SYSTEMATIC PRACTICE OF NAVAL MANOEUVRES. 351 if a sudden declaration of war had sent an enemy's force to oppose him, commanded by a Suffrein, the writer cannot but imitate the candour he has lauded, by expressing his opinion that the above qualities, which would have shone with such lustre in relation to a single ship, might not alone have availed their possessor to lead a squadron or fleet to victory. During the last war, frequent instances occurred of commanders being placed in the temporary command of ships of the line attached to fleets, and it is very probable that some of those officers had never before served in such ships. Pushing our surmises a reasonable degree farther, it might appear that some of them had never sailed in a fleet for a longer time than would suffice to exchange dispatches, and consequently, they could have no practical acquaintance with the duty of even a " gib and stay-sail jack. Now the writer readily concedes, that frigates, sloops of war, &c. form the best school for the attainment of the essentials of seamanship, knowledge of foreign seas, and other useful matter; but he nevertheless considers the education of a naval officer incomplete whilst it lacks the branch of which he is treating. A collateral support of this opinion may be found in a memorial that was addressed to the Admiralty, by three highly distinguished Captains, (two of whom are Flag-officers,) who considered themselves aggrieved by the selection of a junior officer as Captain of the Fleet, upon the last Copenhagen expedition. Quoting from memory, one of the grounds of complaint was, that the officer in question had " never commanded a ship in line of battle!" Notwithstanding he was pre-eminent for the depth and variety of his nautical knowledge, yet his presumed inexperience in that branch upon which the above objection was founded, may have given rise to doubts of his competency to aid the Commanderin-chief in certain contingencies. It would be useless to plead for the utility of the art, whether applied to purposes of attack or of defence, as this was most strikingly illustrated by Admiral Jervis, who, by a promptly-executed manœuvre, defeated a very superior force ; * The converse of the above statement was injurious both to the service and to individuals. There are lieutenants, who from want of interest, or from the mistaken judgment of their friends, served their whole midshipman's time in threedeckers, that were chiefly stationed off Brest or Toulon, and never visited any other foreign ports than Gibraltar or Mahon. The Queen, 98, was actually out of port for twenty-two months, and for most of that time she was off Cadiz, probably a unique fact in maritime records. In such ships, some of the mids, from the force of habit, ceased to desire more active employment, and all of them must have remained practically ignorant of certain duties incident to their profession. A greater number served all this important period in two-deckers, which are certainly a preferable class of ships to the others. It may be questioned, however, if a longer term than three years can be served in a ship of any particular class, and produce corresponding advantages in the formation of professional character: unless the elève should have the good fortune to be placed with one of those ornaments of the profession, who combines the principles and manners of a gentleman, with the best qualities of an officer; let him abide in such tutelage as long as possible, for the happy union here described, although less rare than formerly, is not and never will be very common. In general, therefore, a change of both ships and captains, and between several classes of the former, appears most desirable. The peace custom of keeping ships in commission for the term of three years only, commonly effects this change; but a long war may lead to a recurrence of the evil deprecated, unless it should be officially prevented. + See the Naval Chronicle of 1807 or 1808, for this memórial. and by Admiral Cornwallis, who by an equally judicious disposition of his squadron of seven sail, foiled thirty sail of the enemy, and secured a place for his name in naval annals, which the gratitude of his country did little to emblazon: for no sea officer of this age, backed by such various, distinguished, and long services, ever received such a shallow meed of reward, and from a people too, whose liberality to their public servants is munificent. The assumed neglect which forms the subject of these observations, may be referred to the circumstance of the method of close quarters having been so successfully acted upon in the two last wars, and if they could always be resorted to at the will of either of the hostile parties, there would be little need of manœuvring; but as such meetings must principally depend upon a reciprocity of desire and of interest, which seldom exists, it becomes advisable to cultivate the means that will give the option of leading to such an end when wished for. A cursory review of naval history seems to lead to a conclusion, that the modes of sea-fighting move in a kind of cycle: in the sea-fights of the 16th and 17th centuries, there was some very close work between ourselves and the Dutch: in some of the subsequent wars, distant cannonading had its day: still more recently, and in our own time, close quarters have been revived; and it is not difficult to imagine circumstances which may render the contrary practice the manifest policy of a fleet, and in such a case, to adopt it with effect, the commanders should be able to manoeuvre skilfully. Suppose two fleets of considerable numerical inequality to meet, and that the inferior are greatly excelled in gunnery, this fleet would do well to engage its opponent distantly, for its success would thus be rendered more certain, and its loss in reaping it would be less than in the contrary case. On the other hand, it would be most advantageous to the other fleet to close, in order to make up for its deficient gunnery, as its chances of success would vary inversely with the distance at which it might engage: that is to say, at the nearest possible distance they would be greater than at any other. The former part of this theory has been practically controverted by Nelson and by others, nevertheless it seems accordant with reason, and among recent events derives support from the tactics practised by the enemy in the single actions of the American war. However, it may be observed, that there is not a strict analogy between the engagements of fleets, and those of single ships; because in the latter, the ship that is equal in force and sailing, and superior in gunnery to her adversary, will most likely subdue her: whereas, in the former case, it may be in the power of a very inferior fleet, possessing the latter advantage, in the contingencies of a shift of wind, or of a partial breeze, so to regulate its motions, as to attack a part of its disabled opponent's forces, with a decided advantage. An opinion unfavourable to manoeuvring is partially entertained, arising from the decisive results that attended Ñelson's battles; but in order to dispel this error, it is only necessary to consider the circumstances in which he found his adversaries,-these enabled him to dispense with the ample and matured resources_connected with this subject, with which it is well known his mind was stored in two instances the enemy were at anchor, and in the last and "crowning act" of his glorious career, confiding in their superior numbers, they showed no wish to retreat. The naval events of the two : last wars, therefore, do not depreciate the art, but those of previous ones afford abundant testimony, that an enemy who was skilful in manoeuvring, has often postponed the commencement of, or avoided a battle altogether. Reverting to the present period, it is hoped that the circumstance of the comparatively large peace establishment of ships of the line recently stationed in the Mediterranean, has afforded opportunities in reference to this matter, that have not passed unheeded: and in justification of the individuals who are alluded to in the former part of this paper, it may be urged, that from whatever cause, and to whatever extent the alleged ignorance may prevail, it is really less imputable to them as a fault, than to the absence of an initiatory system of instruction in periodical operation, and easily available to the wants of the service. The recent revival of the Rodney and Clerk controversy, having excited an unusual interest, renders the present an appropriate juncture for originating such a system. Through this medium, the principles and miniature practice of naval manoeuvres might be imparted methodically to young officers, whose minds would thus become so deeply imbued with this kind of knowledge, as to place its (at least) partial retention in the memory beyond the oblivion to which half pay condemns so much useful professional acquirement. That some of the active-minded officers, whom the peace has placed in this vegetating position, would readily embrace the proposed means of instruction, may be inferred from the facts, that the prescribed number of pupils in the Senior Department of the Naval College continues complete; and also from similar alacrity having been shown with respect to the gunnery instruction on board the Excellent. It is suggested therefore, that at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, naval manoeuvres should be taught at appointed periods of the year, by officers selected for their competency, and attached to the respective flag-ships at those ports. For this purpose, not fewer than twenty of the finest boats of the ships in port should be assembled under the above superintendance, and should proceed to practise the evolutions that are necessary for the guidance of and preservation of order in fleets, these are few and simple. The French, who were the first people in modern history that reduced this art into a connected form, have swelled their books with a variety of manœuvres, some of which are more ingenious than useful, except as mental exercises, which tend to create a quick conception of resource in situations of difficulty. Every officer, of whatever rank, who had charge of a boat, should in his turn lead a line and direct the proceedings. As combined movements of this nature are simplified in their execution by uniformity of size, and of rate of motion in their elementary parts, it might be advantageous to employ the boats of the Ordinary for this purpose: as they are of the same size and rig, there is probably a greater equality in their sailing than in that of the boats of commissioned ships, and besides they work quicker and with greater certainty than the latter, which are various in both these particulars: being, however, for the most part lug-rigged, and consequently in tacking, unless their sails are dipped very smartly, they are more likely than any others to miss stays, and to gather sternway, an accident that in the exercises might create confusion, it would be a more advantageous employment for these boats, to appro U. S. JOURN. No. 32. JULY 1831. 2 A priate them for this use, solely to the half-pay officers, who should be directed to repair on board the depôt ship to take charge of them. Officers who reside at the above ports, and keep sailing-boats, should be invited to join the exercises in them. Upon foreign stations the same end may be attained whenever a sufficient number of ships meet in port, and their other duties will permit. The expense of executing this project would be limited to the supply of a few copies of printed manoeuvring instructions, diagrams, and signals: and some sets of boats, flags, and pendants, besides a little more wear and tear of the boats. The harbours above mentioned, and the anchorages in their immediate vicinities, include such a variety of hydrographical features, as would enable the little fleets not only to practise every description of manœuvre, but also to repeat and elucidate all those that are celebrated in naval history. An interesting employment would thus be supplied for the young officers of guardships and others, that would usefully occupy some portion of the time that is now too often wasted, and a foundation might be thus laid for future individual distinction, resulting from the performance of eminent national services. Since the foregoing observations were written, the guard-ships have been assembled, and report states, for the purpose of sailing upon a cruise of evolution: if this should prove correct, the measure seems to recognise the policy of giving the peace-formed officers some practice in that part of their duty; and the writer would finally remark, with a feeling of sincere respect for the officers who command the ships of the squadron, that the cruise may not prove valueless to them either, for a naval historian of Lord Howe's battle states, that "some of the captains, from having been long unemployed, showed an ignorance of manoeuvring." PROTEUS. THE EFFECTS OF INEXPERIENCE IN NAVAL AFFAIRS ON THE PART OF THE ARMY-WITH A REMEDY. TO THE KING. SIRE,-As an officer of long standing in your Majesty's service, and having observed frequently in my humble services during the late war, where I felt, and witnessed in others, the awkwardness of a total ignorance of naval affairs, with its consequent inconvenience and ill effects upon the army generally, I am induced to call the circumstance to your Majesty's notice, and at the same time most humbly to point out a remedy. Here I beg leave to remark, that in giving army officers a knowledge of naval affairs, I do not mean that they should in any respect infringe upon, or usurp the naval officers' profession, which should, and must be, held whole and entire. I should qualify the expression "ignorance of naval affairs," and rather term it" a want of knowing how to act promptly with the navy." My object will better appear when I remind your Majesty of the helpless state of our battalions during and after a disembarkation, and the danger of such a state of things in the vicinity of an enemy; all owing to the want of practical experience in the officers, not one of whom, perhaps, in fifty, ever served with a floating armament; even field officers, commanding regiments, not knowing how to place their own persons in a boat. This deficiency must be familiar to those who served on coast operations in America, more particularly at New Orleans, and in Holland, &c. &c. &c. I need not take any further pains to establish the truth of my position; the thing is notorious, and is acknowledged by all my military acquaintance. When it is recollected that our military operations are almost always combined, is it not evident that the army officers, or a portion of them, should be so far acquainted with the sea and the ship, as to be enabled to attend to their men, to the interior economy, and the several important duties connected with the arrangement of their battalions, instead of being, as has been seen too frequently, solely occupied with their own persons and baggage, all owing to the helplessness we feel when embarked on a new element? To obviate this dangerous inconvenience is the object by which I am induced to offer these remarks, and for which purpose I beg leave most humbly to state to your Majesty, that having lately visited Chatham, I there witnessed the combined duties of the troops of the line with those of the marines: there they take the duties of the garrison, and act together in brigade; and there it at once occurred to me how easy it would be to invest the one branch of your Majesty's service with the practical experience of the other, and that all this may be done without working any great change in long established systems, or of causing the least occasion of jealousy in the minds of the most tenacious for the honour of their several departments or branches of service, and without any other alterations than that of allowing an interchange of commissions between the army and marine officers, as at present exists between the officers of one regiment of the line and those of another. It is clear that this may be effected without any other change whatever in the systems at the Admiralty or Horse Guards. It requires no change of private men, no change of discipline, no giving up or change of authority in either department; and as to the patronage usual in the disposal or interchange of commissions, a satisfactory arrangement may be made without difficulty, to prevent any inconvenience on that head. It may not be necessary or practicable that all officers should serve at sea, but when the field officer is called upon to consult with the naval commander, a twelve-month's previous service at sea would in many cases enlighten and render him more capable of giving his opinion. Did the present severe duties of the army permit, how desirable would it be that a portion of intelligent men were serving in your Majesty's ships, visiting other countries, and practising on a small scale measures so necessary to be acquainted with in time of war and armaments; such officers returning to the army, either by exchange or promotion, would carry to their messes a fund of useful information, which is at present confined to a branch of the service, whose members have no inducement or opportunity of imparting it. Sire, much, very much more might be urged in favour of this measure, and I firmly believe if |