Obrazy na stronie
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power than any other man to fulfil it, and was under greater obligations than any other man to obedience; he sinned when he knew he was the representative of millions, and that the happy or miserable state of all mankind depended on his conduct; which never was, nor can be, the case of any other man in the world:-Then, I say, it will follow, that his nature was originally corrupt, &c.-Thus their argument from the wickedness of mankind, to prove a sinful and corrupt nature, must inevitably and irrecoverably fall to the ground.-Which will appear more abundantly, if we take in the case of the angels, who in numbers sinned and kept not their first estate, though created with a nature superior to Adam's." Again, (p. 145 S.) "When it is inquired, how it comes to pass that our appetites and passions are now so irregular and strong, as that not one person has resisted them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent? If this be the case, if such as make the inquiry will tell the world how it came to pass that Adam's appetites and passions were so irregular and strong that he did not resist them so as to keep himself pure and innocent, when upon their principles he was far more able to have resisted them; I also will tell them how it comes to pass that his posterity does not resist them. Sin doth not alter its nature by its being general; and therefore how far soever it spreads, it must come upon all just as it came upon Adam."

But is

These things are delivered with much assurance. there any reason in such a way of talking? One thing implied in it, and the main thing, if any at all to the purpose, is, that because an effect being general does not alter the nature of the effect, therefore nothing more can be argued concerning the cause from its happening constantly, and in the most steady manner, than from its happening but once. But how contrary

is this to reason? Suppose a person, through the deceitful persuasions of a pretended friend, once takes a poisonous draught of liquor to which he had before no inclination; but after he has once taken of it, he is observed to act as one that has an insatiable, incurable thirst after more of the same, in his constant practice, obstinately continued in as long as he lives, against all possible arguments and endeavours used to dissuade him from it. And suppose we should from hence argue a fixed inclination, and begin to suspect that this is the nature and operation of the poison, to produce such an inclination, or that this strong propensity is some way the consequence of the first draught. In such a case, could it be said with good reason, that a fixed propensity can no more be argued from his consequent constant practice than from his first draught? Or, suppose a young man, soberly inclined, enticed by wicked companions, should drink to excess, until he had got a habit of excessive drinking, and should come under the power of a

greedy appetite after strong drink, so that drunkenness should become a common and constant practice with him: And suppose an observer, arguing from this general practice, should say, "It must needs be that this young man has a fixed inclination to that sin; otherwise, how should it come to pass that he should make such a trade of it?" And another, ridiculing the weakness of his arguing, should reply, "Do you tell me how it came to pass, that he was guilty of that sin the first time, without a fixed inclination, and I will tell you how he is guilty of it so generally without a fixed inclination. Sin does not alter its nature by being general: And therefore, how common soever it becomes, it must come at all times by the same means that it came at first." I leave it to every one to judge, who would be chargeable with weak arguing in such a

case.

It is true there is no effect without some cause, ground, or reason of that effect, and some cause answerable to the effect. But certainly it will not follow that a transient effect requires a permanent cause or a fixed propensity. An effect happening once, though great, yea, though it may come to pass on the same occasion in many subjects at the same time, will not prove any fixed propensity or permanent influence. It is true, it proves an influence great and extensive, answerable to the effect, once exerted, or once effectual; but it proves nothing in the cause fixed or constant. If a particular tree, or a great number of trees standing together, have blasted fruit on their branches at a particular season-or if the fruit be very much blasted, and entirely spoiled-it is evident that something was the occasion of such an effect at that time; but this alone does not prove the nature of the tree to be bad. But if it be observed, that those trees, and all other trees of the kind, wherever planted, and in all soils, countries, climates, and seasons, and however cultivated and managed, still bear ill fruit, from year to year, and in all ages, it is a good evidence of the evil nature of the tree. And if the fruit, at all these times, and in all these cases, be very bad, it proves the nature of the tree to be very bad. If we argue in like manner from what appears among men, it is easy to determine whether the universal sinfulness of mankind-all sinning immediately, as soon as capable of it, and continually, and generally being of a wicked character, at all times, in all ages, in all places, and under all possible circumstances, against means and motives inexpressibly manifold and great and in the utmost conceivable variety-be from a permanent internal great cause.

If the voice of common sense were heard, there would be no occasion for labour in multiplying arguments to shew that one act does not prove a fixed inclination; but that constant pursuit does. We see that, in fact, it is agreeable to the rea

son of all mankind, to argue fixed principles, tempers, and prevailing inclinations, from repeated and continued actionsthough the actions are voluntary, and performed of choiceand thus to judge of the tempers and inclinations of persons, ages, sexes, tribes, and nations. But is it the manner of men to conclude, that whatever they see others once do, they have a fixed abiding inclination to do? Yea, there may be several acts seen, and yet not be taken as good evidence of an established propensity, even though that one act, or those several acts, are followed by such constant practice as afterwards evidences fixed disposition. As for example; there may be several instances of a man drinking some spirituous liquor, and those instances be no sign of a fixed inclination to that liquor: But these acts may be introductory to a settled habit or propensity, which may be made very manifest afterwards by constant practice.

From these things it is plain, that what is alleged concerning the first sin of Adam, and of the angels, without a previous fixed disposition to sin, cannot in the least weaken the arguments brought to prove a fixed propensity to sin in mankind, in their present state. From the permanence of the cause has been argued the permanence of the effect. And that the permanent cause consists in an internal fixed propensity, and not in any particular external circumstances, has been argued from the effects being the same, through a vast variety and change of circumstances. But the first acts of sin in Adam or the angels, considered in themselves, were not permanent, continued effects. And though a great number of the angels sinned, and the effect on that account was the greater and more extensive; yet this extent of the effect is a very different thing from that permanence, or settled continuance of effect, which is supposed to shew a permanent cause or fixed propensity. Neither was there any trial of a vast variety of circumstances attending a permanent effect, to shew the fixed cause to be internal, consisting in a settled disposition of nature, in the instances objected. And however great the sin of Adam, or of the angels was, and however great the means, motives, and obligations were against which they sinned-and whatever may be thence argued concerning the transient cause, occasion, or temptation, as being very subtle, remarkably tending to deceive and seduce, &c.-yet it argues nothing of any settled disposition, or fixed cause, either great or small; the effect both in the angels and our first parents, being in itself transient, and, for ought appears, happening in each of them under one system or coincidence of influential circumstances.*

* See vol. I. p. 398. note.

The general continued wickedness of mankind, against such means and motives, proves each of these things, viz. that the cause is fixed, and that the fixed cause is internal in man's nature, and also that it is very powerful. It proves that the cause is fixed, because the effect is so abiding, through so many changes. It proves that the fixed cause is internal, because the circumstances are so various-including a variety of means and motives-and they are such circumstances as cannot possibly cause the effect, being most opposite to it in their tendency. And it proves the greatness of the internal cause; or that the propensity is powerful; because the means which have opposed its influence have been so great, and yet have been statedly overcome.

But here I may observe, by the way, that with regard to the motives and obligations against which our first father sinned, it is not reasonably alleged, that he sinned when he knew his sin would have destructive consequences to all his posterity, and might in process of time pave the whole globe with skulls, c. It is evident, by the plain account the scripture gives us of the temptation which prevailed with our first parents to commit that sin, that it was so contrived by the subtlety of the tempter, as first to blind and deceive them as to that matter, and to make them believe that their disobedience should be followed with no destruction or calamity at all to themselves, (and therefore not to their posterity) but on the contrary, with a great increase and advancement of dignity and happiness.

Evasion II. Let the wickedness of the world be ever so general and great, there is no necessity of supposing any depravity of nature to be the cause: man's own free-will is cause sufficient. Let mankind be more or less corrupt, they make themselves corrupt by their own free choice. This Dr. T. abundantly insists upon, in many parts of his book.*

But I would ask, how it comes to pass that mankind so universally agree in this evil exercise of their free-will? If their wills are in the first place as free to good as to evil, what is it to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consisting of so many millions, in so many successive generations, without consultation, all agree to excercise their freedom in favour of evil? If there be no natural tendency or preponderation in the case, then there is as good a chance for the will being determined to good as to evil. If the cause be indifferent, why is not the effect in some measure indifferent? If the balance be no heavier at one end than the other, why does it perpetually preponderate one way? How comes it to pass, that the free will of mankind has been determined to evil, in like manner before the flood, and after the flood; under the law and under the gospel:

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among both Jews and Gentiles, under the Old Testament; and since then, among Christians, Jews, Mahometans; among papists and protestants; in those nations where civility, politeness, arts, and learning most prevail, and among the Negroes, and Hottentots in Africa, the Tartars in Asia, and Indians in America, towards both the poles, and on every side of the globe; in greatest cities and obscurest villages; in palaces and in huts, wigwams and cells under ground? Is it enough to reply, It happens so, that men every where, and at all times, choose thus to determine their own wills, and so to make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and sin constantly as long as they live, and universally to choose never to come up half way to their duty?

A steady effect requires a steady cause; but free-will, without any previous propensity to influence its determinations, is no permanent cause; nothing can be conceived of farther from it: For the very notion of freedom of will, consisting in self-determining power, implies contingence; and if the will is perfectly free from any government of previous inclination, its freedom must imply the most absolute and perfect contingence: And surely nothing can be conceived of more unfixed than that. The notion of liberty of will, in this sense, implies perfect freedom from every thing that should previously fix, bind or determine it; that it may be left to be fixed and determined wholly by itself: Therefore its determinations must be previously altogether unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent, be a cause sufficient to account for an effect in such a manner, and to such a degree, permanent, fixed, and constant?

When we see any person going on in a certain course with great constancy, against all manner of means to dissuade him, do we judge this to be no argument of a fixed disposition of mind, because, being free, he may determine to do so, if he will, without any such disposition? Or if we see a nation, or people, that differ greatly from other nations in such and such instances of their constant conduct-as though their tempers and inclinations were very diverse-and any should say, we cannot judge at all of the temper or disposition of people by any thing observable in their constant practice or behaviour, because they have all free-will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without any thing in their temper or inclination to bias them. Would such an account of such effects be satisfying to the reason of mankind? But infinitely further would it be from satisfying a considerate mind, to account for the constant and universal sinfulness of mankind by saying that their will is free, and therefore all may, if they please, make themselves wicked: They are free when they first begin to act as moral agents and therefore all may, if they please, begin to sin as soon as they begin to act: They are free as long as they continue to act in the

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