SUMMARY.

EXAMINATION of the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology suggested by previous inquiry-Confusion of thought on the subject, evidenced in popular statements of the relation between Faith and Reason-also in attempts to settle the necessary points of belief-Discussion of the Scholastic principles: 1. that whatever is first in point of doctrine is therefore true; and 2. that the logical consequence of any doctrine is necessarily true-The former principle, a remnant of Scholastic view of Theology as a demonstrative science-Universality and ubiquity of belief no tests of divine truth-The principle only true when strictly confined to Scripture facts - Contrast of the earlier and later Christian writers in the tradition of doctrine-The preference for earliest authorities inconsistent with the principle which establishes doctrines by logical consequences-Symbolical nature of language in its application to Theology-Unscriptural doctrines must result from the method of logical deductions-Necessity imposed in such a case of answering all objections-Impossibility of maintaining thus the principle of Authority-Progressive accumulation of doctrines by such a mode of proceeding-Truth of Fact confounded with Truth of Opinion in the Scholastic method-No dogmas to be found in Scripture itself-Dogmas therefore to be restricted to a negative sense, as exclusions of unscriptural truth-Articles and Creeds not necessarily to be dispensed with, because imperfect-Their defence however not to be identified with that of Christianity-Use and importance of Dogmatic Theology to be drawn from its relation to Social Religion.

Sum of the whole inquiry-Present interest of it-Scholasticism the ground of controversial defence to the Church of Rome -Remnants of it in Protestant Churches in the state of Controversy, and in the importance attributed to peculiar views of religious truth-Result of the examination sufficient to prove the force of Theory on our Theological language-The impression from this fact not to be transferred to the revealed truths which are real parts of sacred history-Real beneficial effect of honest search into the truths of Divine Revelation.

JEREMIAH XXIII. 28.

He that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully. What is the chaff to the wheat ? saith the Lord.

Qui habet sermonem meum, loquatur sermonem meum vere. Quid paleis ad triticum ? dicit Dominus. LAT. VULG.

LECTURE VIII.

THE examination in which I have been engaged, involves the consideration of two principles of Theology: 1. That whatever has been originally established in Religion is true; whatever is subsequent, or may be shewn to have arisen at any particular period during the progress of the Gospel, is corrupt; 2. That whatever may be deduced by necessary inference from any established proposition, must also be true. These principles were employed by the School-divines in two ways: either to prove the affirmative of any point; or to demonstrate the erroneousness of any assumed truth. I purpose now calling your attention to a discussion of these fundamental principles; and, from this discussion, to deduce the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology.

The consideration of our Religion, under this last point of view, is naturally brought before the mind, by the inquiries which I have been pursuing into the effect of Scholasticism on our theological language. For the question arises: If a technical statement of the Sacred Truth necessarily involves so much of human theory-if, as has been shewn, the Christian doctrines, in their mode of expression, carry so much of the speculation of an antiquated philosophy;-how far are all human formularies of faith to be admitted; and what is the ground, on

which they rest their pretension to be received by the Scriptural Christian?

The discussion on which I am now entering, is an arbitration of the point, where Divine Truth ends, and Human Truth commences; or, where the certainty of Divine Fact ceases, and the probability of Opinion takes its rise, in matters of Religious belief and conduct. For it is the confusion of the limits of these two things, that brings perplexity into the subject; occasioning fallacious inductions from one ground of assent to the other. The dialectical theologian calls upon us to receive his sentences, as the voice of God which none can gainsay; building the necessity of pious submission on the theoretic necessity of demonstrative argumentation: or, on the other hand, he appeals to our reason, and insists on our accepting, as irrefragable conclusions, what no conclusion of reason can establish, and what ought to rest solely on the authoritative Word of God.

Hence it is that writers, in different ages of the Church, have been so often employed in debating the respective provinces of Faith and Reason. A confusion of thought has been constantly prevalent on the subject. The very circumstance of treating Faith and Reason as distinct principles, is an evidence of this confusion: as if the assent to Divine Truth could be an act of Faith, in any way distinct from an act of Reason. The mischief of such a statement of the case is, indeed, too apparent from

experience. The indolent, or the sensitive, mind, readily seizes on a distinction, which, to the one, saves the trouble of thought and diligent examination,--to the other, supplies a pious sentiment for the acceptance of any wild, or even repulsive doctrines of religion. To say; this is of Faith,—that is of Reason,—peremptorily silences all suspicions and misgivings of the judgment and the heart. Persons are thus led to overlook the analogy of God's dealings with his creatures; and to imagine, that the truths of the world of Grace are to be received and judged, by a different set of principles from those which are applied to the ordinary providences of God. On this hypothesis, there is nothing so extravagant that may not be admitted as part of Divine Truth. Indeed, the more extravagant any proposed doctrine is, the more attractive should it be, on such a principle, to the religious inquirer : since it is then, a more striking exemplification of the contrast supposed between truths of Faith and Reason. Many a devout and excellent mind, I fear, has been seduced from sober religion, by this speculative distinction between Faith and Reason: or, at least, where fanatical doctrine has been adopted, it has furnished a defence, against which, all attempts to convince of error have been necessarily unavailing.

What, however, has been at bottom the real object of all these inquiries, is, to ascertain the distinction between dogmas and facts of Religion. Men have found both rested on the same footing. They have