by which the weakest devotee ever believed he was securing the happiness of a future life, is more rational than unconcern about it. Upon this subject, nothing is so absurd as indifference; no folly so contemptible as thoughtlessness and levity.” The principle contained in this is that which the religion that we profess teaches. Serious attention ought to be paid to a paramount concern; no concern can equal that of eternity. But serious attention is not gloom; gloom is rather the companion of despair. But the venerable Archdeacon of Carlisle is not the only writer who has made the accusation of fanaticism against us for those practices. In every age he has had predecessors; one of whom he quotes himself in the close of his second chapter.

"The constancy, and by consequence the sufferings of the Christians of this period, is also referred to by Epictetus, who imputes their intrepidity to madness, or to a kind of fashion or habit; and about fifty years afterwards by Marcus Aurelius, who ascribes it to obstinacy. 'Is it possible (Epictetus asks) that a man may arrive at this temper and become indifferent to those things, from madness, or habit, as the Galileans?'" (lib. iv., c. 7).

This was a general imputation upon the Christians, that they were fanatics, mad, unsocial, illiberal, bigoted, unfashionable; but this madness was taught by our Lord, was noticed very soon, and having a method in it, has been brought down to the present day amongst us.

We did think we should be able to conclude to-day, but we find it necessary to defer the remaining topic of monastic vows to our next.

ers.

SECTION V

We were obliged last week to omit our conclusion of this examination of Archdeacon Paley's paragraph. We now lay it before our readThe only questions remaining to be disposed of, are, Did our Lord recommend the rigors of an ascetic life? did he recommend the vows of a monastic life as carrying man to a higher degree of divine favour? The rigors of the ascetic life consist in the practice of those virtues which we have before seen, were recommended by our Lord as carrying man to a higher degree of divine favour. We unhesitatingly answer then, the Archdeacon asserted what the Scripture does not warrant, when he stated that our Lord did not recommend it. But we also add, that every act done by every ascetic is not to be charged upon the general system. It would be bad reasoning to argue against the propriety of man's living in society, because in the social state, he has opportunities and excitements to crimes which he would not know of and could not commit in a different state. It would be bad reasoning to accuse any body of men, generally, with the faults or the

follies of some individuals of that body. It would be a fallacious and a wicked exhibition, if a man were to collect the catalogue of crime and the list of criminals from the courts of a nation, and the catalogue of follies, and the list of the weak-minded through an entire region, and publish both as a correct history of that country. It is true every fact would be correctly given; no false statement could be found in the compilation. Bet we ask would this be a correct history? The publisher would deserve at least the indignant reproof of the insulted community, and the rebuke of every honest man. There have been hypocrites and fanatics in the religious orders; there have been very few of the former, perhaps a greater number of the latter description amongst the ascetics. But every man who aspires to piety is not the Tartuffe of Moliere's imagination. And the history of the ascetics of our church is very unlike the misrepresentations of their enemies, blending all the real faults and follies of hypocrites and enthusiasts with the immense fictions of the imagination, and either concealing the heroic virtues of persons of whom the world was not worthy, or giving such an occasional tincture of modified and compassionate praise, as would be necessary to keep some semblance of impartiality.

The vows of a monastic life are those of continence, voluntary poverty, and obedience to a regular superior. These topics have been before examined with the exception of obedience. Yet shall it be necessary for us to go through the examination of the question, whether constitutional obedience to a regularly appointed governor is virtuous? And if virtuous, does it not raise man to a higher degree of divine favour? And was not this virtue frequently inculcated by our blessed Lord?

Respecting vows: we were about to write upon the subject, when we received the communication which exhibits the meaning of a prophetic passage of St. Paul, and as we are now closely pressed for room, we shall refer Mr. "No Monk" to that, reserving to ourselves the right of entering more at large thereupon at a future day.

Thus we believe it must be clear that the boasted authority of Doctor Paley is devoid of that truth which ought to be its support, and that what he is pleased to call the fanaticism of Roman Catholics, is more like the doctrine of our blessed Lord, than is what he and his admirer, "No Monk," would call rational Christianity.

We have been diffuse, but we have omitted a far greater quantity of what might properly be inserted, than many of our friends may imagine.

LIBERALITY

[The following short Essay on the Misuse of the Term "Liberality," appeared in the United States Catholic Miscellany, for 1822.]

SECTION I

We have often been amused at the use made of this word, and at the vague sense in which it is applied to religion. With some persons, a liberal man means a person who considers all modes of worship exactly alike, and attends to none. With others, a liberal man is he who gives a preference to one mode, and says, at the same time, that all others are equally good. Others consider a liberal man to be a person who not only gives a preference to one mode, but avows that he considers some others quite erroneous,―at the same time that he considers some others equally good as his own, but does not oppose either. With another class, a liberal man may consistently oppose some sects, and support others, whilst he persecutes none.

Let us for a moment examine those descriptions. The first exhibits to us an irreligious man. But if to be liberal, it be requisite to be irreligious-and that to be saved, it be necessary to be religious-we must candidly avow that we give the preference to religion and salvation; and that we would sacrifice the foolish, empty praise of thoughtless infidelity, to the substantial benefits of peace of conscience here, and eternal glory hereafter. Irreligion is not liberality. Neglect of our duty to our Creator is not liberality. If there be such a being as an atheist, he would by this be the most liberal man in the world.

The second is an irrational man. For, if all modes of worship be alike, if all be equally good, it is quite irrational to give a preference where there is perfect equality; and as preference involves choice founded upon some motive after examination and comparison, the man who gives a preference and says he has no motive, contradicts himself.

Another consideration will exhibit this more clearly. It is a fact, that all the systems of religion differ from each other by their being contradictions to each other; by one asserting exactly what another exactly denies. Thus, one system asserts that Christ revealed, that in the divine nature there are three persons. Another system denies that

Christ revealed, that in the divine nature there are three persons. One system asserts, that Christ established several distinct orders of clergymen in the church. Another system denies that Christ established several distinct orders of clergymen in the church. One system asserts, that Christ instituted seven sacraments. Another system denies that Christ instituted seven sacraments. And so, in every distinct sect, there is at least one distinct tenet of contradiction to all the other sects; and this contradiction is not upon a matter of opinion, but upon a matter of fact. Now, in matters of fact there can be no latitude of opinion; for it is strictly true, that the fact agrees with the assertion, or disagrees with the assertion. Hence, if a man gives a preference to the assertions of one sect, it is ridiculous for him to say I profess to believe the fact to be as stated by this society; but he who denies the truth of that fact also agrees with me; though he denies exactly what I assert, still we both believe the same. This we consider to be the assertion of an absurdity, viz., that the same proposition can be, at the same moment, and in the same sense, true and false. And as we do not consider liberality to be absurdity, we do not consider the person who answers the second description to be a liberal man.

The person described in the third place, is exactly in the same predicament as the persons described in the second; for it makes no difference in the argument whether the assertion be made that two hundred sets of contradictory propositions are at the same time true, or that only two contradictory propositions are true; still, it is the assertion of an absurdity.

The person described in the fourth place differs from the third only in this circumstance, that he opposes by argument, or by not supporting some of those from whom he differs; but he is in exactly the same predicament if he holds certain doctrines; and whilst he holds it to be a fact, that they were revealed by God, holds also that the person who denies this fact, may believe truth in the denial. This contradiction is an evident absurdity.

We have supposed, of course, all through, that God has revealed certain doctrines, and that man can know the fact of God having spoken, and know what doctrine he did reveal when he spoke.

We have been led to these remarks by our desire to fix some meaning for the expression a liberal man in a religious sense; for we know of no phrase more frequently used, and less understood. We shall renew the examination.

SECTION II

In our last number we made some examination of the meaning which was usually attached to this phrase. We now resume the subject. Frequently the proper signification of an expression is only discoverable by ascertaining what it does not mean; and as every virtue is believed to consist in a happy mean, we should inquire for the virtue of liberality in a mean between extreme carelessness and infidelity on one side, and bigotry and intolerance on the other. We have examined the first extreme,-let us glance at the second.

We look upon bigotry to be an irrational attachment to doctrines, joined to a hatred of all who have not an attachment to the same doctrine. Thus, there may be bigots in true religion and in false religion. Bigotry is not the peculiarity of any sect, but is the result of criminal disposition or weakness of intellect in an individual. A person may have an irrational attachment to a true doctrine, and the doctrine is not rendered false by the unreasonableness of the individual. A person may have an irrational attachment to a doctrine, and still have no hatred to those who differ with him; such a person may be weak, but not criminal. Bigotry is criminal, and the criminality is the hatred which enters into its composition. Bigotry is a weakness, and the weakness is exhibited by the unreasonableness of the attachment. Bigotry is then an unreasonable attachment to a doctrine whether true or false, joined to hatred of those who do not hold that doctrine. It may now be asked, how can a person be unreasonably attached to a true doctrine? We answer, the truth of the doctrine may not be evident to him who embraces it, and therefore his attachment is founded upon no rational principle. We may now be told that all belief of mysteries is irrational, for their truth is not evident to man; as the very fact of their being mysteries, is an assertion that their truth is not evident. Our answer is very simple. To have evidence of the truth of a doctrine, it is sufficient that we have evidence of the capacity, knowledge, and veracity of him who delivers it, and evidence of the fact that this witness testified the truth of this doctrine; and as we thus give our assent, and form our attachment to the doctrine upon a rational principle, our belief of mysteries upon the testimony of God is rational. Thus, the man who is attached. to the doctrines of religion, many of which are mysterious, may have a rational ground for that attachment. But he may also have an irrational attachment, but the quality of his attachment does not influence the intrinsic truth or falsehood of the doctrine, neither does it influence the evidence of that truth, or of that falsehood. Thus, a bigot may be