TWICE within twelve months our national equanimity has been disturbed by reported cessions of territory and power by China to Russia, and the public alarm has only been quieted by the assurance that the reports were not authentic. But there is little consolation in that, if the assurance applies only to written instruments; for it is not the verbal form, but the salient truth behind, which gives significance to these international transactions. Treaties, like other contracts, are valid while both sides observe them, or where one party has the power of enforcing observance on the other. As between Russia and China a treaty is of quite secondary importance; for, so far as it gives official expression to a state of facts already existing, it affects international interests much as a parish register does the longevity of the community. It is but a record.

The comments of the Press on the Russo - Chinese Convention which were published in an English newspaper in Shanghai in October last betray a want of unanimity in the conception of what constitutes British interests in the Far East, and are not very clear as to the means whereby they may be safeguarded. These currents of opinion, set flowing through the columns of the Press, are suggestive of the eddy of a swift stream in which froth and driftwood are swirled round and round without definite direction. The reason of this may possibly lie in the fact that a certain phase of diplomacy which was in full credit a few years ago has been pronounced obsolete by the highest authority in this country, while

the idea of its obsoleteness has not yet percolated through all the strata of journalism. Critics are consequently at a loose end, and those of them are the happiest whose safety-valve in all cases is abuse of the wicked Tories. If, they say, such things had happened under a Liberal administration, what a howl there would have been from Land's End to John o'Groat's. There is no safer syntax than the perfect subjunctive.

Touching the facts themselves, there can be no doubt that the events of the past two years have reduced China virtually to the status of a dependency of Russia, if not also to her very ambitious partner, France. To speak more accurately, the condition which was latent has been brought into the light of day by recent occurrences. Whether she nominally controls this or that railway, or makes use of this or that seaport, Russia will do what seems good to her with Chinese railways and harbours whenever emergency calls for action.

Such limitations as there are to the exercise of this optional faculty depend neither on the will nor power of China, but of third parties. It is of little avail, therefore, to raise an outcry against a treaty which, assuming it to be authentic, merely defines a state of things existing independently, and in which we have acquiesced; and it would appear that the only questions much worthy of our consideration are- (1) How are the interests of Great Britain affected by the new relations between Russia and China? and (2) How may these relations be modified to our advantage?

A summary answer to both

questions is given by certain writers who argue that if the partition of China is going to begin, it behoves us to see that we get our share. But, in point of fact, the partition of China began forty years ago when the Amur region was ceded to Russia, and it was carried forward by an enormous stride in 1860, when the whole Pacific seaboard north of Korea was made over, gratis, by China to the same Power. The process was followed up vigorously in the sixties and the seventies by the rapid succession of French annexations in what is called, with a grandiose comprehensiveness, Indo-China; and the conquest of Upper Burma, which was forced upon us by France, falls in a certain sense within the same category. Finally, the cession of Liaotung on the mainland, and of the rich island of Formosa, to Japan in 1895, marked a further stage in the progress of dismemberment. True, Liaotung was, by the intervention of three European Powers, restored to the Government of China; but it was given back as an encumbered estate rather than as an integral portion of the Chinese dominions. It will be managed under the supervision of the mortgagee.

To speak, therefore, of the partitioning of China in the future tense is to hide the truth from our eyes. The process has begun, and will probably continue. For whatever restraint Russia may put on herself within her sphere, or France within hers, it does not admit of a doubt that the Japanese attack will be renewed on the day that promises success. Whatever British interest, therefore, is to accrue on the breaking up of China has accrued. We do not, however, for our part, consider that the true interest of Great

Britain lies in a participation in Chinese spoils; but, on the contrary, in adopting every reasonable and practical means of arresting the progress of dissolution.

The development of the new relations between Russia and China will affect British interests commercially and politically, which is the same thing under two aspects, our politics being but the guardian of our commerce. The extension of Russian influence in the wilds of Manchuria will gradually bring a large tract of country now under bandit rule within the sphere of peaceful government. So far, therefore, it tends to the promotion of trade, which is our ultimate object. On the other hand, however, the benefits to traders of the introduction of the reign of law may be largely neutralised by an anti-commercial policy on the part of the new Government, prohibitive tariffs, exclusive dealing, or repressive regulations. It must be said to the credit of Russia, however, that she has shown a better recognition of the needs of a new settlement than France has ever shown. The commercial regulations in Vladivostock compare favourably in point of liberality with those of Tongking or Madagascar.

It is in the political bearing of the new Russian position that its effect on surrounding nations stands out in a somewhat alarming manner. The southern coast of Liaotung possesses several serviceable harbours for peace or war purposes, of which Port Arthur is by no means the most important. Manchuria, as has been pointed out more than once during the past few years in the pages of

Maga,' is an ideal recruitingground. The original population has been virtually absorbed by a more energetic race of immigrants

from the northern Chinese provinces, mainly from Shantung. These colonists, as they are sometimes called, are inured to a life of adventure, and own no law save that of their own self-constituted and self-defended communes. Emancipated at once from the restraints of the normal family jurisdiction, which is the preservative of Chinese society, and from the control of a Government too weak and too indolent to follow them into regions which are not deemed worth the cost of administration, these hardy colonists pursue their avocations as hunters, gold-washers, ginseng - gatherers, robbers. Their armed and mounted bands give great trouble at times even to the Russian settlers, whose lands they not infrequently invade, ―a state of things which might at any time have furnished the Russian frontier officers with valid excuses for planting garrisons within Chinese territory to repel the raids of the bandits, over whom the Chinese Government exercises no efficient control. This would have been following up the policy which has effected, during two hundred years, the gradual absorption of Siberia.

These horse robbers of Manchuria are full of courage and enterprise, and only need the discipline of orderly government to become good soldiers as well as good citizens. They are of the very stuff that armies should be made of. In the hands of an organising Power, drilled, armed, fed, and led by competent officers -even under the Government of China herself - the Manchurian forces might have rendered the Russian possessions on the Pacific untenable. Less than twenty years ago the Russian authorities were, in fact, seriously alarmed at the reputed strength of the Chinese

forces. But there was no cause, for though China may squander money and men, she has not the genius to create an army.

But the invasion of Liaotung by Japan in 1894 completely changed the outlook for Russia. It is reasonable to suppose that after the military debauch responsible Japanese statesmen would have seen the wisdom of conciliating the population of Manchuria, and of forming them into an army. That was the danger that threatened Russia, and compelled her, at any cost and risk, to expel the Japanese from the Chinese continent. And now Russia holds this superb military material in her own hands, and will by its means become practically invulnerable in Manchuria. So far, then, Russia occupies a defensible position not to be lightly contested.

The reported concessions from China, however, go a good deal further than that. They point to a Russian occupation of the seaboard of the purely Chinese province of Shantung. The harbour of Kyao-chiao, on the east coast of that province, and looking straight across the Yellow Sea, is commodious and landlocked; how far defensible may be known to experts. The Chinese themselves were not wholly unaware of the strategic convenience of the port, attention having been called to its importance by Captain W. Lang, R. N., when in the Chinese service. The very last function in which Li Hung Chang appeared before the Japanese war - cloud threatened was an official inspection of Kyao - chiao with a view to its fortification and conversion into a great naval port. The visit was actually cut short by the receipt of news of the beginning of the troubles in Korea, which were the prelude to the war.

But the possession of Kyaochiao by Russia would partake rather of the character of an aggressive than a defensive move, for it is separated by an open sea from the territorial continuity which is the strength of Russia. Howsoever the move might be covered by the military maxim that attack is but a form of defence, still the occupation of Kyao-chiao by Russia might fairly be construed as a menace to all who are affected by it. And here, again, the character of the population is a most important element in the situation. The natives of Shantung-whence, as has been said, the emigrants to Manchuria are mostly drawnpossess the qualities of manhood in an eminent degree. Not only endowed with an excellent physique, they are also loyal, intelligent, and courageous men. In the disastrous collapse of the Chinese forces in 1894-95, the Shantung sailors displayed the highest military quality. It was they alone who enabled the brave Admiral Ting to make a stand with his shattered fleet after the desertion of the Chinese generals. Wielding such a force as could be made out of such men, any Power holding the key to Shantung would occupy a vantage-ground whence all Central China might eventually be dominated.

Consequently the cession of a war-port in Shantung is perhaps

the most serious of the reported gains of Count Cassini's treaty. The menace, so far as such may be implied, points of course more immediately at Japan; but having regard to possible eventualities and the ultimate focussing of British interests in China, we also should be at a terrible disadvantage in asserting ourselves, with Russia silently standing over us in an impregnable naval stronghold backed by a fertile country and an indigenous force of the best fighting material in China.

And there is the less excuse for Russia seeking a position so far beyond the natural sphere of her defensive needs in that the coast of Korea, which has now no competing claimant, possesses commodious harbours within easy striking distance of Japan, which has constituted herself the natural enemy of Russia in Far Asia. The Korean people, too, who are rather apt to be left out of account in international adjustments, have shown high militant capacity in many a hard struggle. Their hatred of the Japanese, handed down from father to son since the desolating invasion of 1597, and intensely aggravated by the brief experiences of 1894, is of itself a weapon of incalculable value in the hands of Russia, -a Power which has the pre-eminent gift of enlisting on her side the sympathy of conquered peoples.1

VOL. CLXI.— NO. DCCCCLXXVI.

U

With this mere hint at the way in which our British interests are touched by the new situation created by Japan and Russia, we may glance at the further question, How the circumstances may be modified to our advantage. The attempt to answer it would lead far afield into regions of hypothetical strategy, and into matters more suited to the deliberations of a conclave than for literary discussion. If the problem had been, how to make the worst of the situation, our proceedings during the past few years would supply a fairly good solution; and some negative wisdom at least may be derived from chewing the cud of even such comparatively ancient history as that. Time was when the game was in our hands, though not for long. We could not rise to the occasion because we had no man at home or abroad competent to deal with it. The judgment of events consequently went against us by default, as has happened more than once-in Damaraland, for instance. It is far from agreeable to rake over the rubbishheaps of failure; but if pearls of policy may perchance lie buried there the operation becomes justifiable. Moreover, no true appreciation of the actual position of affairs can be had that does not embrace to some extent the antecedent circumstances.

In June 1894 Japan betrayed hostile designs against China. There was no dispute between the two countries, and the most laboured ingenuity, not on the part of the Japanese, but of their paid and unpaid counsel, has never been able to formulate any ground for the war that would not equally have served Cetewayo in his prime. Russia was too gravely affected to miss the trua meaning of the movement. The threatened up

heaval was going to upset the balance of power in Asia, and bring dangers to the front which, in the natural course of events, might have slumbered for a generation. Russia was, as a matter of fact, much concerned to prevent the war, and took unusual pains to dissuade the Government of the Mikado from the invasion. A special communication from St Petersburg, communicated to the Japanese Foreign Minister in June, left no shadow of doubt as to the direction in which the vital interests of Russia were threat

ened, or as to the necessity which events might impose on her to defend those interests. At that juncture Russia softened towards England, holding out the hand of fellowship, and inviting cooperation in the maintenance of peace. It was the psychological moment sometimes dreamed of by political seers, but seldom recognised till it is past. England was dull of hearing and egregiously misinformed. Though she did in a perfunctory way make an attempt subsequently on her own account to bring about an accommodation, in which she had the moral support of Russia and of other Powers as well, it was doomed to failure through the inadequacy of her tools. What actually happened was, that while the British representative in daily conference with the Japanese Minister was expressing his confidence in the peaceful issue of their deliberations, a Japanese admiral was actually torpedoing in cold blood an English steamer conveying Chinese troops to Korea. The meek acceptance of this outrage by the British Government gave the coup de grâce to British influence in the Far East; and it is a debatable question whether the lost position can ever be regained.