of the world as it presents itself to common sense is that of a wide-spreading universe, extending indefinitely in infinite space, and of inconceivable duration. The objects about us appear to be colored, gustible, sonorous, and fragrant. Their colors, sounds, tastes, and smells appear to be perceived directly, as well as their distances and directions from us. They appear to be altogether independent of our minds and of all mind. If every thinking being should cease to exist, the world would continue to exist with all its tastes, and odors, and colors, and sounds. The various parts of the universe appear to be independent, and at the same time constantly acting and reacting upon one another, producing motions in various directions and of various degrees of rapidity, receiving and inducing endless changes; and yet, while changing, remaining the same throughout. The bodies of human beings are animated by consciousness and directed by wills; but the relation of dependence between the body and consciousness common sense does not clearly conceive. This, I conceive, is