better guide than they had, and one absolutely infallible, to give less time to an inquiry not only most momentous, but of such moment that compared with it, all other inquiries signify nothing. If we have had no revelation, we are not sure that we know more of God's will than the heathens did, and it eminently behoves those amongst us who are not convinced of the truth of holy writ, to, inquire unceasingly what the will of their maker is. If we see such men lax in this inquiry, and easily satisfied with that faith which they have adopted, they stand self-convicted of supineness in God's service, and the philosophers of old time were angels of light compared to them. Those virtuous men knew that the favour of God could not be attained at less expense than that, not merely of conforming to what they thought his will, but of inquiring with unremitted industry what that will Nor is it fit that it should be so; the favour of a being who can do with us whatsoever he will, is not a jewel of so small price, as that it may fitly be bought with less labour than we should give to obtain any earthly blessing. If we wished to recommend ourselves to an earthly sovereign, and to become his favoured servants,

Avas.

divination, oracles, &c. arose from this foundation; and however su'perstitiously and foolishly the search might be conducted, it proved at least the want of a superior guide to be real. Nor was this search confined to the ignorant and the vulgar; on the contrary the wisest and best men were the most solicitous after such notices as they could obtain for the di ̈rection of their conduct. This was, I believe, particularly the case with regard to Socrates, and his immediate followers. One discovers it strongly in thewritings of Xenophon, one of the greatest Generals,one of the most illustrious Philosophers, and one of the most amiable men, in all heathen -antiquity. His own good sense, and the instructions of his excellent preceptor taught him that humility which leads human weakness to the fountain of divine wisdom for a supply of its deficiencies, and his piety, though imperfectly directed, was sincere. How unlike this distinguish. ed ornament of polished Greece, are the present soidisant philosophers of Edinburgh and Paris! He, through all the impediments of long established error, carefully sought his way through clouds and darkness; they, on the contrary shut their eyes against the divine illumination which brightens all around them!'

we should confess it necessary to learn the most acceptable and effectual mode of serving him; and should not present ourselves to his notice till we had informed ourselves in the greatest degree possible to us, what were his real interests; the nature of his expectations; the bent of his wishes. Or as, if we failed in this necessary precaution, we should find no excuse for our failure in the plea that we thought ourselves right; as prejudice, or indolence would avail nothing in our behalf; so neither shall it be a sufficient plea for any servant of his heavenly master, that he thought his motives and system of conduct right, if it were within his power to have adopted better motives, and a better system of conduct, or if he failed diligently to inquire whether such motives and such system of conduct were within his reach, or not.

Shall we expect to gain God's favour on easier terms than those by which alone we could gain (I should rather, perhaps, say deserve) the approbation of a temporal Prince? It is as fair to expect that reason should endow the indolent savage with as much of the wisdom of this world as application gives to the studious philosopher. Indolence and prejudice will no more excuse us for not having obtained a juster faith and system of practice when they were, or, as for any trouble we took to decide the matter might have been within our reach, than they would excuse us to an earthly master for having studied a science by bad means, where good ones were, or, as for any trouble we took to decide the matter, might have been at hand.

In a word, to be good is a science, of all sciences the most difficult, (let the world speak for itself) both as it relates to the learning and the practising of it; and when at the last day we give in our accounts, it will not be enough to say that we acted in a way, and from a motive which we be lieved to be right; but in a way and from a motive which were the best that we could possibly attain under our particular circumstances.

The question by which those who have not had the gospel preached untot hem," must be judged, is not whether

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they did or did not know and practise what was absolutely and in its own nature right, i. e. what is most conformable to God's nature and wishes; for to know that certainly and in all its parts is possible to none, by the mere light of nature and to have any other than the rudest and most unjust notions of it, absolutely impossible to others. This would be obviously a most unequal rule of judgment. All that shall be required of heathens therefore, is to have made the greatest advances in the knowledge of God's will, which under their particular circumstances they could make, and being free agents, to have conformed their practice to their knowledge in the greatest degree that they could so conform it, even though that knowledge should have been wide from the truth, as the east is from the west. For otherwise, God has not placed his creatures on the same terms; he has put within the reach of some, what he has not put within the reach of others. lf I dwell on this subject it is because I would not leave to the sceptic the possibility of charging me with having underrated the virtue of heathens. It will be seen how high a place I have assigned to those amongst them who, having natural light alone for their guide, made God's nature. and attributes their continual study, and his supposed will their continual practice. They fell indeed into a world of errors from which we are relieved, but they did their best, and to do his best is all that God requires from any man. They doubtless, if any do, shall obtain future happiness, for if such happiness have ever been promised to, or reserved for any, it is promised to and reserved for all, who from the foundation of the world, having zealously endeavoured to act up to the best light of religion and morality within their reach, have also, heartily repented of all wilful aberrations from it.

Let me not be misunderstood in this chapter. That there are certain modes of moral and religious conduct more nearly approaching to absolute rectitude than others, is very sure; and that it is possible to prove them such

without calling in revelation to our aid (further than to invest the Almighty with that character, which the scriptures give him) I will endeavour to shew hereafter.

But as it is from God's character of perfection alone that we can prove them such, so, to have just notions of what constitutes perfection in the ruler of an universe is necessary to our having just notions of moral and religious excellence. From their unavoidable want of this knowledge of God's nature it sprang, that the Heathens had notions of moral and religious duties so imperfect; that they thought suicide a virtue, and returning good for evil, foolishness"* We see how little natural religion could do for them, wise as they were, when they did not set out with just notions of their Maker. But as virtue consists in the greatest possible conformity of our conduct, to what, according to our best means of information, we think God's will, and because we think it such, therefore if any of the heathens acted by this rule, and from this motive, they did all that God requires from any of his creatures. Let us be as zealous to examine the truth of the scriptures, to understand them rightly, and, if they be true, to obey them uniformly, as some of the Heathens were to learn and practise their duty, and we have nothing to fear. To know God's will is not

* It will be said, that so far as relates to the returning of good for evil, some of the Heathens had juster notions. That some of them * thought forgiveness decorous, at least, s certain. "Nor are those to bę listened to who think it right to be greatly offended even with our enemies" is the translation which a sceptic has himself given, very triumphantly, of a passage in Cicero. With Aristotle" says the Rev. Charles Bulkley, in his Economy of the Gospel, it is an amiable and manly character to be no rememberer of injuries, easily reconcileable and forgiving." This is a quotation much stronger than the former, and this supported by a few more such passages, which it is possible to col lect, (insisting be it remembered on placability, not on that love which "suffereth all things") may stand as an exception to the following general rule, viz. that the Heathens did not acknowledge any obligation to return good for evil; that to do so was unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks, foolishness."

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equally possible to all, but to all it is equally possible to use their best means of knowing it, and their best power of conforming to it. Thus much the savage can do the philosopher, the christian can do no more. To have done this shall save all men, if there are any who shall be saved. I conclude then, that virtue in free beings, believing in the existence of a God, and that he wishes from them some things rather than others, is any mode of conduct adopted by them, because, according to the best light within their reach, they believe it to be that mode of conduct which God requires from them; and that vice is the exact contrary of this; i. e. that in free beings, believing in the existence of a God, and that he wishes from them some things rather than others, it is departure from that mode of conduct, which according to the best light within their reach, they believe to be what God requires from them. I fear that I have been prolix, and guilty of some repetition in this chapter, for which I beg the reader's pardon the momentous nature of the question discussed must plead my excuse. In future, I trust that I shall not lay myself open to the same charge.

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CHAP. II.

On the inability of Human Reason, to understand the conduct of God's Providence; and the consequent absurdity of disbelieving any act ascribed to the Almighty to have been performed by him, merely because it disagrees with, or contradicts our reason.

GOD, who thought fit to make this world and its

inhabitants, must also think fit to govern them, for otherwise he has made something which is not worth taking