been accorded to the Irrigation Department to be expended in works of drainage.

We have therefore no hesitation in saying that until we are prepared to take over the debt of Egypt, after the wise example of France in Tunis and Madagascar, or have the courage to proclaim a protectorate, the mixed tribunals and the Caisse de la Dette, with all their faults, are worth preserving, and are by no means unmitigated evils.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech on the vote of the grant in aid, indicated clearly the intentions of the Government as to the future military operations in the Sudan. He said :—

"Since that expedition" (of last year) "was undertaken we have never concealed, either from Parliament or from the country, that, in our view, there should be a further advance in the same direction, and that Egypt could never be held to be permanently secured so long as a hostile Power was in occupation of the Nile valley up to Khartoum. We have had to consider whether that policy should still be pursued. We believe that the policy is right, and we intend that it shall be pursued. What we propose is that the policy shall be continued in the coming season, first of all by an advance to a very important point on the Nile called Abu Hamed, which lies to the north-east of the extreme limits of the present This province of Dongola. is to be as that was" (last year's) "an Egyptian advance, in the first place to Abu Hamed and afterwards possibly beyond. How far I do not think it right to say. But this I will say, that in our opinion the main work to be done in the coming season should be first the consolidation and connection of the districts already under the dominion of the Khedive, and, secondly, the acquisition of important strategical positions which may be of the utmost value in the future."

"

We cordially approve of the views thus so clearly enunciated.

The objectif is Khartoum, but when it may be convenient to reach it depends upon circumstances. Last year's campaign proved that the Derwishes cannot hold any position on the river-banks against the fire of gunboats. The bravest of men are helpless against the volleys of shot and shell poured in upon them from these floating batteries, to which they can only reply from a few antiquated guns and by rifle - fire. Leave their trenches they must, for they become untenable. The only alternative is to move on or die. The defence at Berber and Omdurman, both on the river's banks, will inevitably meet the same fate as at Hafir. Nor can the Derwishes with time improve their powers of resistance. Gunboats they cannot build, guns they cannot make. It matters, then, little, as far as the opposition of the enemy is concerned, whether the advance to Khartoum is made this year or the next. Strategically, however, it is of importance to make sure of the position of Abu Hamed, and this can best be done by a light railway across the desert from Wady Halfa. Writing of Abu Hamed, Mr Chelu, in his valuable work on the course of the Nile, says :

"Below Abu Hamed the Nile ceases to flow towards the north, and takes a course west-south-west until it reaches Debbeh, sixty kilometres above Ambukol. As the wind blows almost constantly from the north during nine months of the year, it follows that, on account of the direction of the river, this wind, favourable between Assouan and Debbeh, and between Abu Hamed and Khar

toum, ceases to be so from Debbeh to Abu Hamed, and constitutes a very serious obstacle to boats which cannot struggle against it.”

The river between Ambukol and Abu Hamed is full of rapids, and

the fourth cataract, which is about half-way between these two places, is thus described by Mr Chelu :

"Although the length of the catar act does not exceed six kilometres, it is difficult to go up it against stream in less than six days, say one kilometre per day. The velocity of the water in some places is extraordinary; in others there is no depth. At some points hauling is impossible on account of the multitude of rocks

which rise up along the course of the channels, narrow and deep; further on it is literally necessary to slide the boats over sand or rock. Attempted with boats of some size the passage of the fourth cataract is only possible if, after lightening them of their loads, it is arranged to haul them by a number of men varying between 50 and 1500."

From this description it will be easily understood how, opposed by wind and stream and confronted by constant perils, the upward navigation in this portion of the river presents so much difficulty that the transport of artillery and stores for a large army is danger

ous.

It is this which makes the construction of a light railway220 miles in length-across the desert, from Wady Halfa to Abu Hamed, an absolute necessity. But Abu Hamed once reached and put in railway connection with the base at Wady Halfa, a free way is secured at high water to Khartoum, 330 miles distant. It is hoped that this line may be completed by the 1st of September, but to accomplish this will require the utmost efforts of the energetic Sirdar, his officers and men. Should Abu Hamed be connected with Wady Halfa by the 1st of September, then Berber may be got to before the waters have fallen; but if not, then next year both Berber and Khartoum may be taken during the flood.

This movement by stages as may be feasible is decidedly the

most advantageous. Although slow, it is sure, and financially it is convenient. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was able to assure Parliament, as the result of careful inquiry, that no further grant in aid would be required in 1897 :—

"The Egyptian Government will construct that railway, and they will bear all the other expenses that are likely to be incurred in the coming season.. I have satisfied myself both as to the nature of the operations to be undertaken, their probable cost, and the means of the Egyptian Government to meet them; and I am so convinced that it is not in our con

templation to ask Parliament during 1897 for any further expenditure in this matter than that which is now proposed."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer's anticipations are well founded. The material for the railway being provided for by the grant in aid, the other expenses will be covered by the surplus of 1897, which is likely to amount to £400,000.

We cannot close without expressing our satisfaction at the firm language used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in regard to the occupation of Egypt: "The fact that we have been compelled to make this advance [of money] through, certainly, no fault or action of our own is, I think, rather likely to prolong the occupation."

These words are emphatic when it is remembered that they proceed from official lips, and they are all that could have been desired. Their effect has already been felt in Egypt and in France. In Egypt the most simple intelligences have been impressed by the fact that the mixed tribunals and the Caisse de la Dette, who posed before them as supreme, have proved to be of no account at all

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when British policy was in question. In France the speech of M. Hanotaux to the Chamber of Deputies, in reply to that of the Chancellor, spread discouragement in the ranks of the Colonial party, whose mission it is to foment the Egyptian agitation, because it referred not to the rights of France in Egypt but to the rights of Europe. In the majority of the French press the declarations of M. Hanotaux were severely criticised, and growing impatience of the Egyptian question is clearly evident. In one newspaper we read :

"The English act and disregard our vain protestations. They know that these will never be followed by action, and that the Government will never exceed, in regard to Egypt, the limit of platonic talk.

"One thing is certain, that the English will never leave Egypt of

their freewill. It will require force to oblige them. But is it decided in France to employ that force? No, Then to what use all certainly not.

summonses before the mixed tribunals, the fantasmagorie of notes and of which makes diplomatic negotiations resemble the acts of a lawyer, and reduces our 'Ministers plenipotentiaries' to the rank of sheriff's officers?"

From half-a-dozen more newspapers we could quote extracts in the same strain. As the quarrel with England about the evacuation of Egypt is being recognised more and more daily to be entirely platonic-talk behind which there is no action-the majority of Frenchmen are getting tired of it, especially as it is about a country which under its present régime is as open to French merchants and capitalists as it could be under any other.